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Abstract 
 
 
“[I]n all of our operations involving the use of force, including those in the armed 
conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, the Obama Administration 
is committed by word and deed to conducting ourselves in accordance with all 
applicable law…[I]t is the considered view of this Administration…that US targeting 
practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war.” 
- Harold Koh, US State Department Legal Adviser.
1
 
 
“My concern is that these drones, these Predators, are being operated in a framework 
which may well violate international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law.” 
- Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or 
Arbitrary Executions.
2
 
 
The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly referred to as “drones”, in 
lethal targeting operations, is one of the most topical and controversial issues in 
international law.
3
 The writer’s interest in this area, the relationship between 
technological developments in warfare and settled principles of international law, 
developed from his attendance at a lecture given by Professor Harold Koh at Queen’s 
University in Belfast back in May 2013. Professor Koh’s now seminal speech to the 
American Society of International Law in 2010, while serving as Legal Adviser to the 
US Department of State, set out the US Government’s position on the legality of 
drone strikes under international law.   
In recent years, the United States has increasingly utilised drone technology to target 
and kill enemy operatives in its counter-terrorism operations – against Al-Qaeda and 
                                                 
1
 Harold Koh, former Legal Adviser, US Department of State, Keynote Address at the American 
Society of International Law Annual Meeting: The Obama Administration and International Law, 
25/03/10, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.html, hereinafter referred to as 
Koh, ASIL Speech. 
2
 US Warned on Deadly Drone Attacks, BBC News, 28/10/09, available at 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8329412.stm.  
3
 The terms ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicle’, ‘UAV’ and ‘armed drone’ are used interchangeably in this 
work. 
 2 
Taliban forces in Afghanistan and North West Pakistan, and against militants 
affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Somalia and Yemen. UAVs have taken on an ever more 
prominent role in the US’s current military and counter-terrorism operations, given 
their relative low cost, greater accuracy and precision, reduced blast radius, advanced 
surveillance capabilities, and greater flight time than conventional manned aircraft. 
The recent proliferation of armed UAV technology, and its deployment in situations 
of asymmetrical conflict for the purpose of conducting targeted killing operations, has 
fuelled a public and academic debate, centrally focused on issues regarding the 
compatibility of such technology and current targeting practices with established 
norms of international law. The term “targeted killing” does not yet have an agreed 
definition under international law, although Murphy and Radsen have formulated the 
following useful definition: 
                      
                     extra-judicial, premeditated killing by a state of a specifically 
                     identified person not in its custody.
4
 
 
Targeted killings by means of unmanned drone strikes have proven to be a successful 
counter-terrorism strategy, not only in terms of locating, targeting and eliminating 
enemy operatives, but also, and perhaps more importantly, given public discontent at 
long-standing military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, in avoiding many of the 
challenges that flow from the use of traditional military forces, such as public hostility 
to the deployment of traditional ground forces, the detention of enemy forces, as well 
as security threats to military personnel from insurgent attacks. 
In the context of the US drone program, three discrete areas of international law are of 
particular relevance: 
1. the jus ad bellum, which sets out the narrow circumstances in which a state 
can lawfully resort to the use of armed force; 
2. international human rights law, the corpus of which is of universal application, 
particularly in situations of armed violence falling below the threshold of an 
armed conflict; 
                                                 
4
 A.J. Radsen and R.W. Murphy, ‘Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists’, [2009] at 405, 
available at 
http://repository.law.ttu.edu/bitstream/handle/10601/1325/DueProcessandTargetedKilling31CardozoL
R405.pdf?sequence=1.  
 3 
3. the jus in bello, international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of 
hostilities in situations of armed conflict. 
 
What follows in this work is an analysis of the legality of US drone strikes in key 
target states through the prism of each of the three aforementioned paradigms. 
What shall become clear is that, while the use of armed drones per se may not 
violate international law as an unlawful means and method of warfare, the broad 
interpretation of the jus ad bellum favoured by the United States in the years since 
the 9/11 attacks, in particular those rules relating to the resort to force by a victim 
state in self-defence in response to an armed attack, as well as current US 
targeting practices, in particular the controversial use of Signature Drone Strike 
Protocol (SDSP), have been the subject of rigorous academic debate, and for the 
most part have proven difficult to reconcile with established principles of 
international law. This debate remains far from settled, and in consequence the 
entire US drone program, shrouded in a veil of secrecy, remains of dubious 
legality, particularly when examined through the prisms of international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law. 
 
 4 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11…this is a just war- a war 
waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defence.” 
 
- Barack Obama, 23
rd
 May 2013, Speech at the National Defence University, 
Washington D.C.
1
 
 
The face of warfare changes with the evolution of technology. Regrettably, the legal 
frameworks regulating the resort to the use of force and the conduct of hostilities, the 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello, usually fail to keep pace with developments in 
technology. Therefore, the appearance of UAV technology hardly presents a new 
challenge in the history of warfare. That is not to say, however, that the use of armed 
UAVs in lethal targeting operations in contemporary conflicts does not present 
complex issues of law that need to be addressed with some degree of finality. It is not 
surprising, then, that the United Nations has made repeated calls for the United States 
to set out the legal justifications for its drone programs.2 The program itself has 
proven so controversial because, although it is an ‘open secret’, its existence has 
neither firmly been acknowledged nor squarely denied. Precise information related to 
the program is scarce, and what is in the public domain is largely based on rumour, 
leaks and informal statements. The US drone program has become as much a symbol 
of President Obama’s counter-terrorism strategy as Guantanamo Bay was of his 
predecessor’s. Nevertheless, we do know of the existence of three subprograms: the 
first undertaken by the US military; the second undertaken by Joint Special 
Operations Command; the third, most controversially, undertaken by the CIA. The 
targeting operations carried out by the CIA have been the subject of much academic 
literature, much of which focuses on the status of civilian CIA operators as unlawful 
                                                 
1 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-presidential-national-
defense-university, (accessed 19th November 2014). 
2 See ‘US Warned on Deadly Drone Attacks’, BBC News, 28th October 2009, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8329412.stm, (accessed 19th November 2014). More recently, Ben 
Emmerson QC, UN Special Rapporteur, in his March 2014 report to the UN Human Rights Council, 
invited the US in particular to make representations in respect of the various legal issues identified 
therein regarding the use of armed drones in current operations. See Report of Ben Emmerson QC, 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
While Countering Terrorism, presented to the UN Human Rights Council, 11th March 2014, Ref: 
A/HRC/25/29.  
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combatants engaging in strikes that violate settled norms of international law. It is not 
proposed to discuss this topic further in this work, save to say that the Obama 
Administration has given assurances that it is taking measures to relieve the CIA of its 
role in lethal drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, no doubt in response to 
concerns as to the legality of such a role. Despite Secretary of State John Kerry’s 
assurances that these measures would be in place by the end of 2014, it would appear 
that the CIA’s involvement has continued into 2015. This has led to criticism and 
discontent in Congress, with high-profile members such as Senator John McCain, 
calling for an immediate end to CIA involvement, particularly in the wake of a 
disastrous strike undertaken by the CIA on an Al-Qaeda compound in Pakistan in 
January 2015, which resulted in the death of two hostages, one of whom was a US 
citizen.3 
 
Notably, there is a paucity of substantive law regulating aerial warfare, and none 
specific to targeting operations conducted by UAVs, and so the law that regulates the 
use of armed UAVs is the existing legal framework regulating air and missile warfare. 
Following the end of the First World War in November 1918, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recognised the need to settle the law relating to 
aerial warfare, and thus established a Commission of Jurists consisting of experts 
from the US, UK, France, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands. The Commission 
formulated the Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare 1923. Regrettably, these rules were not 
formalised by means of treaty, which is unfortunate as it clouds in uncertainty the 
legal force of the rules. Nevertheless, the rules are an instructive expression of 
established legal norms and a credible attempt to codify the law relating to aerial 
warfare, and this writer would certainly be persuaded by any argument that the rules 
constitute customary international law. 
With the emergence of UAV technology in the first decade of this century, there came 
an evident need to bring greater certainty to the law, and so in 2009 the Program on 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University published the 
Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare.4 The AMW 
                                                 
3 See David Lerman, ‘McCain Renews Push to End CIA Control of Drone Strikes’, Bloomberg News, 
26th April 2015, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-26/mccain-renews-
push-to-end-CIA-control-of-drone-strikes, (accessed 1st May 2015). 
4 HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, available at 
http://www.ihlresearch.org/amw/HPCR%20Manual.pdf. Hereinafter referred to as the ‘AMW Manual’. 
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Manual consists of 175 rules, reflecting treaty provisions and customary international 
law relevant to aerial warfare, and is certainly a persuasive, albeit inconclusive, 
statement of the law. The panel of experts that drafted the AMW Manual recognised 
the emerging technology and therefore the rules address the laws applicable to UAVs. 
However, the main legal issues surrounding the use of UAVs in lethal targeting 
operations fall outside the scope of the AMW Manual.5 Interestingly, the AMW 
Manual seems to equate armed drones with manned aircraft for the purposes of lethal 
targeting operations, requiring the same level of precautions to be taken before an 
attack is initiated.6 Further, it also states that civilians controlling and operating armed 
UAVs are directly participating in hostilities.7 This equivalence in the legal positions 
of manned and unmanned aircraft has been broadly accepted by commentators, in 
particular O’Connell, Glazier and Lewis.8 Lewis takes the view, echoing the 
submissions of Vogel, that despite the technological sophistications of UAVs, from a 
legal perspective there is nothing unique about their use as a weapons platform that 
requires the formulation of a new legal framework to regulate their use in situations of 
armed violence.9 A missile fired from an armed drone is no different to a missile fired 
from a manned aircraft. Therefore, the use of armed drones is governed by the jus ad 
bellum, international human rights law, and, where the intensity and organisation of 
violence meets the threshold of armed conflict, is governed, as with any other attack, 
by international humanitarian law. It seems, therefore, that few problems are posed in 
consequence of this legal equivalence, with commentators such as Alston and 
O’Connell seemingly more concerned with the issue of how and where armed drones 
may be legally employed.10 
                                                 
5 Ibid, r.1 (dd)-(ee), 6 (2009). 
6 Ibid, r.39. 
7 Ibid, r.29 (vi). 
8 See Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting, House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, (Congressional Research Service, Nimble Books LLC, 28th April 2010) (hereinafter referred to 
as Drones II): prepared statement of David Glazier, warning that, “CIA personnel are civilians, not 
combatants, and do not enjoy the legal right to participate in hostilities” (at 20); prepared statement of 
Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, arguing that unmanned drones are “battlefield weapons”, and as such 
should not be used outside of “combat zones” (at 44-46); prepared statement of Michael W. Lewis, 
opining that “[I]n circumstances where a strike by a helicopter or an F-16 would be legal, the use of a 
drone would be equally legitimate.” 
9 Ibid. See also Ryan Vogel, ‘Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict’, (2010-2011) 39 Denv. J. 
Int’l L & Pol’y 101. 
10 See for example Al-Aulaqi –v- Obama 727 F.Supp 2d 1,9 (D.D.C. 2010), describing the Plaintiff’s 
contention that because Anwar Al-Aulaqi was located in Yemen, he was, “outside the context of armed 
conflict”. See also O’Connell, ‘Combatants and the Combat Zone’, 43 U. Rich. Rev. 845, 860-864 
(2009), describing a geographically limited zone of conflict in which the corpus of international 
 7 
It is not proposed to give over a large portion of this work to a technical exposition of 
the various models of UAVs currently deployed in the US’s counter-terrorism 
operations across the globe, and the writer would refer the reader to P.W. Singer’s 
Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21
st
 Century.11 For the 
purposes of this work, what is clear is that UAVs have taken a central position in 
current targeting operations. Vogel notes that UAV technology languished for years in 
Research and Development and virtual obscurity,12 before becoming, in the words of 
Leon Panetta, the former Director of the CIA, “the only game in town” in the fight 
against Al-Qaeda.13 Even in the early years of the conflict in Afghanistan and the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, the US military rarely utilised UAV technology. In 2001, the 
US possessed only 10 ‘Predator’ drone aircraft, which at that time were used mostly 
in reconnaissance missions. By 2007, the fleet numbered more than 180 aircraft. As 
this work is concerned with the use of armed drones for lethal targeting operations, 
there are two models of drone aircraft of particular relevance. The first model is the 
‘Predator’, the most widely recognised drone aircraft. At approximately 27ft in length, 
it has a flight time of 24 hours, at a maximum altitude of 26,000ft. The ‘Global Hawk’ 
is the larger model, at approximately 40ft in length. It has a flight time of 35 hours, at 
a maximum altitude of 65,000ft. Both aircraft are armed with laser-guided Hellfire 
missiles, capable of precision targeting, and are capable of high-altitude surveillance. 
The tactical advantages of drones are therefore obvious, and the US has placed 
increasing reliance on them in order to reach high-value targets in remote territory and 
to support combat and counter-terrorism operations. Compared to the deployment of 
conventional military forces, the use of armed drones presents additional advantages 
to those already enunciated. Obviously, there is the minimisation of risk to military 
                                                                                                                                            
humanitarian law applies. See also Drones II, supra n.8, testimony of O’Connell, arguing that 
international humanitarian law does not apply to drone strikes carried out in Pakistan, as Afghanistan is 
the only legitimate zone of active hostilities. See also letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of 
Human Rights Watch, to President Obama, dated 7th September 2010, urging the rejection of the notion 
of the “global battlefield”, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/12/07/letter-obama-targeted-
killings. See also Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, para.86, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (28th May 
2010), stating that there “are very few situations” when the legal standards for use of UAVs could be 
met when a state deployed them “[o]utside its own territory (or in territory over which it lacked 
control) and where the situation on the ground did not rise to the level of armed conflict”.  
11 See P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, (Penguin, 
2009).  
12 See Vogel, supra n.9, at 104. 
13 ‘US Air Strikes in Pakistan Called “Very Effective”’, CNN News, 18th May 2009, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/Politics/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/, (accessed 28th November 2014). 
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personnel as targeting operations can be conducted at a distance from the target. This 
“risk-less warfare” is a fundamentally novel form of conflict, which has disrupted the 
mutuality of warfare, from which the law of armed conflict proceeded. Drones are 
significantly less expensive than conventional military hardware such as ground 
forces and manned aircraft. Further, the ability to track the movement of targets over a 
period of time, together with precision targeting capabilities, minimises the risk to 
civilians and civilian objects. Lastly, the use of drones avoids the difficulties and 
controversies associated with the deployment of military personnel, such as the 
detention of belligerents and the threat of insurgency. As much as the driving force 
behind the deployment of UAVs was to minimise the risk to human life in gathering 
intelligence and targeting operations, the proliferation of UAVs has as much to do 
with the relatively low cost of UAV aircraft compared to that of manned aircraft at a 
time when national defence budgets are under considerable pressure. For example, a 
single F-22 ‘Raptor’ aircraft costs approximately $170 million, whereas a ‘Predator’ 
drone costs approximately $6 million. Compared to manned aircraft, UAVs are an 
ideal surveillance and striking weapon, particularly in counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency operations, where targets are usually individuals. Although criticism of 
drone targeting practices has been directed at the perceived indiscriminate nature of 
those practices, which has resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties, according to 
Lewis, the reality of UAV strikes is that they provide greater opportunity for 
disproportionate attacks to be halted prior to weapons deployment, and allow for a 
much higher degree of confidence that a target has been properly identified, thereby 
meeting the requirements of the principles of distinction and military necessity.14 
Furthermore, a UAV’s on-board sensors allow key personnel to make a determination 
on the proportionality of an attack before any weapon is fired. Although Vogel has 
likened the sanitary environment of the drone control room as reducing war almost to 
the playing of a video game, he submits that this leads, for the most part, to sounder 
determinations on the issue of proportionality.15  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this work shall consider the jus ad bellum issues relevant to the 
US drone programs operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and against 
                                                 
14 Michael W. Lewis, ‘Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield’, (2011-2012) 47 Tex. Int’l L. J. 
293, at 299. 
15 See Vogel, supra n.9, at 106. 
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the self-styled ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq and Syria. Chapter 2 will set out the general 
framework of the jus ad bellum. This corpus of law has been the subject of much 
academic debate since the 9/11 attacks and the commencement of the US ‘war on 
terror’, and there are complex and competing arguments as to the proper boundaries 
regulating a victim state’s resort to the use of force, particularly with respect to a 
state’s right to resort to the use of force in self-defence against an armed group 
operating transnationally. Chapter 2 shall examine this debate and set out the 
contemporary framework of the jus ad bellum. Chapter 3 shall examine the legality 
under the jus ad bellum rules of the US’s resort to the use of force in each of the key 
target states. 
 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter sets forth the prohibition of the use of force. The jus ad 
bellum forms that body of exceptions to this prohibition, setting out the limited 
circumstances when a state’s resort to force would be lawful in international law. The 
primary exception relied upon by both the Bush and Obama Administrations in a 
vigorous defence of the use of drones in lethal targeting operations is that of self-
defence. Both Administrations have argued that the US is engaged in a just war of 
self-defence against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, and that drone 
strikes form a legal (that is, a necessary and proportionate) and continued response to 
the armed attack perpetrated on 11th September 2001 and to the current threat posed to 
the US by these groups. Therefore, this work shall consider whether current US 
targeting practices are compliant with the right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 
of the UN Charter. Only if such is the case will the initial resort to force be lawful. At 
the outset one can spot an immediate obstacle in attempting to justify the use of lethal 
force in self-defence as a continued response to an attack that occurred nearly 
fourteen years ago, that is the appearance of remoteness. With the passage of time, it 
becomes more difficult to justify defensive force. Having regard to the fundamental 
challenges that large-scale acts of terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qaeda and affiliated 
groups have posed to the traditional orientation of the jus ad bellum as between states, 
particularly since the 9/11 attacks, this work shall consider the issue of whether the 
US can use drone strikes in lawful self-defence against a non-state actor (such as Al-
Qaeda) which is acting independently of any state. Further, it must be considered 
whether the US’s inherent right to self-defence is confined to situations in which an 
armed attack has already occurred, or whether there exists a right to act in anticipatory 
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self-defence against a non-state actor on the territory of another state, where there is 
judged to be an imminent threat of attack, and whether there even exists in 
international law a broader right to resort to the use of force in pre-emptive self-
defence. It therefore bears consideration whether the continued threat posed by 
militant groups, particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East, justifies 
the use of armed drones in pre-emptive strikes against those suspected of planning 
attacks against US interests. Related to this issue are the settled principles of 
international law on state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which particularly come 
to the fore in those instances when the US conducts drone strikes over the territory of 
states in which there exists no situation of violence amounting to armed conflict. Such 
strikes clearly involve prima facie violations of those states’ sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Of particular relevance here are the strikes conducted in the tribal 
areas of Pakistan. There have been numerous reports of US violations of Pakistan’s 
sovereignty in apparent self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Scholarly 
debate and disagreement on the legality of the US drone program is grounded in the 
differing interpretations of the scope of Article 51, a debate which has yet to be settled 
with any degree of finality. There exists jurisprudence of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) holding that states cannot invoke Article 51 against non-state actors, 
because attacks carried out by non-state actors cannot be attributed to a recognised 
state as defined in that Article. Armed attacks must be by or on behalf of a state, a 
position based on the two guiding principles of necessity and proportionality. Indeed, 
in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo –
v- Uganda),16 the ICJ rejected past proposals to extend the scope of Article 51 to 
permit states to resort to the use of force in pre-emptive self-defence against non-state 
actors. However, the US position has found some judicial support. Judge Rosalyn 
Higgins, for example, has stated that Article 51 is unambiguous in its meaning: 
 
There is, with respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus stipulates that self-
defence is only available when an armed attack is [perpetrated] by a state.
17
 
 
                                                 
16 [2005] ICJ 168. 
17 Ibid, at 174. 
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This may mark the beginnings of a shift in judicial thinking on the scope of Article 
51, questioning and possibly ultimately rejecting a state actor requirement, due in part 
to the evolution of weaponry and the realities of contemporary conflict.  
It is therefore imperative that an international consensus is reached on the following 
outstanding issues, which Emmerson usefully sets out in his final report: 
i. Does a state’s inherent right to national self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 
of the UN Charter entitle a state to engage in lethal targeting operations on the 
territory of another state against a non-state armed group, should that group 
pose a direct and immediate threat of attack, even when that group has no 
operational connection to the host state? If so, under what circumstances does 
such a right exist? Does such a right exist even when the host state refuses 
consent to the targeting operations? What if the host state is judged to be 
unable or unwilling to deal with the threat posed by the armed group? What 
are the criteria for establishing “unwillingness” and “inability”? 
ii. Is a state’s inherent right to self-defence confined to situations in which an 
armed attack has already occurred, or is a state entitled to carry out strikes in 
pre-emptive self-defence against a non-state armed group on the territory of 
another state, without the consent of the host state, where it judges there to be 
a risk of imminent attack? How is “imminence” to be defined?18 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this work shall offer a critical analysis of the legality of US drone 
strikes in key target states through the lenses of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law (in those instances where the latter lex specialis is 
applicable). The inter-relationship between international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law shall be examined through the prism of US drone 
strikes in these states. Chapter 4 shall consider whether US targeted killing operations 
by means of armed drone strikes against suspected terrorists, are compliant with the 
corpus of international human rights law. The international human rights law 
paradigm is of universal application to all situations of armed violence, whether or not 
there exists a situation of armed conflict. It is primarily for this reason that the writer 
proposes to first consider the lex generalis of international human rights law. As 
                                                 
18 See Report of Ben Emmerson QC, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, presented to the UN Human Rights 
Council, 11th March 2014, Ref: A/HRC/25/29, at 70. 
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Alston submits, armed conflict is the exceptional rather than the norm, and only in 
exceptional circumstances will a situation of armed violence rise to the level of an 
armed conflict, engaging the lex specialis of international humanitarian law.19 In most 
situations of armed violence, therefore, no armed conflict exists to which the lex 
specialis applies, and so the conduct of hostilities falls to be regulated solely by 
international human rights law. The standards of international human rights law, set 
forth in both numerous agreements between states and in the corpus of customary 
international law, have as their primary objective the protection of human life and 
dignity. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 form the basis of human rights protection 
within international law. Central to this legal paradigm is the prohibition against 
arbitrary deprivation of life by a state. With regard to lethal drone strikes, therefore, 
such acts can only be lawful if they are necessary, proportionate to the threat posed, 
and undertaken in order to protect human life. Targeted killings deemed to be 
intentional and with the sole objective of execution can never be permissible.20 This 
then leaves the issue of whether international human rights law is violated by US 
targeting practices, the sole purpose of which is the elimination of suspected terrorists. 
The US has consistently argued that international human rights law is not of 
extraterritorial application, in the face of jurisprudence and state practice to the 
contrary, even in situations of non-international armed conflict. The UN Human 
Rights Council clearly set out the extraterritorial scope of international human rights 
law prior to the US ratification of the ICCPR in 1992, and at the time of ratification 
the US entered no reservations specifically denying such extraterritorial application. 
The international human rights law paradigm has an intolerance for collateral damage, 
that is, the deaths of non-combatants, and it shall be evidenced that there are 
legitimate concerns that US drone strikes fail to satisfy the principles of necessity and 
proportionality, and thus appear to violate fundamental norms of human rights law 
that insist that individuals cannot be arbitrarily deprived of life, so raising concerns as 
to the legality of such strikes under international human rights law. 
As UAVs become a permanent fixture in modern warfare, their use has come under 
increased scrutiny from international lawyers, with vocal critics challenging on a 
number of grounds the legality of using UAVs to target and kill enemy belligerents in 
                                                 
19 See Alston Report, supra n.10, at para.9. 
20 See Ibid, at para.32. 
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the purported transnational conflict in which the US is presently engaged. There 
clearly exists a diversity of juristic and academic opinion on this particular issue, and 
this is borne out in the existing literature. Whilst some commentators, such as Koh, 
take the view that current targeting practices do not violate international human rights 
law and international humanitarian law, other commentators, such as Professor Mary 
Ellen O’Connell and Professor Philip Alston, take the opposite view, challenging on 
several grounds the legality of current targeting practices. O’Connell, in particular, 
argues that current targeting practices outside zones of active hostilities (the only 
legitimate zone of active hostilities, in her opinion, being Afghanistan) operate in 
violation of established norms of the corpus of international human rights law, 
amounting to arbitrary, extra-judicial killings that are wholly disproportionate to any 
legitimate right of the US to act in self-defence.  
Chapter 5 of this work shall consider the extent of the applicability of international 
humanitarian law to US drone strikes in key target states, and whether US targeting 
practices violate the settled principles of the jus in bello. Only when a situation of 
armed violence meets the legal threshold of an armed conflict will the lex specialis of 
international humanitarian law apply alongside international human rights law. 
International humanitarian law will only be engaged if the tests of intensity and 
organisation, set down in Tadic, are satisfied.21 While the US has applied a standard 
of “unable or unwilling” in the context of lethal drone strikes conducted in self-
defence, it has also claimed to be in a situation of almost continual armed conflict 
with Al-Qaeda and its affiliated forces, therefore taking a legal position that, in 
accordance with international law, and the Authorisation for the Use of Military Force 
2001, it has the authority to undertake such strikes without any requirement to 
undertake any pre or post-facto analysis of whether each targeted strike constitutes 
lawful self-defence. In fusing the right to resort to force in self-defence with 
international humanitarian law governing the conduct of hostilities, the US seems to 
have misconstrued the relationship between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. If 
one concedes that the US is in a state of armed conflict with Al-Qaeda and affiliated 
groups, then drone strikes conducted in zones of active hostilities must be examined 
through the prism of international humanitarian law. First, it must be considered 
whether the conflict is of an international or non-international character. The 
                                                 
21 Prosecutor –v- Dusko Tadic, ICTY, Case IT-94-1-A. 
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judgement of the US Supreme Court in Hamdan –v- Rumsfeld points to the latter 
characterisation, although the Court’s judgement is rather ambiguous, based more on 
the absence of a conflict as between two state parties than on the reality of a conflict 
between a state and a transnational terrorist network.22 If a situation of non-
international armed conflict exists, what then are the temporal and geographical limits 
of the battlefield? If lethal targeting operations are, as the US asserts, a continued 
response to the attacks perpetrated on 11th September 2001, there may indeed be merit 
in O’Connell’s submissions that Afghanistan is the only legitimate zone of active 
hostilities and the application of international humanitarian law is limited thereto, 
with the framework of international human rights law applying to strikes beyond its 
borders. Irrespective of any claim by the US that it is engaged in a new form of 
‘transnational’ conflict, where it is entitled to target the enemy where it is found, it 
must be considered whether the extraterritorial nature of US drone strikes, particularly 
outside zones of active hostilities, meet the intensity threshold to engage international 
humanitarian law, and if not, whether the body of international human rights law 
provides an adequate regulatory framework.  
 
Although technically two discrete areas of law operating in parallel, the US drone 
program has brought to the fore questions of the interconnection and interoperation of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. It is far from 
simple to argue anything other than the US drone program being of questionable 
legality. Even if one accepts the existence of an armed conflict extending beyond 
Afghanistan, and the application of the jus in bello to strikes occurring outside 
Afghanistan, and the broad compliance with the jus ad bellum notwithstanding, this 
work will highlight the challenges and failures to ensure that such strikes comply with 
the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, as well as falling far 
below the standards set by international human rights law so as to amount, in some 
instances, to arbitrary killing. 
 
Koh, in his ASIL speech in 2010, set out the official legal position of the Obama 
Administration, mirroring that taken in the Guantanamo Bay habeas corpus litigation, 
that the US considers itself to be engaged in “several armed conflicts” – one in 
                                                 
22 [2006] 548 US 557. 
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Afghanistan and the other against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and affiliated forces both “in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere”, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and may use force 
consistent with its right to self-defence under international law, with no need for a 
separate legal justification under the jus ad bellum for those military operations 
related to the conflict.23 Koh’s speech can certainly be viewed as an attempt by the 
Obama Administration to banish the “global war on terror” rhetoric of its immediate 
predecessor. However, it is more than a simple shift in rhetoric. The US never 
intended to fight any form of terrorism anywhere in the world, and so we have Koh’s 
expression of the Obama Administration’s position as being engaged in a global war 
against specific terrorists – Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and affiliated forces, including 
those who offer substantial support. Similarly, John O. Brennan, the current Director 
of the CIA, in a speech on 16th September 2011, whilst serving as US Homeland 
Security Advisor, submitted that, due to the presence of a situation of armed conflict, 
the US takes the legal position that, in accordance with international law, it has the 
authority required to strike against targets without any requirement for a separate self-
defence analysis each time.24 As Vogel rightly submits, Obama has taken his 
predecessor’s posture of fighting those groups contemplated in the Authorisation for 
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) 2001, in a wartime framework, anywhere in the 
world, and applying the law of armed conflict to any belligerents encountered in that 
fight, subject to “considerations specific to each case, including those related to the 
imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the 
willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses”.25  This 
position, and the US policy of extraterritorial operations against suspected terrorists, 
whether by drones or by other means, especially those outside the ‘hot’ battlefield of 
Afghanistan, have proven to be highly controversial. Obama’s policy has drawn 
support from several key players, with Harold Koh, former CIA Director and US 
Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, and his immediate successor Leon Panetta, 
broadly defending the policy of targeted strikes against those groups contemplated in 
the AUMF 2001, but mostly side-stepping the weightier, and more controversial, 
issues presented by drone warfare. Under pressure from the UN and other 
                                                 
23 See Koh, ASIL Speech, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’, available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. 
24 Available at http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/16/john-brennan-speech-on-obama-administration-
antiterrorism-policies-and-practices/>, (accessed 22nd November 2014). 
25 See Vogel, supra n.9, at 102. See also C.A. Bradley and J.L. Goldsmith, ‘Congressional 
Authorisation and the War on Terrorism’, (2005) Harv. L. Rev. 2047. 
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organisations to offer legal justifications for its targeted killing program, Harold 
Koh’s speech at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law set out the, “considered view of the Obama Administration”, stating that, “great 
care is taken to adhere to [the principles of distinction and proportionality]…in both 
planning and execution” of lethal targeting operations, asserting that such operations, 
“comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war”.26 It is submitted that the 
positions taken by Koh and Brennan must be rejected outright, for they appear to be 
based on an obvious conflation of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. The US must 
justify each breach of another state’s territorial sovereignty under the relevant rules of 
the jus ad bellum. The purported existence of a situation of armed conflict, ‘global’ or 
otherwise, does not diminish this requirement. 
 
The attacks of 11th September 2001 ushered in a change in how the US viewed 
matters touching on international peace and security. The problem of terrorism, 
domestic and international, became more than a law enforcement problem. In its 
“global war on terror”, the Bush Administration used drone strikes against targets in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, with the frequency of strikes increasing 
markedly in Barack Obama’s first term, before steadily declining. At the time of 
writing, the Taliban has been subdued, although by no means defeated, remaining an 
active force in Afghanistan, aided by militants in the tribal areas bordering north-west 
Pakistan. Indeed, the Durand Line has been porous to the flow of militants between 
the two countries. The Pashtun tribal heartland straddles the border between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the intermingling of cultures and allegiances has 
allowed militants to flourish in the region. The political reality in Pakistan is that the 
civilian government maintains only limited control over large areas of its territory, as 
well as limited control over its military and intelligence services. Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban have taken advantage of this reality in recent years, and the Pakistani 
authorities have proven largely unwilling or unable to counter the threat posed by 
these groups. President Obama has made it clear that the US will act in accordance 
with its duty to protect its citizens from attack, arguing that the US may undertake 
drone strikes over foreign soil when a host state proves unwilling or unable to deal 
                                                 
26 See Koh, supra n.23. 
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with the threat posed by terrorists operating within its territory.27 Therefore, in his 
May 2013 speech at the National Defense University in Washington D.C., President 
Obama offered strong legal and political justifications for the use of armed drones and 
presidential policy guidance was issued tightening the criteria for their use, although 
no promise was made to cease the use of armed drones altogether, and indeed soon 
thereafter a CIA drone strike over Pakistan on 1st November 2013 killed the leader of 
the Pakistan Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud. Despite the repeated assertions of the 
Obama Administration that it has the right to resort to armed drone strikes outside 
zones of active hostilities, further to its inherent right of self-defence, effectively 
creating a new legal paradigm authorising the use of force, opinion in the international 
community has largely been stacked against the US in how it has conducted its drone 
program, with accusations that the US has acted with impunity, violating the 
sovereignty of Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, in flagrant breach of international law. 
Some commentators, such as Anderson, are obvious proponents of such a paradigm, 
what Anderson refers to as “naked self-defence”, in that the jus ad bellum not only 
authorises the resort to force in the form of a policy of targeted killings as a self-
defence towards ends of national security, but also as that use of force is occurring 
outside a situation of armed conflict, international humanitarian law does not apply.28 
Thus, US drone operations outside zones of active hostilities need only satisfy the jus 
ad bellum. This concept seems to have garnered support in the current US 
Administration, with Koh stating that, “[B]ut a state that is engaged in an armed 
conflict or in legitimate self-defence is not required to provide targets with legal 
process before the state may use lethal force”.29 However, O’Connell vehemently 
denies the existence of any such paradigm justifying the use of lethal force, taking 
issue in particular with arguments made by the Bush and Obama Administrations that 
because the attacks on 11th September 2001 were preceded and followed by other 
attacks, the US may target and kill Al-Qaeda members and their affiliates wherever 
they are found.30 O’Connell submits that the theatre of conflict is confined to 
                                                 
27 See James Joyner, Obama Orders Pakistan Drone Strikes, NEW ATLANTICIST, 24th January 2009, 
available at http://www.acus.org/new_antlanticist/obama-orders-pakistan-drone-attacks, (accessed 21st 
November 2014). 
28 See Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in Legislating 
the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform, 346-400 (Benjamin Wittes, Brookings Institution Press 
2009). 
29 See Koh, supra n.23. Emphasis added.   
30 See Drones II, supra n.8, prepared testimony of Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell. 
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Afghanistan, for the only recent attack on the US that could justify the use of 
retaliatory force in self-defence occurred on 11th September 2001. Therefore, 
O’Connell submits, there is no basis in international law for drone strikes anywhere 
outside Afghanistan and strikes outside this theatre of conflict violate international 
human rights law. It is respectfully agreed with O’Connell that the notion of “naked 
self-defence” advanced by Anderson must be rejected, as it was in the Alston 
Report.31 The purpose of the jus ad bellum is limited to regulating when a state can 
breach the territorial sovereignty of another state, and not how and against whom, the 
force is used. To the extent that a state uses lethal force in the territory of another 
state, it must find authority in the relevant principles of international human rights law 
and, where applicable, international humanitarian law. 
 
Thus, there are a number of outstanding issues on which there is no clear consensus 
among states and international lawyers, and where current state practice and 
interpretations of international law challenge established norms of those legal 
frameworks which have served to regulate the resort to and the use of force for the 
best part of a century. Any uncertainty in the interpretation and application of 
international law governing the use of lethal force by UAVs is to be discouraged, for 
it risks creating a dangerous divergence in state practice, particularly given the 
number of states now in possession of UAV technology. As Emmerson rightly 
submits, this runs contrary to the obligation set out in paragraph 6(s) of General 
Assembly Resolution 68/178, which urges states to ensure that any measures taken or 
means employed in counter-terrorism operations, including the use of armed drones, 
are compliant with obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, in particular the 
principles of distinction and proportionality.32  
 
The Obama Administration has stated publicly that: 
 
                      [t]he rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon 
                      system used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on 
                      the use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed 
                                                 
31 See Alston Report, supra n.10.  
32 See Emmerson Report, supra n.2, at 23 and 70. 
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                      conflict – such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs – so 
                      long as they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war.33 
 
Notwithstanding the repeated assertions of the US that it is committed to ensuring that 
lethal targeting operations comply with international law, the ongoing failure of the 
US to put in place mechanisms for effective oversight and transparency casts a 
shadow of doubt over some of the legal justifications proffered in defence of its drone 
program. Indeed, in the current circumstances, it is difficult, though not impossible (as 
the following two chapters of this work will show), to give credence to the US’s 
invocation of the right to resort to force in self-defence, and quite easy to understand 
the hostility that exists among the international community to current targeting 
practices, particularly those involving blatant violations of the sovereignty of other 
states by a nation viewed by some as acting with impunity and in flagrant breach of 
international law. It is the apparent difficulty in reconciling current targeting practices 
with the fundamental principles of international law, especially those of international 
human rights law, that has led many scholars to criticise the US drone program as the 
most effective “extrajudicial execution” program since the Vietnam War. This is 
certainly a severe criticism, but as this work will show, it is one that has a degree of 
validity given the less than credible legal justifications advanced by the US.  
 
President Obama, whilst acknowledging the tragic reality that drone strikes have 
resulted in the deaths of non-combatants, has vigorously defended the use of armed 
drones in a just war of self-defence against a transnational terrorist network. The 
Obama Administration has, nevertheless, accepted that increased oversight of drone 
strikes outside areas of active hostilities is necessary to address the criticisms made 
against US targeting practices. Addressing the National Defence University in 
Washington D.C. on 23rd May 2013, President Obama made reference to newly 
effected “presidential policy guidance”, which imposed more stringent conditions on 
targeted drone strikes, particularly when capture is a viable alternative, as well as 
setting out plans to transfer responsibility for undertaking lethal targeting operations 
                                                 
33 See Koh, supra n.23. 
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from the CIA to the US military by the end of 2014.34 The guidance itself remains 
classified, however it has been disclosed in outline.  
 
There is still much information to which commentators are not privy. The ongoing 
failure of the Obama Administration to disclose that which is not vital to maintaining 
national security casts a cloud over the legal justifications proffered in support of the 
US drone program. If the US wishes to make a credible invocation of its right to use 
force in lawful self-defence, one which can gain support from the wider international 
community of states, and if it wishes to show that it is abiding by the settled norms of 
international law relating to the resort to force and the conduct of hostilities against 
Al-Qaeda and affiliated forces, then it must offer greater transparency and 
mechanisms of accountability, particularly when drone strikes involve blatant 
encroachments on the territorial sovereignty of a state where no situation of armed 
conflict exists and where the US is arguing that such strikes are justified in self-
defence when that state is unable or unwilling to counter the threat posed. 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
34 See B. Obama, 23rd May 2013, supra n.1. 
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2 
 
The US Drone Program and the jus ad bellum – Part One 
 
2.1 Background 
 
The following two chapters of this work examine the jus ad bellum, and consider 
whether the US drone programs operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, 
and against the self-styled ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq and Syria, comply with the legal 
framework that serves to regulate the resort to the use of force by states. One could 
devote an entire thesis to an examination of the current status of those legal principles 
that make up the jus ad bellum, however this writer proposes to confine his discussion 
to those principles of direct relevance to targeted killings undertaken by US drones on 
the territories of the aforesaid states. Of particular relevance, and central to the Obama 
Administration’s pronouncements on the legality of US drone strikes, is the right of 
self-defence. As President Obama stated in his May 2013 speech at the National 
Defense University in Washington D.C.: 
 
America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11…this is a just war- a war 
waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defence.
1
 
 
The following two chapters seek to explore the jus ad bellum issues raised by the use 
of armed drones by the United States against suspected terrorists around the world. 
When does international law permit a state to violate the territorial sovereignty of 
another state in order to conduct targeted killing operations? This chapter examines 
the current status of those legal principles of the jus ad bellum which are of primary 
relevance to the US drone program, considering whether, and if so, how, those 
principles have undergone substantive change in the years following the attacks of 
9/11. The following chapter will then examine the controversial issue of whether US 
drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and against the self-styled 
‘Islamic State’ In Iraq and Syria, comply with the requirements of the jus ad bellum. 
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Targeted killings using armed drones as a weapons delivery platform have become a 
recognisable feature of the Obama Administration’s strategy to counter the terrorist 
threat posed by Al-Qaeda and other islamist groups around the world, including Al-
Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen.
2
 
According to unofficial estimates, by February 2015, US armed drones had conducted 
413 strikes in Pakistan, 90-109 strikes in Yemen, and 8-12 strikes in Somalia.
3
 
Whilst it is accepted that drone strikes have been in decline, certainly since their peak 
in the first year of the Obama presidency in 2009, it must be acknowledged that the 
US will not cease the use of armed drones completely. Indeed, in his May 2013 
speech at the National Defense University, President Obama set out a strong legal and 
political defence of the US drone program, whilst at the same time announcing newly-
effected presidential policy guidance setting out the criteria to be satisfied before a 
drone strike could be authorised.
4
  
The United States has consistently made the argument that, as a matter of 
international law, it is in a situation of armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 
associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and therefore is entitled to use force 
consistent with its inherent right to self-defence.
5
 In US domestic law, the Obama 
Administration continues to place its reliance on the Authorisation for the Use of 
Military Force (AUMF), passed by Congress on 14
th
 September 2001, which 
authorises the use of armed force against those responsible for perpetrating the 9/11 
attacks, granting the President authority to use all, “necessary and appropriate force”, 
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 For an interesting overview, see Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, ‘Targeted Killings: Contemporary 
Challenges, Risks and Opportunities’ (2013) 18 JCSL 1. 
3
 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism provides an invaluable resource tracking the publicly 
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st
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February 2015). Further, according to officials in Yemen, between 27 July and 8 August 2013, 34 
suspected militants were killed by US drone strikes in that country – see Associated Press, ’12 in 
Yemen Die in Strikes by U.S. Drones’, New York Times, (New York, 8 August 2013), available at 
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against those whom he determined, “planned, authorised, committed or aided”, the 
9/11 attacks, and those who harboured those persons or groups.
6
 
 
The position taken by the Obama Administration in respect of extraterritorial targeted 
strikes against suspected terrorists using drones has raised a number of controversial 
legal issues, particularly in relation to those strikes carried out far from the ‘hot’ 
battlefield of Afghanistan. As stated previously in this work, much of the controversy 
has centred on issues under international human rights law (IHRL) and international 
humanitarian law (IHL), such as which legal framework is applicable to a particular 
targeted killing operation, whether a situation of armed conflict exists as between the 
US and those groups and individuals targeted, as well as the issue of who is a 
legitimate target.
7
 Certainly, the recent reports of UN Special Rapporteurs, Christof 
Heyns and Ben Emmerson QC, focus primarily on the IHRL and IHL issues related to 
the US targeted killing program.
8
 These same issues were also discussed in detail in a 
recent report to the European Parliament, as well as in two recent studies by Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
9
 
Henrikson submits that comparatively little attention has been paid to the separate 
issues arising under the jus ad bellum, and the issue of whether or not the US can 
legally violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the aforementioned states in 
conducting targeted drone strikes against suspected terrorists.
10
 This may well be a 
well-founded submission on the part of the learned commentator, with the notable 
exception of the US drone program operating in Pakistan, which has been the focus of 
comment by scholars such as O’Connell, Murphy and Paust.
11
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The Obama Administration’s repeated assertions that it is engaged in an armed 
conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, has led some commentators 
to submit that the existence of a situation of armed conflict eliminates the requirement 
for a separate jus ad bellum analysis for those targeted killings related to that armed 
conflict. John O’Brennan, currently serving as Director of the CIA, in a speech on 16
th
 
September 2011, whilst serving as Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 
and Counter-terrorism, stated that, “the United States is at war with Al-Qaeda”, and 
so, “takes the legal position that – in accordance with international law – we have the 
authority to take action against Al-Qaeda and its associated forces without doing a 
separate self-defence analysis each time.”
12
 This matter was touched on briefly in the 
introductory chapter to this work, and it has been respectfully submitted that 
O’Brennan’s position must be incorrect, based as it is on an erroneous conflation of 
the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, and a failure to acknowledge the distinction 
which exists between these two discrete bodies of international law, which apply 
independently of each other. An earlier point must be reiterated – the existence of a 
situation of armed conflict, ‘global’ or otherwise, does not negate the requirement for 
compliance with the jus ad bellum. Put simply, on each occasion when a use of force 
by the United States (this includes force applied by means of armed drone strikes) 
violates the territorial sovereignty of another state, that breach must be justified under 
the jus ad bellum in order to be considered lawful. Clearly, it is the overriding purpose 
of the jus ad bellum to regulate when a state can lawfully resort to the use of armed 
force, and not how, and against whom, that force is used. It is for that reason too that 
Kenneth Anderson’s pronouncements on a doctrine of ‘naked self-defence’ must be 
rejected outright. Anderson has advanced the view that US drone operations in 
Pakistan need only satisfy the jus ad bellum, submitting that there is legal authority in 
international law for a policy of, “targeted killing, as a self-defence toward ends of 
vital national security that do not necessarily fall within the strict terms of armed 
conflict in the sense meant by…international treaties on the conduct of armed 
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conflict.”
13
 It is respectfully submitted that Anderson’s view, too, is based on an 
erroneous conflation of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, or at least a 
misunderstanding of their proper inter-relationship. Anderson’s view is not reflective 
of either state practice or jurisprudence of the ICJ. As the ICJ noted in its Advisory 
Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, a, “use of force that is 
proportionate under the law of self-defence”, (jus ad bellum), must, “in order to be 
lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict”, (jus in 
bello).
14
 Therefore, to the extent that a state resorts to the use of lethal force in a 
situation of armed conflict, the requirements of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello must 
both be satisfied. Anderson’s ‘naked self-defence’ is a third paradigm that simply has 
no proper place in international law.  
 
A useful starting point for any assessment of the legality of the US drone program 
under the jus ad bellum is the UN General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, which states: 
 
No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, 
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against 
the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements, 
are in violation of international law. No state may use, or encourage the use of, 
economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another state in order to 
obtain from it advantage of any kind.
15
 
 
The principle underlying this Declaration is the prohibition on breaches of territorial 
sovereignty. 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter declares that: 
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[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
 
As Shaw rightly submits, this general prohibition on the use of force is regarded as a 
principle of customary international law, binding upon all Member States, and the 
reference in Article 2(4) to “force” rather than “war” is intentional, and beneficial, in 
that the prohibition expressed therein therefore covers situations in which the level of 
violence falls below the threshold of an armed conflict.
16
  
However, the general prohibition on the use of force is not absolute, and there exist 
specific exceptions, most importantly in relation to the right to use force in self-
defence and collective action authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. 
There has been much academic debate as to the exact scope of the prohibition on the 
use of force contained in Article 2(4), and as to the precise scope of the exceptions 
thereto. Higgins, for example, is one commentator who has suggested that the specific 
wording of Article 2(4) implies that the prohibition on the use of force covers only 
force directed at the territorial integrity and political independence of a state.
17
 On this 
basis, Travalio submits that the use of force for the purposes of combating terrorism 
falls outside the Article 2(4) prohibition.
18
 With respect, Travalio’s interpretation 
must be rejected. The weight of scholarship is rightly in favour of a reading of Article 
2(4) as a ‘catch-all’ prohibition that covers the use of force in countering terrorism. 
Most academics have rejected Travalio’s interpretation,
19
 and this prevailing view is 
certainly supported on a reading of the travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter and 
the jurisprudence of the ICJ, such as in the Corfu Channel Case, where the Court 
rejected an attempt by the UK to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the prohibition 
set down in Article 2(4), stating that: 
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The Court cannot accept such a line of defence. The Court can only regard the 
alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in 
the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the 
present defects in international organisation find a place in international law. 
Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take here; 
for, from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and 
might easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself.
20
 
 
It therefore seems that, although international law posits a general prohibition on the 
use of force by a state on the territory of another state, for the purpose of this work 
there exist three clear instances in which a state may nevertheless be entitled to use 
force and conduct targeted killing operations against suspected terrorists on the 
territory of another state: 
I. Use of force with the consent of the host state; 
II. Authorisation by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter; 
III. Use of force in self-defence. 
 
2.2 The use of force with the consent of the host state 
 
Article 20 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility 
provides that, “valid consent by a state to the commission of a given act by another 
state precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former state to the extent 
that the act remains within the limits of that consent.”
21
 So, although the use of force 
by the attacking state constitutes a prima facie violation of Article 2(4), that use of 
force will be lawful if the host state gives a valid consent. This valid consent would 
bar any claim by the host state that its territorial sovereignty has been violated.
22
 Such 
valid consent may be given in advance or contemporaneously.
23
  
The issue of consent is a controversial one, and an examination of the academic 
literature reveals no consensus with regard to its role in situations involving the use of 
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force. O’Connell, for example, rejects the notion of consent as a valid basis for the use 
of force in those instances where the use of force would have been unlawful if it had 
been the host state acting, submitting that: 
 
If a government seeks assistance from another state…the party providing assistance 
may only use that level of force that the government itself has the right to use. Those 
commenting on the right of the United States to use attack drones in Pakistan often 
overlook this important set of legal principles governing internal armed conflict. For 
much of the period that the United States has used drones on the territory of Pakistan, 
there has been no armed conflict.
24
 
 
Most scholars, however, take an opposing view to that held by O’Connell. Deeks, for 
instance, submits that: 
 
International law today does not clearly prohibit states from using consent as a 
partial or complete rationale for their forcible actions in another state’s territory, 
even when that consent purports to authorise an activity that the host state could not 
legally undertake.
25
 
 
Therefore, the widely accepted view is that the host state’s valid consent will render 
the attacking state’s use of force lawful under the jus ad bellum, to the extent that that 
use of force is conducted within the confines of that consent. 
All of this raises the question of what constitutes a ‘valid’ consent, and who is 
authorised to consent on behalf of the host state. As Emmerson rightly submits, 
domestic law of the host state may dictate those with authority to consent to the use of 
force, but international law otherwise presumes that, when a legitimate government 
exercises effective control over the territory of the state, it is the proper consenting 
authority.
26
 Obviously, consent to violate the territorial sovereignty of the host state 
can only be given by those who have been vested with the authority to provide such a 
consent. 
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2.3 Authorisation by the UN Security Council 
 
The resort to the use of force by a state on the territory of another state is lawful if it is 
based on an authorisation from the UN Security Council. Under Article 24 of the UN 
Charter, UN member states have conferred upon the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the, “maintenance of international peace and security”, and have 
invested the Security Council with certain powers to enable it to discharge this 
responsibility. Chapter VII of the UN Charter vests power in the Security Council to 
authorise member states to take such, “action by air, sea or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
27
 One recent 
example of UN Security Council authorisation for collective enforcement action 
under Chapter VII is UNSC Resolution 1973 of 17
th
 March 2011, which established a 
no-fly zone over Libya and authorised the use of, “all necessary means…to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack,” in that country.
28
 
Therefore, force falling within the scope of that authorisation would be lawful under 
the jus ad bellum, and would not violate the general prohibition contained in Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.  
 
 
2.4 The Right to Self-Defence 
 
The third and final relevant exception to the general prohibition on the use of force by 
a state is the right to resort to force in lawful self-defence. The classic definition of the 
right of a state to act in self-defence in customary international law comes from The 
Caroline Case.
29
 It is not proposed to detail at length the facts of this case, which are 
well-recited in the extant literature on self-defence under the jus ad bellum. In 
correspondence with the British Government following the incident involving The 
Caroline, the US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, set out what he considered to be 
the elements of self-defence in international law. There had to exist, Webster posited, 
“a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and 
no moment for deliberation.” Such elements had to exist before self-defence could 
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become a legitimate justification for resorting to force, which could neither be 
unreasonable nor excessive, “since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, 
must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.”
30
 The British accepted 
these basic elements of the right to self-defence in 1837, and they now form part of 
customary international law. 
The inherent right of a state to resort to force in self-defence was further expressed in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides: 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain and restore international peace and security. 
 
The customary law right of self-defence exists in parallel to, and alongside, Article 51 
of the UN Charter, and has not been superseded by it. This co-existence is clearly 
rooted in the very nature of sovereignty. The State, as the supreme authority under 
international law, must be empowered by international law to respond to threats 
against its nationals and its territorial integrity. As Newton rightly submits, it is, 
“modern consensus that the sovereign right of self-defence did not originate in Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter and is not restricted to responses enumerated 
therein.”
31
 
 
That there exists such a right of self-defence under the jus ad bellum is without doubt, 
however the scope of such a right has been the subject of much controversy and 
                                                 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 See Michael Newton, ‘Flying into the Future: Drone Warfare and the Changing Face of 
Humanitarian Law’, 39 Denver J. Int’l Law & Pol’y (2011) 601, at 604. Indeed, in the Nicaragua case, 
the ICJ clearly established that the right of self-defence existed as an inherent right under customary 
international law as well as under Article 51 of the UN Charter. See Military and Paramilitary 
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua -v- USA) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, pp.14, 94. 
 31 
extensive debate amongst commentators, in particular with regard to the use of force 
in countering terrorism.
32
 
 
Most, but not all, scholars agree that, for a state to make a legitimate claim that it is 
entitled to resort to the use of force further to its inherent right to self-defence, it must 
demonstrate that it has been subjected to an armed attack. In this respect, the onus of 
proof rests on the victim state. The ICJ stated clearly in Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo -v- Uganda) (Judgement) 
that: 
 
Article 51 of the Charter may justify a use of force in self-defence only within the 
strict confines there laid down. It does not allow the use of force by a state to protect 
perceived security interests beyond these parameters.
33
  
 
The degree of threat or use of armed violence required to constitute an ‘armed attack’ 
is an issue that divides commentators. A minority of scholars hold the opinion that a 
state may respond in self-defence to any threat, even those not rising to the level of an 
armed attack.
34
 These scholars argue that a state should not be required to withhold a 
response of self-defence until the threat escalates to the level of an armed attack.
35
 To 
require such would create a gap in the law where a state could not respond to serious 
threats against its nationals or territorial sovereignty, which would render to right to 
self-defence entirely meaningless. Schwebel further opines that the language of 
Article 51 lacks condition. Its articulation that a state has a right to self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs could be an indication that the framers of the UN Charter did not 
intend to limit the right to self-defence “if and only if” an armed attack occurs. 
However, the majority of scholarship holds the view that a state must be the victim of 
an armed attack in order to lawfully resort to force in self-defence. 
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Prior to the 9/11 attacks, it was open to question whether an attack perpetrated by a 
terrorist group could constitute an ‘armed attack’ for the purposes of engaging Article 
51 of the UN Charter. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, state practice and the weight of 
academic opinion weighed against the concept in international law of a right to self-
defence against non-state actors. Indeed, few openly supported the existence of such a 
right in the absence of some element of state complicity in the activities of the non-
state actor. As Murphy rightly submits, “prior assertions that terrorist acts constituted 
an “armed attack” justifying a robust exercise of self-defence have not met 
widespread acceptance by the global community.”
36
 However, this position has 
changed markedly in consequence of the 9/11 attacks. The day following the attacks, 
the UN Security Council recognised the United States’ right to self-defence in this 
instance.
37
 Further, NATO’s North Atlantic Council stated that the attacks should be 
viewed as an action covered by the Treaty of Washington, which states that an armed 
attack against one or more of the members of the alliance shall be considered an 
attack against them all, if it was determined that the attacks emanated from a foreign 
state.
38
 This apparent shift in position, which may be political as much as an 
intentional broadening of the scope of the right to self-defence, is recognised by an 
evolving state practice with regard to countering international terrorism. Gray and 
Lubell take the view that, from the international response to the 9/11 attacks, there 
could, under certain circumstances, be a right of self-defence against non-state actors 
who perpetrate acts of terrorism, even where there is little or no state complicity in 
those acts.
39
 The difficulty, however, lies in properly delineating the scope of such a 
right. Certainly, Article 51 does not expressly specify that an armed attack must be 
perpetrated by a state, but in the event of an attack by a non-state actor with no state 
complicity in that attack, the question of what constitutes a permissible response in 
self-defence becomes more problematic. In part, this difficulty is due to the fact that 
an ‘attack’ must be of a sufficient intensity to constitute an ‘armed attack’. According 
to the ICJ in Nicaragua, only the, “most grave forms of the use of force” constitute an 
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armed attack.
40
 The Court also opined that an armed attack must reach a certain 
significant scale of violence above, “mere frontier incidents.”
41
 In line with the 
Nicaragua judgment, O’Connell submits that sporadic rocket fire, or small armed 
groups crossing a border, would not rise to the level of an armed attack.
42
 Dinstein, 
however, argues that smaller scale attacks constitute armed attacks triggering a state’s 
right to self-defence, provided that the scale and effects are not de minimis.
43
 In line 
with this thinking, Judge Jennings opined that it would be dangerous to unnecessarily 
restrict the right to self-defence, as it would limit a state’s ability to lawfully respond 
to a threat to its sovereignty.
44
Certainly, the response of the international community 
recognising that the 9/11 attacks were of sufficient gravity to trigger the United 
States’ right to self-defence, offers little by way of assistance in this regard. Although 
recognising the threat posed by terrorism to international peace and security, the 9/11 
attacks are the only specific instance where the UN Security Council has specifically 
recognised a right of self-defence in response to a specific terrorist attack. 
This minimum threshold requirement in Article 51 has been the subject of much 
dispute, with claims from some states, in particular, Israel, that there exists an 
‘accumulation of events’ doctrine, whereby a series of small-scale, sporadic terrorist 
attacks, designed to achieve an objective that could not be achieved by a single 
concentrated attack, could be weighted cumulatively in determining whether the 
threshold requirement has been satisfied. O’Connell submits that the sporadic nature 
of terrorist acts is precisely the reason why states should be required to respond to acts 
of terrorism using law enforcement methods within the human rights framework, as 
opposed to military force.
45
 A string of terrorist attacks, O’Connell argues, must be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and cannot accumulate to constitute an armed 
attack.
46
 However, there is a contention that the accumulation of attacks is justified 
when there exists a coordinated campaign of violence. Israel has been a staunch 
advocate of this doctrine in relation to its operations against Hezbollah militants 
launching attacks against Israel from Lebanon.
47
 The ICJ has referred to the doctrine 
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in passing, with several judicial remarks seemingly endorsing the doctrine, at least 
implicitly. In Nicaragua, the ICJ stated: 
 
Very little information is however available to the Court as to the circumstances of 
these incursions or their possible motivations, which renders it difficult to decide 
whether they may be treated for legal purposes as amounting, singly or collectively 
(emphasis added) to an ‘armed attack’ by Nicaragua on either or both states.
48
 
 
Later, in Islamic Republic of Iran -v- USA (Judgment), the ICJ opined: 
 
…the question is whether that attack, either in itself or in combination with the rest 
of the “series of…attacks” (emphasis added) cited by the United States can be 
categorised as an “armed attack” on the United States justifying self-defence.
49
 
 
Finally, in Armed Activities, the Court stated: 
 
The Court is of the view that, on the evidence before it, even if this series of 
deplorable attacks could be regarded as cumulative in character (emphasis added) 
they still remained non-attributable to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
50
 
 
Notwithstanding these passing judicial comments, implicitly endorsing the 
‘accumulation of events’ doctrine, until recently the doctrine was controversial. 
However, in the years following 9/11, it is submitted that legal opinion seems to have 
shifted to such an extent that the doctrine finds considerable support amongst 
commentators, particularly in relation to attacks by irregular armed bands and terrorist 
groups. Dinstein, for example, submits that if, “continuous pin-prick assaults form a 
distinctive pattern, a cogent argument can be made for appraising them in their totality 
as an armed attack.”
51
 This certainly seems to be reflected in recent state practice, 
with Tams rightly pointing to an increasing willingness amongst states to accept the 
doctrine.
52
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2.5 A Right of Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors? 
 
The previous discussion raises the issue of attribution of an armed attack, in particular 
the question of whether the jus ad bellum recognises a right of self-defence against 
non-state actors, such as terrorist organisations. It is not yet a settled point as to 
whether a victim state must be able to attribute that attack to a state actor in order to 
lawfully resort to force in self-defence, or whether a state may respond to an armed 
attack perpetrated by a non-state actor. Under what circumstances can the actions of a 
non-state actor be attributable to a host state for the purposes of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter? How close must the connection be between the non-state actor and the host 
state for the host state to be fixed with legal responsibility for the actions of the non-
state actor? Article 8 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state 
responsibility offers some helpful initial guidance, providing that the conduct of a: 
 
person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a state under international 
law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under 
the direction or control of, that state in carrying out the conduct.
53
 
 
O’Connell submits that, on the basis of the ICJ’s decisions in Nicaragua, Oil 
Platforms and The Wall, attribution of an armed attack to a state actor is an absolute 
requirement for self-defence, and that without it a victim state must use law 
enforcement methods within the human rights framework.
54
  
A reading of the jurisprudence suggests that the threshold for attribution to the host 
state is rather high. The ICJ in Nicaragua, in setting down a test of ‘effective control’, 
concluded that US participation in the financing, organisation, training, supplying and 
equipping of the Contras, and in the selection of targets, did not suffice for the 
purpose of attributing to the US the acts perpetrated by the Contras. The ICJ noted 
that for, “this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would 
in principle have to be proved that [the United States had] effective control of military 
and paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were 
committed.”
55
 Whilst in Tadic,
56
 the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
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Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
57
 questioned the rationale behind this high 
threshold, opting instead for a less onerous test of “overall control”,
58
 the ICJ 
nevertheless reaffirmed the higher threshold in both the Armed Activities
59
 and the 
Genocide
60
 cases. In the latter case, the ICJ was clearly explicit in stating that 
“effective control” is required in respect of, “each operation in which the alleged 
violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the person 
or group of persons having committed the violations”.
61
 The Court therefore utterly 
rejected the notion that the test for attribution was a variable one that was dependant 
on the nature of the act perpetrated in the absence of a clear lex specialis.
62
 Regardless 
of the test applied, the attribution requirement predicates a lawful use of force in self-
defence upon the occurrence of an armed attack attributable to a state actor. Violent 
acts perpetrated unilaterally by a non-state actor would not be sufficient to trigger the 
right of self-defence. 
As it stands, therefore, a host state is responsible for the actions of a non-state actor 
only if it exercises effective control over the non-state actor in the course of their 
operations. However, other scholars such as Dinstein maintain that attribution is not 
required and that a state possesses a right to use force in self-defence against a non-
state actor, even when the actions of the non-state actor cannot be attributed to a host 
state.
63
 In other words, there is a free-standing right of self-defence against a non-state 
actor. A non-state actor can perpetrate an “armed attack” for the purposes of 
triggering a state’s right to resort to force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. This issue came to the fore following the 9/11 attacks, with the US arguing 
that the attacks triggered its right to use force against the Al-Qaeda terrorist network 
based in Afghanistan. The notion of a right to self-defence against non-state actors has 
been controversial. In The Wall, Judge Kooijmans noted, in his Separate Opinion in 
the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, “for more than 50 years…it has been the generally 
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accepted interpretation”, that an armed attack must come from another state.
64
 Judge 
Kooijmans’ dictum is certainly reflective of the pre-9/11 prevailing interpretation of 
Article 51 that the armed attack must be perpetrated by the territorial state itself before 
it could be the legitimate target of force in self-defence directed at the perpetrators of 
the attack. However, as with the ‘accumulation of events’ doctrine discussed above, 
the 9/11 attacks seem to have heralded a shift in legal opinion on this issue. The 
response of the UN Security Council to the 9/11 attacks, which recognised the right of 
the United States to act in self-defence, did not itself set down state attribution as a 
condition precedent.
65
 Despite a few persistent objectors, notably Professor 
O’Connell, who staunchly advocates the traditional view,
66
 for most scholars, the 
response of the international community in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks indicates 
that, subject to certain conditions, there does exist, in the words of Gray, a, “right to 
self-defence against non-state actors for terrorist attacks.”
67
 Therefore, as Lubell 
rightly submits, there is plentiful evidence, reflected in state practice since 9/11 in 
relation to the interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, to support the view that 
a non-state actor can be responsible for an armed attack that engages a victim state’s 
right to self-defence.
68
 It is of note that the report of Christof Heyns reflects this 
position, although Heyns points to an emerging view amongst commentators that the 
threshold of violence necessary to justify the use of force in self-defence ought to be 
set higher where the initial armed attack is perpetrated by a non-state actor. 
69
 
Certainly, there is nothing in the wording of Article 51 referring to the nature of the 
party responsible for the armed attack, only the nature of the party entitled to resort to 
force in self-defence – there is no mention or qualification as to the nature of the 
perpetrator of the armed attack. However, although the weight of scholarly opinion 
may have shifted in favour of recognising the emergence of a right of self-defence 
against a non-state actor, to date this has yet to be reflected in the jurisprudence of the 
ICJ, with the Court thus far sceptical of the existence of such a right. In both The Wall 
and Armed Activities, the majority of the Court maintained the traditional 
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interpretation of Article 51 that excluded a right of self-defence against non-state 
actors.
70
 In both cases, the reasoning of the majority met with strong dissenting 
opinions.
71
 Judge Higgins opined that there was nothing in the wording of Article 51 
to prohibit the use of force in self-defence where the armed attack was perpetrated by 
a non-state actor – the wording does not limit armed attacks to those attributable to an 
attacking state (such an apparent limitation being understood in light of the Nicaragua 
decision, with which the learned Judge expresses her own reservations).
72
 Similarly, 
Judges Kooijmans and Buergenthal, in The Wall, expressed deep dissatisfaction at the 
apparent reluctance of the ICJ to depart from Nicaragua and accept that armed attacks 
by non-state actors could engage the victim state’s right to resort to force in self-
defence.
73
 It seems, therefore, that the jurisprudence of the ICJ and academic 
scholarship on the issue are out of step with one another. Whilst there is an absence of 
judicial affirmation of such a right of self-defence against non-state actors, the weight 
of scholarship seems to have determined that such a right does exist, turning its focus 
to how such a right can be exercised lawfully. When, therefore, does the jus ad bellum 
permit a victim state to defend itself against terrorism? 
 
2.6 A Right of Anticipatory Self-Defence? 
 
As stated, a victim state’s right to use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter is triggered when an armed attack “occurs”. Notwithstanding this express and 
clear wording of Article 51, it is submitted that there are limited circumstances when 
a state may resort to force in anticipatory self-defence against an expected, imminent, 
armed attack.
74
 This view was expressed by the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, in 2004: 
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…a threatened state, according to long established international law, can take 
military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would 
deflect it and the action is proportionate.
75
 
 
David Bethlehem offers some helpful guidance on the assessment of whether an 
armed attack is to be regarded as ‘imminent’, opining that same is to be assessed by 
reference to all relevant circumstances, including: (a) the nature and immediacy of the 
threat; (b) the possibility of an attack; (c) whether the anticipated attack is part of a 
continuous and concentrated armed activity; (d) the probable scale of the attack and 
the injury, harm, loss or damage likely to result therefrom in the absence of action 
taken to mitigate the effects of same; and (e) the likelihood that there will be other 
opportunities to undertake effective action in self-defence that may reasonably be 
expected to cause less serious collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects. So 
long as there is a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that an armed attack is 
imminent, a lack of specific evidence or knowledge of when and where an attack will 
take place, or the precise nature of that attack, will not be fatal to a conclusion that the 
armed attack is imminent and thus will not preclude a legitimate claim of self-
defence.
76
 
While the original formulation of the right to self-defence in Caroline clearly 
envisaged the possibility that a state may be required to use force in anticipation of an 
armed attack, it is submitted that the Caroline formula does not recognise the wider 
notion of pre-emptive, self-defence against future attacks that are neither specific nor 
imminent. However, Article 51 of the UN Charter is not a carbon copy of the original 
Caroline formula. Indeed, by seeming to permit force in self-defence only when an 
armed attack occurs, Article 51 seems to be more restrictive than the original 
formulation, by, prima facie, excluding the possibility of self-defence against future 
attacks, irrespective of their degree of imminence. This apparent exclusion of the 
possibility of legitimate anticipatory self-defence certainly finds a basis in the travaux 
préparatoires of the UN Charter, which indicates that the drafters did not wish the 
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right of self-defence to be engaged before the occurrence of an armed attack.
77
 
Furthermore, Brownlie submits that, “it can only be concluded that the view that 
Article 51 does not permit anticipatory action is correct, and that arguments to the 
contrary are either unconvincing or based on inconclusive pieces of evidence.”
78
 
However, support for such a view is not absolute, with Bowett submitting that such a 
restriction is, “both unnecessary and inconsistent with Article 2(4), which forbids not 
only force but the threat of force, and, furthermore, it is a restriction which bears no 
relation to the realities of a situation which may arise before an actual attack and call 
for self-defence immediately if it is to be of any avail at all.”
79
 
Is it therefore possible to reconcile a notion of anticipatory self-defence with Article 
51 of the Charter? One possibility lies in the wording of Article 51 itself, which 
speaks of the “inherent” right of a state to resort to force in self-defence. The wording 
itself does not preclude a pre-existing anticipatory component of this inherent right. 
This possibility finds favour with Higgins, who states that it, “is also contended that 
the continued validity of this pre-Charter law on anticipatory self-defence is 
consistent with the reference in Article 51 to the right of self-defence being 
“inherent”.”
80
 A further possibility is that, while the use of force in self-defence 
against an attack that has not yet occurred may be proscribed by law, it may be 
tolerated by the international community in certain, limited circumstances. Gray 
submits that there is state practice in support of a general acceptance, or at least a 
quiet tolerance, of the use of force in anticipatory self-defence, provided that the strict 
necessity and immediacy requirements of the Caroline formula are not deviated 
from.
81
 
 
Jennings and Watts state: 
 
The better view is probably that while anticipatory action in self-defence is normally 
unlawful, it is not necessarily unlawful in all circumstances, the matter depending on 
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the facts of the situation, including, in particular, the seriousness of the threat and the 
degree to which pre-emptive action is really necessary and is the only way of avoiding 
that serious threat. The requirements of necessity and proportionality are probably 
even more pressing in relation to anticipatory self-defence than they are in most other 
circumstances.
82
 
 
It is not impossible to arrive at an altogether similar conclusion when considering the 
issue of anticipatory self-defence against a non-state actor, such as a terrorist group. 
The Caroline case itself dealt with the issue of self-defence against a non-state actor, 
and the formula set out therein is still regarded as legitimising a limited notion of 
anticipatory self-defence. It is, therefore, arguable that there exists in international law 
a limited right of anticipatory self-defence against a non-state actor. 
Therefore, if one accepts that, in certain limited circumstances, a state may be left 
with little option but to resort to force in anticipatory self-defence against another 
state, the same must be true when there is a necessity to use force in the face of a 
direct and imminent attack from a non-state actor, particularly if that attack may be on 
a large scale. The reality of the threat posed by non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda, 
Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, et al, certainly lends itself favourably to recognising the 
existence of such a right. That being said, this reality should not translate into 
recognition of a broader right of pre-emptive self-defence, which would permit a state 
to resort to force on a pre-emptive basis, with no requirement of prior knowledge of a 
specific imminent attack. 
 
2.7 A new doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence? 
 
Terrorists have demonstrated that they can conduct devastating surprise attacks. 
Allowing opponents to strike first – particularly in an era of proliferation is 
unacceptable. Therefore, the United States must defeat the most dangerous challenges 
early and at a safe distance, before they are allowed to mature.
83
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The response of the Bush Administration following the 9/11 attacks was to claim the 
existence of a new doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence, whereby the US would be 
able to act against emerging threats before they could fully form.
84
 Under this so-
called ‘Bush-doctrine’, the emergence of a new threat from international terrorism, as 
well as the dangers posed by rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, in particular 
with regard to the risk of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, created the need 
to adapt the concept of ‘imminent threat’ to meet the capabilities and the objectives of 
these rogue states and transnational terrorist networks. One major concern that was 
raised, quite legitimately, was that terrorist targets in particular are usually civilians 
and civilian objects. Given that such targets are not as easily identifiable or defended 
as military targets, and the possibility of mass civilian casualties resulting from an 
attack, the US stressed the importance of taking preventive action.
85
 The 2004 UN 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change shared the concerns of the US regarding 
those emerging threats, advocating a more proactive approach in countering them, 
including, “taking more decisive action earlier than…in the past.”
86
 However, in 
contrast to the unilateral approach being advocated by the US, the Panel stressed the 
importance of adopting a multilateral approach through the UN Security Council.
87
 
Therefore, does the threat posed by non-state actors in particular justify expanding the 
scope of the existing, but narrow, right of anticipatory self-defence, so as to allow for 
a wider right of pre-emptive self-defence, with no requirement of knowledge of a 
specific, imminent attack? It is submitted that the US’ attempts to expand the scope of 
the temporal aspect of Article 51 so as to allow for pre-emptive self-defence must be 
rejected outright. Whilst the law as a living construct cannot exist in a vacuum, there 
is nothing in the travaux préparatoires to suggest that the drafters ever countenanced a 
notion of legitimate pre-emptive self-defence in the absence of any imminence 
requirement, and no such notion can be read into the wording of Article 51. The US 
position has found little support amongst the international community, with even their 
closest ally, the UK, declining to accept the assertion of a right to pre-emptive self-
defence.
88
 The principal concern, even amongst those who recognise a limited right of 
anticipatory self-defence, is that a right of pre-emptive self-defence may be used as a 
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cover for unlawful and unprovoked aggression. Therefore, it is submitted, the 
boundaries of the doctrine set out in the Caroline formula requiring imminence and no 
other means to counter the threat, other than force in self-defence, should not be 
redrawn in such a way as to allow for force in pre-emptive self-defence. The need to 
establish the imminence of a threat becomes greater when contemplating force in 
anticipatory self-defence, and the link between the above requirements of the Caroline 
formula is a sound reason to confine lawful self-defence to knowledge of a specific, 
imminent attack. Permitting self-defence outside the Caroline formula runs the risk 
that states may claim pre-emptive action against vague future threats, disregarding the 
fundamental prohibition on the use or threat of force contained in Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter. 
Of course, the concept of imminence must take account of all the circumstances 
prevailing at the time, including the nature of the threat, and the capabilities of the 
actors in delivering that threat. This position certainly finds support in Threats, 
Challenges and Change, which discusses self-defence in the context of terrorist 
attacks, stating that: 
 
a threatened state, according to long established international law, can take military 
action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it 
and the action is proportionate. The problem arises when the threat in question is not 
imminent but still claimed to be real.
89
 
 
Higgins, whilst accepting that allowance for a limited form of anticipatory self-
defence against a specific, imminent attack has considerable support, leaves us with 
the following warning: 
 
Even so far as conventional military action is concerned, there must be circumstances 
(notwithstanding the wording of Article 2(4)), which allow a state to take pre-emptive 
action in self-defence, without waiting to be struck first. But it is equally important 
that this possibility is not abused, and is not used as a pretext for unprovoked 
aggression. The test in The Caroline helps strike that balance: for the state 
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considering an anticipatory use of self-defence, the necessity must be instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.
90
 
 
2.8 Location of the Use of Force in Self-Defence 
 
The issue of where a victim state can lawfully use force in self-defence is one that has 
divided scholars. On the one hand, O’Connell points out that, while there have been 
concerns about US drone strikes in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the 
real concern is whether strikes outside the “hot battlefield” of Afghanistan are 
lawful.
91
 O’Connell submits that without attribution of the armed attack to the host 
state, such use of force would not be a legitimate exercise of self-defence.
92
 
O’Connell’s argument, however, does not sit well with Paust, who contends that a 
state’s right to territorial integrity is not an absolute, and that under certain 
circumstances a victim state may exercise its right to self-defence against a non-state 
actor in the territory of the host state, even when the activities of the non-state actor 
cannot be attributed to that host state.
93
 
O’Connell’s arguments against the legality of targeting terrorists outside the 
traditional boundaries of the battlefield clearly rely on the foundational principle of 
territorial integrity codified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This concept, coupled 
with the requirement of attribution to a state actor, form, according to O’Connell, the 
asserted rule that under the law of self-defence, the territorial integrity of the host 
state prevails unless the armed attack that engaged the victim state’s right to self-
defence can be attributed to the host state.
94
 Only then may the victim state lawfully 
use force in self-defence against the non-state actor in the territory of the host state. 
Where the attribution requirement is not met, O’Connell submits, the victim state 
must rely on law enforcement methods within the human rights paradigm.
95
  
In contrast, Paust asserts that the territorial integrity of the host state may be 
superseded by the victim state’s right to self-defence, provided that the use of force is 
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confined within the limitations of that right.
96
 Paust’s arguments are clearly premised 
upon the notion that a victim state may target individuals directly participating in an 
armed attack, regardless of where they are located, in particular where the host state is 
failing to comply with international obligations to deny safe haven to terrorists.
97
 
Therefore, if one takes Paust’s thinking to its logical conclusion, the United States 
would be permitted to target Al-Qaeda members operating from Yemen, despite the 
fact that no armed attack can be attributed to the Yemeni state. However, such 
targeting must be strictly limited to suspected terrorists and not to the Yemeni state. 
 
 
2.9 Self-Defence – The Requirements of Necessity and Proportionality 
 
It is a settled principle of international law, confirmed by ICJ jurisprudence in 
Nicaragua, Nuclear Weapons, Oil Platforms and Armed Activities, that in order to be 
compliant with the jus ad bellum, force used in self-defence must satisfy the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality.
98
 
The criterion of necessity requires a state to ascertain if an alternative, more peaceful, 
means of redress is available during or immediately subsequent to an armed attack, 
before resort to force in self-defence. Further, there is a requirement of ‘immediacy’ 
embedded within the necessity criterion, which requires that the response of the 
victim state occurs either while the armed attack is still in progress, or soon thereafter. 
However, it is accepted that this immediacy requirement should be interpreted 
flexibly, taking account of all the circumstances. For example, it may take some time 
for a state to determine that it has been the victim of an armed attack, to determine the 
identity of the perpetrator, to explore the possibility of a peaceful resolution, and to 
prepare for an armed response to repel the attack.  
 
With respect to the use of force against non-state actors located and conducting 
operations in and from the territory of a host state, it would appear that, since the 9/11 
attacks, two consequences flow from this necessity criterion. First, in respect of non-
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state actors, the use of force by the victim state in self-defence on the territory of the 
host state is based on the inability or unwillingness of the host state to counter the 
threat posed by the non-state actor. Therefore, if the host state is able and willing to 
deal with the threat, it would be open to question whether it is necessary for the victim 
state to resort to force, and should it proceed to do so, it is doubtful that such force 
would constitute lawful self-defence. This issue is of particular relevance with respect 
to US drone strikes in Pakistan in recent years, and it is proposed to discuss this issue 
further in the next chapter of this work. In the meanwhile, it is worth noting the 
comments of Deeks in relation to this test: 
 
If the territorial state is willing and able, the victim state may not use force in the 
territorial state, and the territorial state is expected to take the appropriate steps 
against the non-state group. If the territorial state is unwilling or unable to take those 
steps, however, it is lawful for the victim state to use that level of force that is 
necessary (and proportional) to suppress the threat that the non-state group poses.
99
 
 
Both Heyns and Emmerson cite the test with approval in their respective reports.
100
 
Similarly, Daniel Bethlehem submits that a state can resort to the use of force on the 
territory of another state in the absence of consent, “in circumstances in which there is 
a reasonable and objective basis for concluding,” that the host state is, “colluding with 
the non-state actor or is otherwise unwilling to effectively restrain the activities of the 
non-state actor such as to leave the state that has a necessity to act in self-defence with 
no other reasonably available effective means to address an imminent or actual armed 
attack.”
101
 As Bethlehem rightly submits, this too would apply when the host state is 
unable to restrain the threat posed by the non-state actor. 
However, this writer believes that it is important, at this stage, to note a significant 
caveat with respect to this ‘unwilling or unable’ test. While the test forms a significant 
part of the US government’s legal position, certainly in respect of US drone strikes 
carried out in the tribal areas of Pakistan, Goodman rightly notes that the test remains 
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controversial under international law.
102
 Indeed, as Henderson notes, leading 
proponents of the test, such as Deeks, readily admit that the test is not well defined 
and its position in the jus ad bellum unclear.
103
 The basic test itself may not (as yet) 
have even attained the status of customary international law.
104
 The extensive research 
undertaken by Deeks in relation to the test, for example, “found no cases in which 
states clearly assert that they follow the test out of a sense of legal obligation.”
105
 
State practice being virtually non-existent, thus far, only the United States has actively 
supported the existence of the test as forming part of a state’s inherent right to resort 
to force in self-defence, using the test as part of its justification for drone strikes in 
Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, further to its right to 
self-defence in the context of an armed conflict against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 
associated forces.   
For the purposes of this work, this writer will assume, for the sake of argument, that 
the ‘unable or unwilling’ test is now an established, or at least emerging, rule of 
customary international law, forming part of a state’s inherent right of self-defence 
under the jus ad bellum. However, it is accepted, as things presently stand, 
international law offers little guidance as to the practical application of the ‘unable or 
unwilling’ test, but it would seem that prior to resorting to the use of force against a 
non-state actor in the territory of another state, the victim state should request that the 
host state, in so far as is practicable in all the circumstances, take all necessary 
measures to counter the threat posed, and afford the host state reasonable time to do 
so.
106
 
The second consequence of the necessity criterion is that the victim state must limit 
any use of force to the non-state actor responsible for the armed attack, and not direct 
any force to the host state itself, unless and until it intervenes on the side of the non-
state actor. This preserves the key distinction between self-defence on the territory of 
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the host state, with the victim state exercising its right of self-defence against the non-
state actor, and self-defence against the host state itself.  
 
The principle of proportionality is a fundamental requirement of lawful self-defence, 
ensuring that a fair and reasonable balance is struck between the initial armed attack 
and the force used by the victim state in self-defence in response to that attack. In the 
context of self-defence and the jus ad bellum, the principle of proportionality serves to 
gauge the legality of force used in self-defence by the victim state, either in relation to 
the preceding armed attack, or in relation to a imminent threat of attack and the 
measures necessary to counter that threat. 
Going back to the Caroline formula, the victim state must show that it, “did nothing 
unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence must 
be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it”.
107
 However, it is respectfully 
submitted that the Caroline formula does not preclude a victim state from resorting to 
a level of force greater than that used in the initial armed attack. As Ago rightly 
submits, “the action needed to halt and repulse the attack may well have to assume 
dimensions disproportionate to those of the attack suffered.”
108
 Nor, as Lubell rightly 
submits, does the principle preclude a victim state from responding to an armed attack 
by exercising force in self-defence against a non-state actor on the territory of more 
than one state, where the non-state actor’s activities are transnational in nature.
109
 
 
Despite the fundamental nature of the proportionality principle in international law, in 
practice proportionality assessments are notoriously difficult to make, particularly in 
instances of alleged self-defence. This is due in no small part to a lack of consensus 
among the international community as to the proper purpose underlying the right to 
use force in self-defence. What belies this lack of consensus is a more substantial 
disagreement as to the purpose of the collective security framework contained in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The traditional interpretation of Article 51 holds that 
the purpose of the right to self-defence is limited to allowing the victim state to use 
force to halt and repel the armed attack for the time necessary before the UN Security 
Council becomes seised of the situation and acts in accordance with Article 51 by 
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taking the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security, and therefore any force beyond this must be authorised by the Security 
Council. Heyns certainly seems to support this traditional interpretation.
110
 However, 
some commentators take the view that the purpose of the right of self-defence is not 
limited in such a way as held by the traditional interpretation of Article 51. For 
example, David Kretzmer submits that the principle of proportionality is not a ‘one 
size fits all’ principle, and that the legitimate aim of the resort to force in self-defence 
may differ, depending on the nature and scale of the armed attack, the identity of the 
perpetrators and any preceding relationship between the perpetrators and the victim 
state.
111
 This would certainly seem to allow for proportionate force for the purpose of 
preventing or deterring further armed attacks. Ruys, like Kretzmer, argues 
persuasively for a flexible approach to determining proportionality with regard to 
large scale armed attacks or in the event of a series of successive armed attacks, 
submitting that, “the more an attack or a series of attacks threaten the existence of a 
state, the greater the need to tackle the source of the attacks itself.”
112
 Further, on 
consideration of recent state practice on self-defence against terrorism, Tams notes 
that the international community seems to have largely abandoned the traditional 
understanding of the right to self-defence as a protective means of halting and 
repelling armed attacks.
113
  
It is respectfully submitted that this contemporary and flexible approach to the 
assessment of proportionality has much to commend it, given the nature of the 
ongoing threat posed by transnational terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda – the fact 
that their activities and capabilities are more difficult to ascertain, and that they 
operate in splinter cells across international borders – which makes it difficult to 
gauge the extent of the threat which needs to be countered by force, and by which 
proportionality is to be measured. 
 
Tams points to the widespread criticism that existed amongst the international 
community of armed responses to completed terrorist attacks prior to the events of 
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9/11.
114
 Such criticism was based on a number of factors, in particular that, since the 
response of the victim state would follow once the armed attack had been completed, 
the force employed by the victim state may be construed as punitive rather than aimed 
at preventing an actual terrorist threat against the state, and thus resemble an armed 
reprisal, illegal under the jus ad bellum. Other factors included the pre-emptive nature 
of such a response in order to protect against an unspecified future attack, and the 
reluctance of states to recognise a legitimate right to pre-emptive self-defence, as well 
as concerns that any response would be disproportionate to the initial armed attack. 
However, the overwhelming support for the US claim in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks that it is entitled to use force in self-defence in response to those attacks may 
be indicative of a growing willingness to accept a delayed response on the part of the 
victim state in the exercise of its right to necessary and proportionate self-defence 
against specific terrorist attacks, but also that not all armed responses following 
specific terrorist attacks will necessarily be considered unnecessary and/or 
disproportionate. What is important, however, is that this flexible approach preserves 
the clear distinction between legitimate self-defence and unlawful reprisals, so that it 
can be reconciled with the existing legal framework in the jus ad bellum. The risk of 
what Tams refers to as, “turning a temporal right into an open-ended licence to use 
force”, must be avoided.
115
 
 
2.10 Concluding Comments 
 
What this chapter has highlighted is that the right of a state to use force in self-
defence in response to an armed attack as enshrined in customary international law 
and Article 51 of the UN Charter, has undergone substantial changes in the years 
following the 9/11 attacks. There are few who would now dispute that acts of 
terrorism can trigger a state’s right to act in lawful self-defence, and it may even be 
that a state can justifiably accumulate the effects of individual terrorist attacks 
perpetrated by the same group in order to determine what can be a very difficult to 
question, that is whether those acts of terrorism are, cumulatively, of sufficient gravity 
to constitute an armed attack and thus engage a state’s inherent right to resort to force 
in self-defence. That the international community has accepted, following the 9/11 
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attacks, that an armed attack may be perpetrated by a non-state actor, is another 
significant development. As regards the use of force in self-defence against a non-
state actor on the territory of another state, such a right is conditioned on the inability 
or unwillingness of the host state to counter the threat posed. This chapter has 
illustrated that proportionality assessments in respect of force in self-defence against 
terrorist acts have proven difficult to make. Traditionally, armed responses to specific 
terrorist attacks have found little support amongst commentators and the international 
community. However, in the years following the 9/11 attacks, there has been a 
growing acceptance that such responses fall within the right to self-defence, although 
admittedly this blurs the line between lawful self-defence and unlawful reprisals. 
 
The next chapter of this work shall use the preceding examination of the 
contemporary jus ad bellum in order to determine whether the US drone programs, in 
undertaking extraterritorial targeted killings against suspected terrorists in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and against the ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq and 
Syria, comply with that legal framework. 
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3 
 
The US Drone Program and the jus ad bellum – Part Two  
 
3.1 Background 
 
As stated in the previous chapter of this work, the United States has conducted 
hundreds of targeted killing operations using armed drones against suspected terrorists 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. Since August 2014, the United States 
has conducted aerial bombardments against the self-styled ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq and 
Syria, including by means of targeted drone strikes. On the basis of the examination 
of the present state of the jus ad bellum in the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to 
provide an analysis of whether armed drone strikes carried out by the United States on 
the territories of the aforementioned countries are compliant with the principles of the 
jus ad bellum. 
The United States has consistently maintained a position that it is engaged in an 
armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, and that those 
targeted by means of armed drone strikes are lawful targets in that armed conflict.
1
 
However, as previously submitted, the existence or otherwise of any situation of 
armed conflict, which would trigger the application of international humanitarian law, 
does not obviate the requirement for compliance with the jus ad bellum in respect of 
US drone strikes carried out in furtherance of that conflict. Put simply, in any instance 
where the United States launches an armed drone strike in the territory of a state with 
which it is not engaged in a conflict, it must justify that use of force, and the resultant 
breach of that state’s territorial sovereignty, under the principles of the jus ad bellum.  
Given the porous nature of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border along the Durand Line, 
and the fact that US counter-terrorist operations against Al-Qaeda and Taliban 
militants straddle both countries, it is proposed to consider together US drone strikes 
in Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan. For 
reasons that shall become apparent, the jus ad bellum considerations related to US 
drone strikes against ‘Islamic State’ shall be examined separately as they apply in 
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respect of Iraq and Syria, such are the differing justifications proffered by the United 
States in respect of its operations against ‘Islamic State’ in both Iraq and Syria. 
 
3.2 US Drone Strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
 
US drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been aimed primarily at members 
of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban located in Afghanistan, remnants of Al-Qaeda and 
associated islamist militant groups which crossed into north-west Pakistan in October 
2001 with the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom, remnants of the 
Afghan Taliban regime located in Pakistan, and members of the Pakistan Taliban who 
oppose ISAF forces in Afghanistan as well the civilian government of Pakistan. These 
groups have found sanctuary in the tribal regions of north-west Pakistan near the 
border with Afghanistan, in areas where the Pakistani government has found it 
difficult to exercise jurisdiction. It seems highly probable that there has been a 
measure of co-operation between these groups, which share similar aims and 
objectives, in particular an extreme islamist, anti-western agenda. 
It is important to keep in mind that the United States is not, and never has been, in a 
situation of armed conflict with the state of Pakistan, that Pakistan has often 
consented to US drone strikes in its territory, and that Pakistan’s security and 
intelligence agencies have not always co-operated with US efforts to target and kill 
Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, and indeed have been suspected of colluding with 
these groups, creating a measure of mistrust between Washington and Islamabad. The 
inability of the Pakistani government to effectively administer the FATA region, and 
the lawlessness that exists there, has enabled the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to flourish in 
that region, to train, plan and co-ordinate attacks against international forces in 
Afghanistan and US interests around the world, as well as civilian and military targets 
in Pakistan.
2
 
As to whether the US drone program operates with the consent of the Pakistani 
government, it is unclear whether a universal consent was ever granted with respect to 
all targeted killing operations. Certainly, there have been instances when the Pakistani 
government has criticised and condemned US drone strikes as a clear violation of 
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Pakistani sovereignty.
3
 These instances have usually followed drone strikes that have 
resulted in the loss of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects. It is of note that 
the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani military has denied the existence of any agreement 
between the United States and Pakistan whereby US drone strikes are permitted over 
Pakistani territory.
4
 
In his interim report to the UN General Assembly, UN Special Rapporteur Ben 
Emmerson QC stated that, whilst there was, “strong evidence to suggest”, that up until 
June 2008 US drone strikes in the FATA region of Pakistan were conducted, “with 
the active consent and approval of senior members of the Pakistani military and 
intelligence service, and with at least the acquiescence and, in some instances, the 
active approval of senior government figures.”
5
 
On 12
th
 April 2012, the Pakistani Parliament adopted legislation revising the terms of 
co-operation with the United States, NATO and ISAF, and called for an immediate 
cessation of US drone strikes inside Pakistani territory. This legislation provided that 
neither the government nor the military nor the intelligence services could lawfully 
enter into verbally-binding agreements on matters touching the security of the state, 
and nullified those agreements already in existence. Any and all such future 
agreements would be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny and oversight. 
Effectively, this was an express revocation of consent by Pakistan to US targeted 
killings using armed drones in its territory. The current civilian government in 
Islamabad, which took office in May 2013, has adopted a similar position, taking the 
view that drone strikes in its territory are counterproductive, in violation of 
international law, in violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and 
called for an immediate cessation of such strikes.
6
 This express revocation of consent 
by the government of Pakistan is significant, for under international law it is the 
legitimate consenting authority, responsible for the conduct of the state’s international 
relations and for the expression of the will of the state in the conduct of its foreign 
affairs. It is, however, claimed that the Pakistani government has, in secret, given the 
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United States a tacit consent to the continuance of armed drone strikes in its territory, 
in spite of US Secretary of State, John Kerry, indicating a clearly defined timetable 
for the cessation of such strikes in 2014.
7
 Under the terms of the alleged agreement, 
reached between US President George W. Bush and Pakistan President Musharaff in 
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan would publicly decry such strikes as illegal 
violations of its sovereignty, but would privately consent.
8
 Documents leaked by the 
‘Wikileaks’ website indicate that Pakistan has privately endorsed and consented to US 
drone strikes in its territory, a position confirmed by former President Musharaff in an 
interview with CNN in April 2013.
9
 Official protestations notwithstanding, it seems 
likely that US drone strikes in Pakistan are carried out with the consent of the 
Pakistani government, the hesitancy in publicly endorsing the strikes having no affect 
on the binding nature of the consent under international law. On the basis of this 
consent, one is led to the inevitable conclusion that the strikes are compliant with the 
jus ad bellum. 
Given the consent of the Pakistan government to the drone strikes, the question of 
whether the strikes accord with the US’s inherent right to resort to force in self-
defence, is rather academic. Nevertheless, given the rather tenuous nature of the 
consent, the issue is worth a consideration, especially since relations between the 
United States and Pakistan have been somewhat strained in recent years, amid US 
concerns that Pakistan is continuously failing to honour its international counter-
terrorism obligations.
10
 Further, it would always be open to the Pakistan government, 
and any future government, to revoke the consent or to place conditions on that 
consent that would be unacceptable to the United States. 
In this regard, the United States has consistently maintained a position that US drone 
strikes in Pakistan are in furtherance of its right to self-defence. Both President 
Obama in his May 2013 speech, and Koh in his ASIL speech, base this right to self-
defence on the 9/11 attacks, arguing that that right, triggered by the armed attack on 
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that day, has not yet been extinguished.
11
 As discussed in the previous chapter, there 
was universal agreement amongst the international community that the 9/11 attacks 
constituted an armed attack that engaged the US’s inherent right to self-defence under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, permitting the US to resort to the use of force in self-
defence against those who perpetrated the attacks of that day. However, at the time of 
writing, the 9/11 attacks were over thirteen and a half years ago, and a pertinent issue 
relating to the US drone program as it operates presently for the purposes of targeted 
killings of suspected terrorists in states such as Pakistan, is the extent to which the 
9/11 attacks can still serve as a legal justification for the resort to force in self-
defence. The issue here, it is submitted, is one of remoteness. One could make a valid 
argument that too much time has passed since the 9/11 attacks for those attacks to 
form a legitimate basis for the use of force in self-defence. Whether the 9/11 attacks 
continue to do so or not, of course, depends much on whether this resort to force by 
the United States is proportionate. It was noted in the previous chapter to this work 
that any assessment of proportionality must first consider and identify the legitimate 
aim of the use of force before any determination of whether the force used is 
necessary in order to achieve that aim. Regrettably, there is no international consensus 
as to the proper legitimate aim of self-defence, with some states in favour of a limited 
‘halt and repel’ right to self-defence, and other states, including the US, in favour of a 
broader right, including the right to resort to force in anticipation of a specific, 
imminent threat. Unsurprisingly, then, there is a divergence of opinion on the issue of 
whether the 9/11 attacks can still serve as a legitimate justification for the exercise of 
the right to self-defence. In his recent report, UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns 
adopted the traditional, limited approach to the right to self-defence, submitting that 
action, “taken lawfully in self-defence, such as the use of drones to target individuals 
in another state’s territory, must serve the purpose of halting and repelling an armed 
attack and must be both necessary and proportionate to that end.”
12
 
It is respectfully submitted that it is becoming ever more difficult, with the passing of 
time, to ground any claim of self-defence on the armed attacks of 9/11. Of course, the 
United States still faces a direct threat from global islamist terrorism, but compared to 
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2001, Al-Qaeda is a pale comparison of itself, due to years of US military and CIA 
action against it. It is a much more loosely organised network, and it is doubtful that it 
could ever again mount an attack on the same scale of 9/11, capable only of causing 
marginal harm to US interests. This appears true since the killing of Osama bin Laden 
in May 2011 by US special forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan. President Obama, in his 
May 2013 speech at the National Defence University in Washington D.C., stated that, 
“the core of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan…is on the path to defeat.”
13
  
The US Department of State opined in 2011 that Al-Qaeda’s: 
 
…organisational strength is difficult to determine precisely in the aftermath of 
extensive counter-terrorism efforts since 9/11. The death or arrest of mid- and senior-
level Al-Qaeda operatives – including Osama bin Laden – have disrupted 
communication, financial, facilitation nodes, and a number of terrorist plots. 
Additionally, supporters and associates worldwide who are ‘inspired’ by the group’s 
ideology may be operating without direction from Al-Qaeda’s central leadership; it is 
impossible to estimate their numbers.
14
 
 
According to counter-terrorism experts, such as Coll, regional ‘franchises’ present 
much more of a threat to US interests than the Al-Qaeda of old – groups such as Al-
Shabaab, AQAP and Boko Haram.
15
 To this, it is supposed, could be added the self-
styled ‘Islamic State’, which seemed to take the world by surprise in the summer of 
2014. A breakaway group of Al-Qaeda, IS has taken advantage of the political 
situation in Syria and Iraq, capturing large swathes of territory, proclaiming an 
Islamic Caliphate based on a brutal and barbaric interpretation of Sharia Law. In 
recent months, IS has accepted pledges of allegiance from Boko Haram in Nigeria, 
and has also forged links with jihadists in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia.
16
 It seems that Al-Qaeda and Islamic State are engaged in a battle for 
dominance in the global jihadist movement, and as the Al-Qaeda of old poses less and 
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less of a threat to the United States, one is drawn to the conclusion that the US can no 
longer base its justification for the resort to the use of force in self-defence on the 
armed attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda on 9/11. As Heyns rightly submits, the US 
right to self-defence against Al-Qaeda was triggered by the armed attacks perpetrated 
on 9/11, and it cannot be said to have been triggered by the dispersed threats from 
islamic terrorism coming from multiple territories.
17
 
However, this apparent decline in the ‘old’ Al-Qaeda, marked by the destruction of its 
command structure, does not preclude a US reliance on the right to self-defence 
against terrorism as a justification for drone strikes in Pakistani territory. The US has 
continued to base its right to self-defence on the 9/11 attacks, without explicit 
reference to any of the new, emerging threats from regional islamist groups as giving 
rise to a new, separate right to self-defence. 
During the course of ground operations in Afghanistan, ISAF forces came under 
sustained attacks emanating from the mountainous border regions along the Durand 
Line. In the Pashtun tribal areas of north-west Pakistan, Al-Qaeda and Taliban 
operatives could take refuge, plan and coordinate attacks. It could, therefore, be 
argued that the US has indeed been the subject of an armed attack emanating from 
groups located in Pakistani territory. The accumulation of the effects of the individual 
attacks would, it is submitted, certainly be grave enough to cross the threshold so as to 
constitute an armed attack and thereby engage Article 51 of the UN Charter. On this 
basis, then, it is submitted that the US is entitled to resort to all necessary and 
proportionate force in Pakistani territory, including by use of armed drone strikes, 
pursuant to its right to self-defence, in order to halt and repel armed attacks emanating 
from Pakistani territory. Of course, as was stated in the previous chapter, this right to 
self-defence would be based on the inability or unwillingness of Pakistan to prevent 
attacks on US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan from being launched from its territory 
and to counter the threat posed by islamist militants belonging to Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban. As regards inability, it has been discussed how the Pakistani government has 
found it difficult to effectively administer the FATA region of north-west Pakistan 
and exercise its jurisdiction there, and so it would be reasonable to assume that the 
government would be unable to effectively halt the attacks emanating from the FATA 
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region. This being the case, it is submitted that the US would be able to resort to 
defensive force in the region by means of armed drone strikes. 
As to the unwillingness of the Pakistani authorities to halt attacks emanating from its 
territory, this is a more controversial and complex issue. Consider the US special ops 
mission that targeted and killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011. Bin Laden, in contrast 
to those targets situated in remote tribal areas of Pakistan along the border with 
Afghanistan, was tracked to a compound in the city of Abbottabad, a city clearly 
under the administration and governance of the central authorities. Whether or not this 
operation was conducted with the consent of the government based in Islamabad is 
not within the realm of public knowledge, but in the absence of such a consent, the 
operation would only be lawful under the jus ad bellum if the US could demonstrate 
an unwillingness on the part of the Pakistani authorities to capture or kill bin Laden if 
presented with the opportunity.  
In counter-terrorist operations against islamist groups in Pakistan, it has been difficult 
to ascertain the level of full co-operation between the United States and Pakistan, 
especially in countering the threat posed by those groups which launch attacks into 
Afghanistan. It is no secret that there is a degree of mistrust and suspicion between 
Washington and Islamabad. Pakistan has been criticised publicly by US officials on 
numerous occasions for saying much but doing little to crack down on suspected 
terrorists operating from within Pakistan, and the US has been reluctant to make full 
disclosure of intelligence to the Pakistani authorities due to concerns that elements 
within the military and intelligence services are sympathetic to the islamist militant 
groups, prompting concerns that intelligence may be leaked and targets forewarned 
about operations aimed against them.
18
 Indeed, a 2012 Congressional Research 
Service Report similarly stated the widespread belief amongst US officials that 
elements within the Pakistani intelligence services have sheltered militants, thereby 
facilitating the continued insurgency in Afghanistan.
19
 On this basis, one may 
conclude that Pakistan has demonstrated an unwillingness to crack down on suspected 
terrorists using the FATA region as a safe-haven from which to launch attacks against 
US/ISAF forces in Afghanistan, thus giving rise to a right to resort to necessary and 
proportionate force in self-defence against those terrorists based in north-west 
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Pakistan. Therefore, it is submitted, to the extent that they are necessary and 
proportionate, US drone strikes in Pakistan are jus ad bellum compliant. 
At this stage, it would be appropriate to mention that the US/NATO military presence 
in Afghanistan is presently being scaled down ahead of a complete withdrawal of 
forces. Security responsibilities have largely been transferred to the Afghan military. 
This itself raises the issue of whether there exists a separate, Afghan, right to self-
defence, triggered by armed attacks emanating from militants located in the border 
regions of Pakistan. It is respectfully submitted that the accumulation of the effects of 
attacks launched into Afghanistan would surpass the threshold of an armed attack, and 
would thus trigger the Article 51 right to self-defence. Under the principles of 
collective self-defence, the Afghan government can, and indeed has, requested US 
assistance in exercising its right of self-defence against those militants planning and 
co-ordinating attacks from Pakistan. It is understood that the US has conducted 
numerous drone strikes against targets in Pakistan at the request of the Afghan 
government, and on the basis of the jurisprudence of the ICJ on collective self-
defence, it is submitted that such strikes would comply with the jus ad bellum.
20
 
Professor Philip Alston has stated: 
 
A targeted killing conducted by one state in the territory of a second state does not 
violate the sovereignty of the second state [where]…the first, targeting state, has a 
right under international law to use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, [and] the second state is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against 
the first state launched from its territory.
21
 
 
Targeted killings by means of armed drone strikes against Al-Qaeda and associated 
forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is submitted, are the very kind of self-defence 
measures identified by Alston, and therefore do not violate the principles of the jus ad 
bellum. 
22
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3.3 US Drone Strikes in Pakistan – Acts of Aggression? 
 
On a related note, for many of the same reasons that US drone strikes in Pakistan are 
in broad compliance with the jus ad bellum, such strikes would not, prima facie, 
constitute acts of aggression that would engage state responsibility for such acts. 
The International Criminal Court has recently defined aggression as the, “use of 
armed force by one state against another state without the justification of self-defence 
or authorisation by the Security Council.”
23
 This definition essentially restates the 
General Assembly’s widely accepted articulation of the crime of aggression in 
Resolution 3314. 
24
 
Article 39 of the UN Charter empowers the Security Council to determine the 
existence of any act of aggression. It is of note that the ICJ has never formally 
determined the existence of any such act. In Armed Activities, the Court declined to 
adjudicate on the specific allegation of aggression made by the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, despite holding that Uganda was guilty of a, “grave violation”, of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
25
 
Thus, insofar as US drone strikes against suspected terrorists in Pakistan can be 
founded on a claim of legitimate self-defence, such strikes do not constitute acts of 
aggression on the part of the United States against the state of Pakistan. Any argument 
to the contrary would certainly be undermined by reference to the drafting history of 
G.A. Resolution 3314, which identifies acts of aggression depending on, inter alia, 
their consequences and gravity, along with other relevant circumstances.
26
 There is no 
exhaustive list of these “other relevant circumstances” contained in the text of 
Resolution 3314, but one can safely assume that the phrase can be understood as 
making a state’s intention relevant to the determination of whether the use of armed 
force by that state amounts to an act of aggression. In the case of US drone strikes in 
Pakistan in particular, the narrow intention of the US to act in self-defence would, it is 
submitted, further undermine any argument that the strikes constitute acts of 
aggression, as defined in Resolution 3314, by the US against the state of Pakistan. 
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3.4 US Drone Strikes in Yemen 
 
In his June 2012 letter to the United States Congress, President Obama acknowledged 
that the US was conducting targeted drone strikes in Yemen against suspected 
terrorists belonging mainly to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
27
 In that 
letter, President Obama stated: 
 
…[t]he US military has…been working closely with the Yemeni government to 
operationally dismantle and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active and dangerous affiliate of 
Al-Qaeda today. Our joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a limited 
number of AQAP operatives and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist 
threat to the United States and our interests.
28
 
 
The US holds AQAP responsible for several noteworthy actual and attempted terrorist 
attacks, including the October 2000 bombing of the US warship, USS Cole, in the port 
city of Aden, the September 2008 attack on the US embassy in Sana’a, the December 
2009 attempt to detonate a bomb on a passenger flight bound for the US city of 
Detroit, and the October 2010 attempt to detonate explosives hidden in printer 
cartridges onboard a cargo flight bound for the US city of Chicago. The US claims 
that Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen, played a prominent role in the 2009 and 2010 
plots. Al-Awlaki was killed in a US drone strike in September 2011, in what has 
become one of the most controversial strikes conducted by the United States, being a 
lethal strike against one of its own citizens, denounced by some commentators, 
particularly the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), as an unconstitutional, 
extra-judicial execution of a US citizen with no regard to his Fifth Amendment right 
to due process, but defended by the US Administration as the lawful use of lethal 
force against an enemy operative in the context of an armed conflict.
29
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In the summer of 2013, it is reported, the CIA intercepted a conversation between 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who succeeded Osama bin Laden as leader of the Al-Qaeda 
network, and Nasser Al-Wuhayshi, leader of AQAP, which allegedly revealed one of 
the most serious plots against the US since the 9/11 attacks. This alleged threat led to 
a temporary lockdown of approximately 25 US diplomatic missions across the Middle 
East.
30
 
As to whether the US drone program operates in Yemen in compliance with the jus ad 
bellum, although there have been occasions when the Yemeni government has 
expressed anger and dissatisfaction with strikes conducted in its territory, the evidence 
points to a broad consent to those strikes and an active participation in the 
identification and locating of targets. There are accounts of the former President of 
Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, giving the US a free pass to conduct counter-terrorist 
operations in Yemen, including by use of armed drone strikes against suspected 
AQAP targets.
31
 Similarly, the current Yemeni President, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, 
has signalled his consent to the continuation of US targeted killings in Yemeni 
territory.
32
 
If one considers UN Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson’s interim report of September 
2013, it appears that the Yemeni government has indicated that the US routinely seeks 
prior consent, on a case-by-case basis, for lethal drone strikes in Yemeni territory. 
Where consent is withheld, a drone strike will not proceed.
33
 On this basis, then, one 
is led to the conclusion that US drone strikes in Yemen are based on a valid consent, 
freely given by the Yemeni government, and are thus in compliance with the UN 
Charter and the jus ad bellum. 
The first half of 2015 has witnessed a marked deterioration in the political situation in 
Yemen. The country is becoming increasingly unstable as internal conflicts continue. 
Shia Houthi rebels have seized control of large swathes of territory since taking 
control of the capital, Sana’a, in January 2015. President Hadi has fled to Saudi 
Arabia, and has accused the regional Shia power, Iran, of supporting the Houthi 
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rebels, and in recent months, air strikes against the rebels have been launched by 
Saudi Arabia, with the approval of the United States. The objective of these strikes, 
according to Saudi Arabia, is to protect the legitimate Yemeni government situated in 
Aden, Yemen’s second city.
34
 
There thus emerges a clouded and complex situation in Yemen at present, fluid and 
volatile. US drone strikes in Yemen have been remarkably successful in countering 
the threat posed by AQAP, regarded by the US as the most dangerous branch of the 
Al-Qaeda network, and which opposes both the Houthi rebels and the Sunni 
President. To further muddy the waters, a Yemeni affiliate of the self-styled ‘Islamic 
State’ has recently emerged, which, if unchecked, could eclipse AQAP. With the main 
political and military focus currently on stalling the rapid progress made by the 
Houthi, AQAP has taken advantage of the opportunity to recover from the effects of 
successful US drone strikes against them. This writer rather suspects that the US 
would not be willing to allow AQAP to completely recover its former position, and 
that US drone strikes against AQAP targets will continue alongside Saudi-led strikes 
against the Houthi. Indeed, the US drone strike which killed AQAP leader Nasser al-
Wuhayshi in the Hadhramaut region would certainly indicate the US’s clear intention 
to continue targeting AQAP in Yemen. 
The consent of the legitimate Yemeni government to US drone strikes in its territory 
renders academic the question of whether the strikes can (also) be justified as the 
lawful use of force in self-defence. In reality, the issue of a right to self-defence may 
not arise unless and until Yemen revokes its consent to the US drone strikes or the US 
acts beyond the limitations of that consent. However, given the current fluidity and 
volatility of the political situation in Yemen, the issue of whether the drone strikes are 
compliant with the jus ad bellum as the lawful exercise of force in self-defence, is 
certainly worth consideration.  
If it is the case that AQAP in Yemen are indeed responsible for the various attacks 
and terrorist plots against the US and its interests from 2008-2010, as outlined earlier 
in this chapter, one could argue that the US has therefore been the target of an armed 
attack emanating from AQAP in Yemen. It is respectfully submitted that the 
cumulative effect of recent attacks against US interests in Yemen is sufficient to cross 
the threshold so as to constitute an armed attack against the United States, thereby 
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engaging the US’s inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
As grave as the attack on the USS Cole was in October 2000, resulting in the deaths of 
17 US Navy personnel, and while that attack, in and of itself, may well have been 
sufficiently grave at that time to constitute an armed attack triggering the US’s right to 
self-defence, for the purposes of this analysis, one finds it difficult to accept that the 
attack on the USS Cole forms part of the series of attacks attributable to AQAP which 
would engage the US’s right to self-defence. After the attack on the USS Cole, it was 
8 years before the next attack attributable to AQAP, and so the attack on the USS Cole 
would be too remote to form part of the same series of attacks. To claim otherwise 
would be to disregard the temporal element underlying Article 51 of the UN Charter 
and the right to self-defence. 
Notwithstanding that the activities of AQAP from 2008-2010 may constitute an 
armed attack on the US, it is a matter of debate as to whether the US right of self-
defence against AQAP still subsists. As submitted, US drone strikes against AQAP in 
Yemen have been lauded by the US as remarkably successful in diminishing the 
threat posed by AQAP, and so the issue is just how much of a threat is still posed by 
AQAP. The use of force by the US by means of armed drone strikes against AQAP 
targets must, at all times, be necessary and proportionate in order to comply with the 
jus ad bellum, and continued strikes will only be lawful if the US is able to 
demonstrate a continued and active threat posed by AQAP to US and US interests. 
The 2013 planned attacks on US interests in the Middle East, which necessitated the 
temporary shutdown of US diplomatic posts in the region, would certainly indicate 
that the threat from AQAP is still real and significant, however few details on the 
specific nature of the threat are in the public domain. On the basis that the threat has 
not been fully eradicated, one could make the argument that the right to self-defence 
still exists, and as such, US drone strikes against AQAP targets in Yemen are broadly 
compliant with the jus ad bellum.  
On a final point, it is worth noting that US drone strikes in Yemen have been 
concentrated in areas of the country where the government finds it difficult to exercise 
effective control.
35
 Therefore, given the apparent inability of the legitimate Yemeni 
government to counter the threat posed by AQAP in those areas, it is respectfully 
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submitted that the US drone strikes would constitute a necessary and proportionate 
response to the threat posed, and thus the lawful exercise of a right to self-defence 
conditioned on the inability of the Yemeni government to halt the activities of AQAP. 
 
3.5 US Drone Strikes in Somalia 
 
The United States has engaged in an extensive counter-terrorism program in Somalia. 
The first reported drone strike in Yemen occurred on 23
rd
 June 2011, and in his June 
2012 letter to Congress, President Obama acknowledged the existence of such 
operations: 
 
In Somalia, the United States …has worked to counter the terrorist threat posed by 
Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda-associated elements of Al-Shabaab. In a limited number of 
cases, the United States…has taken direct action in Somalia against members of Al-
Qaeda, including those who are also members of Al-Shabaab, who are engaged in 
efforts to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States and our interests.
36
  
 
US drone strikes in Somalia have focused primarily on targets associated with Al-
Shabaab, the armed wing of ‘The Islamic Courts’, which seized control of large areas 
of Somalia in 2006. It is widely believed that leading members of Al-Shabaab have 
trained and fought in Afghanistan, merging with the Al-Qaeda network in early 
2012.
37
 
The Somali government has confirmed that US drone strikes in its territory are co-
ordinated with its military and intelligence agencies.
38
 Therefore, on the basis of this 
consent, it must be submitted that US drone strikes in Somalia comply with the UN 
Charter and the jus ad bellum.  
As to whether there exists alongside this consent a free-standing right to resort to 
force in self-defence, it must be noted that, with the exception of an attack in Uganda 
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back in July 2010, which killed more than 70 people, until recently, Al-Shabaab did 
not appear to be conducting operations outside Somalia, pursuing a domestic agenda 
rather than a regional and anti-Western one. This all changed, however, on 21
st
 
September 2013, when Al-Shabaab militants stormed a shopping centre in Nairobi, 
Kenya. More than 60 people were killed, including French, British and Canadian 
citizens. Several US citizens were injured.
39
 The response of the US to this horrific 
attack was to announce that it considered Al-Shabaab to constitute a direct to the US 
and its interests.
40
 
The question to be considered can thus be framed as follows – can the United States 
claim a right of self-defence against Al-Shabaab arising under international law, that 
would justify targeted drone strikes against Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia? 
The September 2013 attack in Nairobi may well constitute an armed attack on Kenya 
by Al-Shabaab. This writer’s own background research on that attack found no 
evidence to indicate that Al-Shabaab was intentionally targeting US or other western 
citizens, and so it is difficult to see how this attack could trigger a US right to self-
defence in response to this particular attack that could justify the use of force by the 
US against Al-Shabaab targets in Somalia. The United States has consistently 
maintained that international law permits the use of force in self-defence in order to 
protect a state’s nationals abroad, however such a right is controversial, and is not 
universally accepted. Indeed, it has attracted few adherents amongst the international 
community, namely the US, the UK, Israel and Belgium.
41
 Furthermore, there is little 
evidence in the public domain to indicate that Al-Shabaab is actively targeting US 
interests in Somalia or the wider region, and this paucity of evidence somewhat 
precludes a definitive legal conclusion on the self-defence point. Of course, the 
United States may be in possession of classified intelligence indicating the presence 
of such a threat to its interests, but on the basis of what is known publicly, it is 
submitted that the US would find it difficult to sustain an argument that drone strikes 
against Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia can be justified as the lawful exercise of 
anticipatory self-defence against a specific, imminent threat from Al-Shabaab to US 
interests in Somalia or the wider region. 
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On 2
nd
 April 2015, Al-Shabaab launched a deadly attack on Garissa University 
College in north-eastern Kenya, killing 150 hostages. This attack, together with the 
2013 attack in Nairobi, may well engage Kenya’s right to self-defence against Al-
Shabaab, and of course it would then be open to the Kenyan government to request 
US assistance in the exercise of that right. However, there is at present no evidence to 
suggest that any such request has been made. 
It is worth recalling that Somalia has, for many years, been regarded as a ‘failed 
state’, with no effective central government exercising jurisdiction over the entirety of 
its national territory. This being the case, it may be that, on application of the ‘unable 
or unwilling’ test, US drone strikes against Al-Shabaab targets in Somalia could be 
based on a right to resort to force in necessary and proportionate self-defence, 
provided of course that the United States can demonstrate that it has been the subject 
of an armed attack emanating from Somali territory, or that it is acting in anticipation 
of a specific, imminent threat from Al-Shabaab. Unfortunately, however, the lack of 
clear evidence in the public domain prevents any definitive legal conclusion in this 
regard. 
 
3.6 US Drone Strikes against the self-styled ‘Islamic State’ 
 
The self-styled Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
42
 came to the world’s attention 
almost by complete surprise in the summer of 2014. On 29
th
 June 2014, the group 
proclaimed an Islamic caliphate in the territories of Iraq and Syria under its control, 
approximately one-third of the territorial land-mass of both states, straddling the 
international border between both Iraq and Syria. 
The territorial losses incurred by the Iraqi government following the IS offensive in 
the early months of 2014, which seized the cities of Mosul, Tikrit and Ramadi, as well 
as gains made by IS in Syria, where it is conducting hostilities against forces loyal to 
President Assad and against other opposition groups, brought IS to global attention. It 
was the potential humanitarian catastrophe that unfolded in northern Iraq in August 
2014, when IS attacks forced members of the Yazidi and Christian minorities to 
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retreat to the relative safety of Mount Sinjar, coupled with the significant threat posed 
by IS to the very existence of the Iraqi government, which prompted the renewal of 
US military action in Iraq on 8
th
 August 2014.
43
 The US-led aerial bombardment that 
commenced on that day had as its principal objectives the supporting of Iraqi military 
operations against IS positions, by means of air strikes and the provision of air 
support (including targeted drone strikes against IS militants and military objects), 
and the humanitarian objective of protecting the Yazidi, Christian and Kurdish 
peshmerga populations from atrocities at the hands of IS militants. The efforts of the 
US in seeking to protect these groups were, at the time, broadly welcomed by the 
international community.
44
 Indeed, the US-led aerial campaign has been viewed as a 
balanced intermediate measure, given the recent US withdrawal of ground forces from 
Iraq, and the understandable hesitancy of the Obama Administration, and the 
American people, to get drawn into another ground conflict in the Middle East. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the geo-political borders between Iraq and Syria have 
effectively been erased by IS in consequence of its operations, for the purposes of the 
application of international law, IS has not been recognised a new state. Iraq and Syria 
remain as two separate and sovereign nations, and therefore the jus ad bellum 
implications in respect of US-led strikes in both countries shall be considered 
separately. 
 
Iraq 
 
The commencement of US air strikes against IS in Iraq on 8
th
 August 2014 drew 
broad support from the international community, and at first glance, the strikes appear 
to be uncontroversial from a jus ad bellum perspective. The strikes were commenced 
at the express invitation, and by the consent of, the legitimate Iraqi government in 
Baghdad and the Kurdish leaders in the north of the country. It has been discussed 
previously in this work that the limited exceptions to the general prohibition of the 
threat or use of force contained within Article 2(4) of the UN Charter – self-defence 
and authorisation by the UN Security Council – essentially bar a claim by the state in 
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which the use of force occurs that its sovereignty has been violated.
45
 An invitation to 
use force, or the provision of consent to such use of force on the territory of a state, by 
the legitimate government of that state, on the other hand, means that no such 
violation of sovereignty occurred in the first place. 
Whilst it is accepted that IS has had some notable successes in Iraq, and that it has 
captured large swathes of territory, this does not cast any doubt over the legitimacy of 
the Iraqi government or its entitlement to request assistance from the US and its 
coalition partners in response to the IS threat.
46
 
Therefore, in terms of US air strikes against IS targets operating within Iraq, including 
strikes carried out by means of armed drones, it is submitted that these are broadly 
compliant with the jus ad bellum. 
 
Syria 
 
The legal issues become significantly more complex when considering whether US 
air strikes against IS in Syria comply with the requirements of the jus ad bellum. 
While the US readily came to the assistance of the Iraqi government in response to the 
latter’s request for assistance against the IS threat, there was an evident hesitancy, not 
only by the US but also its coalition partners, in regards to military action in Syria. 
The Prime Minister of Australia, Tony Abbott, notably stated that: 
 
The legalities of operating inside Syria [whether against IS and/or forces loyal to the 
Assad regime]…are quite different from the legalities of operating inside Iraq at the 
request of, and in support of, the Iraqi government.
47
 
 
US-led air strikes in Syria against IS targets commenced on 23
rd
 September 2014, in 
spite of the concerns raised by several allied states, such as Australia, France and the 
Netherlands as to the legality of such strikes in the absence of UN Security Council 
authorisation or without the invitation or consent of the Assad government in 
Damascus. 
                                                 
45
 See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 21. 
46
 See UN Doc. SC/11571, 19
th
 September 2014. 
47
 See Prime Minister of Australia, ‘Interview with Fran Kelly’, ABC Radio National, 16
th
 September 
2014, available at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-09-16/interview-fran-kelly-abc-radio-national, 
(accessed 30
th
 April 2015). 
 71 
As to consent, it should be noted that the Assad government has made it clear that 
US-led strikes against IS constitute an act of aggression against Syria unless the 
strikes are coordinated with the Syrian authorities, a position supported by Syria’s 
principal allies, Iran and Russia.
48
 However, several key players in the coalition, 
including the US and the UK, have posited that Assad’s regime has forfeited its 
legitimacy by the commission of war crimes against the Syrian people in the course of 
the civil war which has raged on since 2011, and therefore that the consent of the 
Syrian government is not required.
49
 To date, the coalition states have ruled out 
seeking the consent of the Assad government, which is unsurprising given the scale of 
fierce condemnation of the Assad regime’s conduct during the civil war. Seeking the 
consent of the Assad regime or coordinating the air campaign against IS with Assad’s 
forces might give the appearance that the US and its coalition partners continues to 
recognise Assad’s regime as the legitimate government of Syria. It is submitted, 
however, that this position ignores the political reality that, despite the events of 2014 
and the loss of a significant amount of territory to IS, the Assad regime remains the 
government of Syria, and therefore for the purposes of international law, remains the 
proper consenting authority for the use of force in its territory by another state, 
entitled to invite (or to refrain from inviting) such use of force. Indeed, while many 
states, including the US, have recognised the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) as the 
‘legitimate representative’ of the Syrian people, it is important to note that those states 
have not extended this to recognising the SNC as the legitimate government of 
Syria.
50
 
Irrespective of one’s view on the legitimacy of the Assad government, the legal reality 
is that, in the absence of its consent or invitation to the use of force against IS 
militants in its territory, the general prohibition contained in Article 2(4) of the UN 
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Charter remains engaged, meaning that a legal justification must be found in order for 
the US-led strikes in Syria to be compliant with the jus ad bellum.
51
 
Given the absence of consent from the Syrian government, and the continued absence 
of any authorisation by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
for the use of force against IS in Syria, it would appear that the only justifications left 
open to the US-led coalition are self-defence and humanitarian intervention.
52
 
As to self-defence, it has been submitted previously in this work that, for the purposes 
of engaging a state’s right of inherent self-defence under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, the weight of scholarship since the 9/11 attacks has come down in support of 
the position that an ‘armed attack’ can be perpetrated by a non-state actor.
53
 This 
raises the issue of whether any of the actions of IS (either taken individually or 
cumulatively) constitute an armed attack, or the imminent threat of an attack, against 
the US or any other state. 
It is of note that Iraq has not formally claimed to be the victim of an armed attack, and 
the US-led coalition has not claimed to be acting on the basis of collective self-
defence in support of Iraq. In correspondence to the UN Secretary-General, the US 
Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, stated that: 
 
[T]he Government of Iraq has asked that the United States lead international efforts 
to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds in Syria in order to end the continuing 
attacks on Iraq, to protect Iraqi citizens, and ultimately to enable and arm Iraqi 
forces to perform their task of regaining control of the Iraqi borders.
54
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This correspondence is clearly the closest the US has come to an express invocation 
of the right of collective self-defence. It is respectfully submitted that there is no 
difficulty in recognising that the actions of IS in and against Iraq constitute an armed 
attack, and if, as is believed to be the case, these attacks are being directed from IS in 
Syria, the right of collective self-defence is thereby engaged. This is so even on a 
strict application of Nicaragua, which would attach to the notion of ‘armed attack’ 
requirements of ‘gravity’ and ‘scale and effects’ for the purposes of Article 51 of the 
UN Charter.
55
 On such an application of Nicaragua, such intervention in Syria against 
IS would only be lawful if IS was acting as an agent of, or was under the effective 
control of the Syrian government. However, IS is as hostile to the forces of the Assad 
regime as it is to forces opposing the Assad regime.  
In her correspondence to the UN Secretary-General, Samantha Power stated that: 
 
States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defence, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
when, as is the case here, the government of the state where the threat is located is 
unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks. The Syrian 
regime has shown that it cannot and will not confront these safe-havens effectively 
itself. Accordingly, the United States has initiated necessary and proportionate 
military actions in Syria in order to eliminate the ongoing ISIL threat.
56
 
 
The writer has already discussed the uncertain status of the “unable or unwilling” test 
under international law, but if one accepts, purely for the sake of argument, that the 
test has assumed, or is at least assuming, the status of customary international law, it 
is respectfully submitted that, on the basis of facts within public knowledge, it is 
unclear whether the test is satisfied in this instance. It is simply not clear whether the 
Assad regime is either unable or unwilling to prevent the use of Syrian territory by IS. 
Facts on the ground would certainly seem to support the assertion that the regime is 
unable to do so – having lost large swathes of territory to IS over the past year or so, it 
might simply be argued that if Assad was able to prevent IS from operating within 
Syria, he would have done so by now. Therefore, by extension, one could argue that 
US-led strikes to defeat IS in Iraq can be extended into that territory which is no 
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longer under the effective control of the Assad government. Michael Lewis argues 
strongly in favour of the test being satisfied, stating that: 
 
Syria is unable to prevent its territory from being used by ISIS to plan, prepare and 
execute attacks against targets in Iraq…. Whether they are willing to cooperate with 
the US strikes against ISIS is irrelevant.
57
 
 
Notwithstanding the Assad regime’s apparent inability to counter the IS threat, the 
willingness to do so cannot be in dispute, and this is what complicates the situation. 
Although the Assad government has signalled its willingness to cooperate with US-
led air strikes against IS targets in Syria, the US has to date refused to coordinate its 
military activities with Assad’s regime.
58
 This raises doubts as to whether US-led 
strikes against IS in Syria can legitimately be founded on the right of self-defence. 
These same questions regarding the ability and willingness of the Syrian government 
to counter the threat posed by IS operating within Syria, in the context of collective 
self-defence on behalf of Iraq, may also arise in the context of a right of the United 
States to resort to force against IS in Syria in furtherance of a right of individual self-
defence. It should be noted that such a right was not invoked by Samantha Power in 
her letter to the UN Secretary-General, either in response to an armed attack by IS or 
in response to a specific, imminent threat to the US and its interests (including US 
nationals located in Iraq). Rather, Ms Power stated that: 
 
ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, but also to many 
other countries, including the United States and our partners in the region and 
beyond. States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent 
right of individual and collective self-defence, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.
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Whether such a right exists ultimately comes down to whether the US is at risk of an 
attack by IS. On the face of it, IS did not initially set out with any intentions to attack 
the US, being more focused on its principal objective of consolidating its territory in 
Iraq and Syria and establishing an Islamic caliphate, rather than planning and 
executing attacks against the US and its allies. However, although the US did not refer 
to the threat of a specific, imminent attack, given the brutal practices and ideology of 
IS, there is an understandable fear that IS may ultimately perpetrate an attack on US 
soil, and the US has pointed to the extreme ideology pursued by IS and its brutal 
methods to highlight the obvious threat posed by IS, both to the US itself and its 
coalition partners, thus giving rise to a right to respond in self-defence. In this respect, 
therefore, the US is clearly placing reliance on the doctrine of pre-emptive self-
defence, although not referring specifically to that doctrine. As was discussed in the 
previous chapter, the broader right of pre-emptive self-defence permits the use of 
force in the absence of a specific, imminent attack, but in response to a threat of a 
more remote future attack. As previously submitted, there is little international 
support for such a broad right of pre-emptive self-defence. The strongest advocate of 
the doctrine is the US, and although President Obama has avoided the terminology 
used by his predecessor in relation to pre-emptive self-defence, he has consistently 
maintained the right of the United States to resort to the use of force when deemed 
‘necessary’.
60
 
The evidence points, therefore, to the lack of a specific, imminent threat to the United 
States and its interests emanating from IS in Syria, making it difficult to base its resort 
to the use of force against IS in Syria on the right of self-defence. This raises the issue 
of whether the US can base its resort to force on the protection of US nationals in 
Iraq. It should be noted that there is no established rule that attacks on individual 
nationals abroad constitute an armed attack against a state for the purposes of 
engaging its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and 
certainly the US Ambassador did not expressly place reliance on any such rule in her 
letter to the UN Secretary-General.
61
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It is therefore clear that US involvement in Iraq against IS was at the invitation and by 
the consent of the Iraqi government, in response to the humanitarian crisis created by 
IS. The US has not proffered any justification of humanitarian intervention for the 
strikes against IS in Syria, which makes the discussion somewhat academic, 
particularly given the clarity of the legal justifications relied upon by the United 
States. 
While the jus ad bellum considerations in respect of US-led strikes, including by 
means of targeted drone strikes, against IS in Iraq, are relatively straightforward it has 
been shown that the jus ad bellum issues are more complex in relation to US-led 
strikes against IS in Syria. The legal issues are very much fused with the political 
situation prevailing in Syria in the context of an ongoing civil war. Essentially, the 
determination of whether the strikes against IS in Syria are compliant with the jus ad 
bellum hinges on considerations of necessity and proportionality, and on balance, it is 
respectfully submitted that in its collective self-defence of Iraq against the IS threat, 
these requirements are broadly satisfied. As to any argument that the aim has shifted 
from defending Iraq (and the US and its interests) to eradicating IS, raising 
uncertainty as to the proportionality of US action, it is respectfully submitted that, 
whatever the debate, the reality is that the former can only be achieved by the latter. 
As to necessity, this writer would not be persuaded by any argument that the threat 
posed by IS could be diminished solely by non-lethal alternatives, such as economic 
sanctions or diplomacy. IS is an extremist terrorist organisation. Its very nature and 
the brutality of its practices thereby necessitate an armed response to the threat it 
poses. 
 
 
3.7 Concluding Comments on US Drone Strikes and the Jus ad Bellum 
 
The question of whether the US drone programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, 
Somalia, and against the ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq and Syria, comply with the jus ad 
bellum, is certainly a complicated one. The United States has relied on both the 
principle of consent and the right to resort to force in self-defence as justifications for 
armed drone strikes against suspected terrorists in the aforementioned states. The 
drone programs have been controversial, and the legal bases of both justifications 
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proffered by the United States have been questioned by commentators, in particular 
the heavy reliance placed on the principle of consent. 
These previous two chapters have illustrated how a valid consent by the host state 
bars any claim by the host state that the state resorting to force is acting in violation of 
the jus ad bellum, even in those instances where the use of force would have been 
illegal if carried out by the consenting state itself. 
Of course, a valid consent does not in any way justify excessive force or force that 
contravenes the fundamental principles of international human rights law. 
Furthermore, the fact that consent is often shrouded in secrecy, as is the case with 
Pakistan in particular in relation to US drone strikes in the FATA region, raises the 
pertinent issue of whether consent should be stated publicly, or perhaps even 
formalised in writing and deposited with the UN Secretariat (as is the standard 
practice with bilateral and multilateral treaties) in order to be valid. Such measures 
would certainly bring a degree of transparency and accountability to the use of force, 
including current and future drone strikes carried out by the United States. 
The debate regarding the scope of the right to self-defence in respect of the use of 
force by the United States against suspected terrorists has been going on since the 
9/11 attacks, and is far from settled. Both the application and the precise threshold for 
the use of force in self-defence remain uncertain. Nonetheless, it is arguable that 
extraterritorial strikes using armed drones, absent the consent of the host state, may 
only be founded on lawful self-defence if the threat or use of force against the victim 
state amounts to an armed attack. The threat of a sporadic, isolated attack is clearly 
insufficient to amount to an armed attack for the purposes of engaging the right to 
resort to force in self-defence.  
If these previous two chapters illustrate anything, it is that the jus ad bellum is not 
static. It does not exist in a vacuum. In particular, the right to self-defence has 
undergone significant changes in the years since 9/11, the most significant of which 
being the general acceptance that an armed attack perpetrated by a non-state actor 
may engage Article 51 of the UN Charter. Of equal importance is the increasing 
acceptance of the ‘accumulation of events’ doctrine, which, by permitting a victim 
state to weigh the cumulative effect of a series of relatively small-scale attacks in 
order to determine if the threshold for engaging Article 51 has been satisfied, 
introduces a measure of flexibility to the jus ad bellum, and reflects the reality of the 
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threat posed by transnational terrorism, allowing a victim state to act against the threat 
posed by terrorism in a manner that is compliant with the jus ad bellum.  
The main problem, highlighted in the present chapter, is the paucity of evidence in the 
public domain, which often precludes a definitive determination on the legality of US 
drone strikes under the jus ad bellum. The involvement of the CIA, with its ‘neither 
confirm nor deny’ policy, in targeted killing operations in Pakistan and Yemen, the 
lack of information released by the US Administration, and the tendency of the US 
Administration to pronounce the legality of the US drone program in occasional 
speeches, such as Koh’s ASIL speech in 2010 and Obama’s May 2013 speech at the 
National Defense University, leaves a lacuna which can be filled by idle speculation 
as to the legal justifications being relied upon by the US in respect of its drone 
program in general, and specific targeting operations, particularly those occurring 
outside zones of active hostilities.  
This lack of transparency is unfortunate, for it facilitates an accountability vacuum, 
and opens the United States to criticism that its drone program operates in flagrant 
breach of settled principles of international law, including those forming the jus ad 
bellum. The only effective remedy for such deficiencies in transparency and 
accountability, it is respectfully submitted, is for the US to be much more forthcoming 
(subject of course to considerations of national security) with regard to the legal 
justifications underpinning the extraterritorial use of force by means of targeted drone 
strikes. The transfer of responsibility for the US drone program in Pakistan and other 
states from the CIA to the US military, presently underway, is a welcome step in the 
right direction. However, greater accountability can only be achieved by the 
establishing of independent oversight mechanisms, either by the executive, or, 
preferably, the judiciary. President Obama did indicate in his May 2013 speech that 
consideration would be given to establishing such mechanisms. It is regrettable that 
little has been achieved in this regard over two years later.
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4 
 
The US Drone Program and International Human Rights Law 
 
4.1 Background 
 
The following two chapters consider the legal paradigms regulating the conduct of 
hostilities – international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law 
(IHL). It is important to understand when and how these paradigms operate in the 
context of extraterritorial drone strikes conducted by the United States. The escalation 
in the use of armed drone strikes has been justified, politically at least, under the 
banner of a ‘war on terror’, and a lawful response in an ‘asymmetric conflict’. The 
primary purpose of the US’s drone program is the targeted killing of terrorist suspects. 
This purpose has led to growing concerns among commentators that the US drone 
program operates in violation of well-established principles of international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law, that it amounts to ‘extrajudicial 
killing’, and that coercive US targeting practices in its global counter-terrorism 
operations set a dangerous precedent as more states acquire UAV technology.
1
 
Despite the wealth of legal argument, the legality of US drone strikes under both 
paradigms is far from settled, and remains a live and controversial issue. It shall 
become clear in the course of this chapter that there is no broad consensus in relation 
to the issue of whether US drone strikes violate that most fundamental of human 
rights, the right to life, with its prohibition against arbitrary killing. US policy and 
targeting practices certainly appear to challenge established norms of international 
human rights law. 
The nature of US drone operations has brought to the fore the issues of how human 
rights obligations are to be applied in situations of armed conflict, and the 
extraterritorial application of a state’s obligations under international human rights 
law to measures taken outside the state’s sovereign territory. The issue of when, and 
in what circumstances, a state’s obligations under international human rights law can 
extend to measures of lethal force taken outside its own territory, has divided juristic 
and academic opinion, though, as shall be seen, there is now a broad acceptance 
among states (the United States being the notable exception) that, in certain 
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circumstances, human rights obligations can extend extraterritorially, and that lethal 
force employed by a state outside its own territory can come under purview of 
international human rights law. This, in turn, has a bearing on the relationship 
between international human rights law and international humanitarian law, 
particularly when a state employs lethal force in the context of an armed conflict. This 
particular issue shall be examined in greater detail in Chapter 5, suffice it to say for 
now that the applicability and interpretation of certain human rights obligations, 
particularly in respect of the right to life, are not unaffected by the existence of an 
armed conflict and the applicability of international humanitarian law. 
 
4.2 The International Human Rights Law (IHRL) Paradigm 
 
The previous two chapters of this work demonstrated how the self-defence paradigm 
permits a state, when confronted with an actual or imminent armed attack, to resort to 
the use of necessary and proportionate force under Article 51 of the UN Charter and 
customary international law. In all situations of armed violence, a state’s use of force 
is regulated by the principles of international human rights law, and, in those 
situations where the level of violence does not meet the threshold requirements of 
intensity and organisation required of an armed conflict, a state may only use law 
enforcement methods to ensure its security.
2
 In a situation of armed conflict, which 
engages the application of international humanitarian law, it is now a well-established 
principle, affirmed both in the jurisprudence of the ICJ and in numerous General 
Assembly and Security Council resolutions, that international human rights law 
continues to apply, complementary to international humanitarian law.
3
 Therefore, if a 
state is not operating within the self-defence or armed conflict paradigms, its use of 
force must automatically be regulated by the principles of international human rights 
law. The legality of targeted killings using armed drones is related to the choice of 
legal framework best suited to tackle the issue of international terrorism. 
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive treaty law and no customary lex specialis 
relating to terrorism, and so states have been left to address the problems of 
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international terrorism within the existing corpus of international law. Ben Saul 
rightly recognises the drawbacks of this situation, and his recent monograph is a noble 
effort to bring together the various norms and principles in the entire corpus of 
international law that relate in some way to terrorism, including international and 
regional treaty law, customary international law, UN Security Council practice, and 
national and international jurisprudence seeking to define terrorism.
4
 Saul points to 
the intense and persistent disagreement amongst states and commentators regarding 
the definition of terrorism over many years, insufficient evidence of state practice and 
opinio juris supporting a customary international definition or crime of terrorism, the 
fact that national and international judicial bodies rarely invoke terrorism as an 
operative legal concept in its own right, whilst at the same time noting the evolution 
and codification of distinctive prohibitions on terrorism in armed conflict under 
international humanitarian law.
5
 The academic debate rages on as to whether 
terrorism falls under the purview of international human rights law, or under the self-
defence or armed conflict paradigms, and as to which paradigm properly governs the 
US’s various drone programs against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces. 
The human rights and armed conflict paradigms have both been asserted, and sound 
arguments exist for each applying at certain times and places in the US’s current 
campaign. Some scholars, such as Stein, submit that terrorism is a purely criminal 
matter, not a military matter coming under the purview of the law of armed conflict, 
and so the correct paradigm is international human rights law.
6
 O’Connell submits 
that isolated acts of terrorism do not rise to the level of an armed conflict.
7
 In 
O’Connell’s opinion, terrorism, generally, is a crime, and because of the usually 
sporadic nature of terrorist acts, such acts do not rise to the requisite level of violence 
to constitute an armed attack or an armed conflict.
8
 Therefore, O’Connell submits, 
states do not have a right to act in self-defence or to use military force against 
terrorists, and instead must rely on law enforcement measures within the international 
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human rights law paradigm.
9
 O’Connell bases her arguments on state practice and 
opinio juris that treat terrorism simply as a criminal activity, pointing to a corpus of 
state practice evidencing that states regularly employ law enforcement methods 
against terrorists, for example the UK’s use of police surveillance and criminal justice 
mechanisms in countering the threat posed by the Provisional IRA, and Spain’s 
successful criminal prosecution of the individuals responsible for the Madrid train 
bombing in March 2004. Further, it is of note that the UN Security Council has used 
Article 42 of the UN Charter on several occasions to require states to respond to 
terrorism with law enforcement measures, such as extradition, criminal prosecution, 
and freezing the assets of terrorist suspects.
10
 There does, indeed, exist evidence of 
states’ opinio juris that terrorism is a crime that falls outside the purview of 
international humanitarian law. For example, the UK expressly stated, in its 
reservations to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, its position that, 
“the term ‘armed conflict’…denotes a situation of a kind that is not constituted by the 
commission of ordinary crimes, including acts of terrorism, whether concerted or in 
isolation.”
11
 Similarly, in Tadic, the ICTY opined that, “terrorist activities…are not 
subject to international humanitarian law.”
12
 
As Lubell rightly submits, the international human rights law paradigm contains rules 
relating to the use of force by the state against the individual, in particular the right to 
life and the prohibition against arbitrary killing.
13
 These rules are found in treaties 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
14
 both of which contain provisions 
prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of life. In the context of the US drone program, 
therefore, the rules of international human rights law are highly relevant in any 
assessment of the legality of lethal force and targeted killings. A state acting within 
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the international human rights law paradigm must operate within, what Alston terms, 
the, “law enforcement model.”
15
 This term in fact refers to the type of force that can 
be employed, not who may employ the force. Any and all state organs authorised to 
execute police powers, including military and security forces, may employ force in 
accordance with the law enforcement model.
16
 The model permits non-military 
tactics, such as arrest, extradition, detention and trial.
17
 
In the previous chapters relating to the jus ad bellum, it was discussed how the issue 
of the resort to the use of force became more complicated by virtue of the fact that the 
initial armed attack was perpetrated by a non-state actor, the Al-Qaeda terrorist 
network. It is submitted that this presents little difficulty with respect to assessing the 
legality of armed drone strikes under international human rights law, which is, by 
definition, designed to regulate the relationship between the state and the individual 
person.  
The legality of targeted killings by means of armed drone strikes under the 
international human rights law paradigm is, therefore, far from being a settled issue. 
Some commentators, such as Alston, take the view that such targeted killings are 
almost always in violation of international human rights law, whereas other 
commentators, such as Paust and Orr, take the view that US targeting practices 
comply fully with human rights obligations.
18
 
Traditionally, proponents of the US’s targeted killing practices have sought to 
legitimise those practices by pointing to their efficiency and effectiveness in counter-
terrorism operations.
19
 Returning briefly to Professor Koh’s seminal speech before the 
ASIL in 2010, in respect of the US’s targeted killing operations, including those 
carried out using armed drones, Koh advances the US Administration’s legal 
justifications – the first, that the US is acting in lawful self-defence, and the second, 
that the US is engaged in an ongoing armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
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associated forces.
20
 Any reference to the application of human rights law to the US’s 
targeted killing program, in particular the right to life enshrined in Article 6 of the 
ICCPR, is conspicuous by its absence. This omission is hardly surprising, given the 
US’s long-standing objection to the extraterritorial application of its obligations 
arising under the ICCPR.
21
 Both the Bush and Obama Administrations have 
obstinately maintained the position that the US’s obligations under the ICCPR apply 
only to acts of the state within its own territory, and that the US can act 
extraterritorially, including by the use of lethal force, unencumbered by those same 
obligations. The US position is rather isolated, supported only by Israel, and criticised 
by the majority of commentators outside the US, ignoring as it does the broad 
consensus on the universal applicability of international human rights law.
22
 Indeed, 
Koh, in his capacity as Legal Adviser to the US State Department, in two opinions 
from 2010 that were leaked to the media, opined that the US position in relation to the 
extraterritorial application of human rights obligations was becoming increasingly 
untenable, and that the Obama Administration should consider abandoning its 
position objecting to extraterritorial applicability.
23
 It is most unfortunate, then, that 
the United States has, to date, chosen to maintain the status quo in this respect. 
 
Within a situation of armed conflict, a state may legally employ targeted killing 
practices, so long as those practices comply with the jus in bello principles of 
necessity, proportionality and distinction. O’Connell submits that targeted killings 
outside situations of armed conflict (that is, in peacetime), and thus which fall within 
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the purview of the human rights paradigm, are unlawful.
24
 O’Connell rightly 
recognises that a state acting within the human rights paradigm must limit the use of 
lethal force to situations of absolute necessity, where lives are imminently threatened. 
This principle is recognised in most international and regional human rights 
instruments, and in the jurisprudence of various judicial organs established under 
those instruments.
25
 Such emergency situations are the only permissible derogation 
from the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of life. Furthermore, because killing 
is not permitted to be the sole objective of any measures taken in derogation from the 
prohibition, targeted killing is, by its very definition, unlawful under the international 
human rights law paradigm. O’Connell submits that drones, as a weapons delivery 
platform, employ military force, and so are, “therefore lawful only in armed conflict 
hostilities.”
26
 O’Connell’s arguments are clearly based, it is submitted, on US 
targeting practices to date, where drones have been used to target terrorist suspects 
posing no apparent imminent threat. By way of example, let us consider the first 
targeted killing by means of an armed drone strike outside a theatre of armed conflict 
hostilities, which is believed to have occurred on 3
rd
 November 2002, in Yemen. The 
target was Qaed Senyn al-Harithi (also known as Abu Ali). Al-Harithi was the 
suspected mastermind of the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.
27
 Al-Harithi 
and five other suspected Al-Qaeda militants were killed when a drone operated by the 
CIA launched two Hellfire missiles, destroying the jeep in which the men were 
travelling, in the northern province of Marib, 160 kilometres east of the capital, 
Sana’a.
28
 In response to the drone strike that killed al-Harithi and his associates, the 
then UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings, Asma 
Jahangir, reported that the incident constituted, “a clear case of extrajudicial 
killing.”
29
 Given that, on the basis of the facts within public knowledge, al-Harithi 
posed no imminent threat at the time of the drone strike, there is a sound basis for 
                                                 
24
 See O’Connell, supra n.8, at 599. 
25
 See, for example, Article 2(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. See also the decision 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Las Palmeras Case, Judgment dated 26
th
 
November 2002, Series C No.96 (2002). 
26
 See O’Connell, supra n.8, at 589. 
27
 See N. Melzer, Targeted Killings in International Law, Oxford Monographs in International Law, 
(OUP, 2008), at 3. 
28
 See ‘US Predator Kills 6 Al-Qaeda Suspects’, ABC News, 4
th
 November 2002, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=130027&page=1, (accessed 2
nd
 June 2015). 
29
 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Civil and Political Rights, Including 
the Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Asma Jahangir, 13
th
 January 2003, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/3, at para.19. 
 86 
arguing that the strike violated the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of life and 
was thus unlawful under international human rights law. On the face of it, al-Harithi 
seems to have been targeted on the basis of his past involvement in planning attacks, 
in particular the attack on the USS Cole. This raises the spectre of whether the drone 
strike in fact constituted an unlawful reprisal, being an act of retribution for al-
Harithi’s past misdeeds, although the US would certainly counter any such accusation 
by pointing out that the targeted killing of al-Harithi prevented the planning and 
execution of future attacks on US interests, in which al-Harithi would have played a 
pivotal role. 
 
4.3 The Right to Life in International Human Rights Law 
 
The right to life sits at the apex of rights and freedoms guaranteed under international 
human rights law, and while its scope has been debated, particularly in relation to 
extraterritorial counter-terrorism operations involving the use of lethal force, the 
foundational status of the right has not been seriously challenged. 
The inherent right to life of the individual enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ICCPR 
prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life. Article 6(1) provides that, “[e]very human 
being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”
30
 The use of the word ‘inherent’ as a descriptor of 
the right is important, as it indicates the existence of the right independent from its 
recognition in the Covenant.
31
 The right to life is to be found in every major human 
rights instrument, such is the recognition of its importance.
32
 Central to the right to 
life as expressed in these various instruments is a prohibition, the essence of which, as 
Lubell rightly submits, is to prohibit extrajudicial executions and arbitrary killings by 
the state.
33
 The prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of life contained within the 
right to life has attained the status of customary international law, and is therefore an 
obligation binding upon all states, irrespective of whether or not they are signatories 
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to any particular human rights instrument, and has arguably attained the status of a jus 
cogens norm of international law.
34
 As shall be shown, the right to life does not 
automatically adjudge all loss of life as a result of state action to be arbitrary and thus 
in violation of international human rights law, and under this corpus of law, the use of 
lethal force against an individual can be justified in narrow, specific circumstances, as 
a measure of last resort, to be used only when strictly unavoidable in order to protect 
life from an imminent threat. With limited exceptions, therefore, the state may not 
wantonly attempt to take the life of an individual. There exist three relevant 
exceptions: 
i. The deprivation of life in accordance with a lawfully imposed death penalty, 
unless the state is party to an instrument forbidding capital punishment, such 
as the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR;
35
 
ii. Killings taking place in the context of an armed conflict, and which are lawful 
under international humanitarian law;
36
 
iii. Necessary and proportionate force, where lethal force was not the first option. 
As to the first exception, Lubell submits that a targeted killing by one state in the 
territory of another state would not comply with the requirements of a lawfully 
imposed death penalty.
37
 Lubell’s submission is convincing, for while Article 6(2) of 
the ICCPR contains an exception for death penalties, this exception must be read in 
conjunction with the procedural requirements of a fair trial, a right enshrined in 
Article 16 of the ICCPR. Extraterritorial targeted killings may certainly violate any 
number of these procedural guarantees, such as the imposition of a capital sentence 
without trial, proceedings in absentia where the individual is not afforded the 
opportunity to mount a defence, and a lack of opportunity to appeal or to seek a 
pardon. Furthermore, as Lubell rightly submits, the carrying out of an execution in 
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such a manner, outside a monitored and controlled environment, may well violate the 
prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
38
 
As to the second exception, the operation of same rests very much on the precise 
circumstances and the interpretation given to the concurrent application of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the context of an 
armed conflict, and it is proposed to deal with this issue in Chapter 5. 
Under international human rights law, two principles govern the use of lethal force 
outside a situation of armed conflict – necessity and proportionality.
39
 The precise 
meaning of these terms in the context of the international human rights law paradigm 
is markedly different to the meanings of these terms under the jus ad bellum and 
international humanitarian law paradigms. Alston submits that, under international 
human rights law: 
 
[A] state killing is legal only if it is required to protect life (making lethal force 
proportionate) and there is no other means, such as capture or non-lethal 
incapacitation, of preventing that threat to life (making lethal force necessary).
40
 
 
Further, Melzer notes that, under the international human rights law paradigm, the test 
of proportionality asks not whether the use of lethal force is necessary to remove the 
threat, but whether it is justified in view of the nature and scale of the threat posed.
41
 
The threat to life that the use of lethal force seeks to counter must be imminent. The 
question of imminence is extremely important in the context of the legality of drone 
strikes under international human rights law, particularly given the lack of 
transparency in relation to targeting decisions.
42
 There is, of course, the obvious risk 
that in the absence of an imminence requirement, targeted killings may become a 
means of exacting retribution for past actions, which could constitute unlawful 
reprisals. In his report of September 2013, UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns 
challenged the much broader concept of imminence favoured by the United States, 
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apparent in the now infamous leaked Department of Justice White Paper,
43
 which 
effectively dispensed with any requirement that an individual pose an immediate 
threat before being the target of lethal force, stating that: 
 
The view that mere past involvement in planning attacks is sufficient to render an 
individual targetable even where there is no evidence of a specific and immediate 
attack distorts the requirements established in international human rights law.
44
 
 
Given the significant constraints on the intentional use of lethal force under 
international human rights law, Alston concludes that: 
 
[O]utside the context of armed conflict, the use of drones for targeted killing is almost 
never likely to be legal. A targeted drone killing in a state’s own territory, over which 
the state has control, would be very unlikely to meet human rights law limitations on 
the use of lethal force.
45
 
 
Further, outside a state’s own territory: 
 
There are very few situations outside the context of armed activities in which the test 
for anticipatory self-defence…would be met….In addition, drone killing of anyone 
other than the target (family members or others in the vicinity, for example) would be 
an arbitrary deprivation of life under human rights law and could result in state 
responsibility and individual criminal liability.
46
 
 
Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC has echoed Alston’s conclusions. In his report 
of 18
th
 September 2013, Emmerson concludes that, outside situations of armed 
conflict, drone strikes will usually violate international human rights law, because 
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only in the most limited of circumstances would it be permissible under that legal 
paradigm for killing to be the sole or primary objective of an operation.
47
 
 
Therefore, as to the third stated exception, lethal force employed by a state must be 
proportionate to a legitimate aim, and necessary, after all less harmful means have 
been reasonably exhausted. It would have to be demonstrated, therefore, that efforts to 
arrest or capture were either made and were unsuccessful, or were shown to be 
unfeasible. Therefore, the actions of the state would have to be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim of protecting life, and not simply retribution for past acts of terrorism. 
There must exist sufficient, credible evidence that the individual targeted posed a real, 
imminent and grave threat. In consequence, unnecessary or disproportionate force 
may violate international human rights law. The European Court of Human Rights 
upheld the precepts of necessity and proportionality in the case of McCann -v- United 
Kingdom, reaffirming the requirements of necessity, proportionality and imminence 
of threat, which must be present in order for the use of lethal force against terrorist 
suspects to comply with human rights law.
48
 In that case, the Court held that the 
killing of members of the Provisional IRA by British state agents was a violation of 
the right to life expressed in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
because those individuals could have been arrested and detained upon their arrival in 
Gibraltar, where the operation was conducted.
49
 Therefore, it is submitted that the 
intentional, premeditated killing of an individual would generally violate the 
prohibition against arbitrary killing, however, where an intentional killing is the only 
means of protecting life against an imminent threat, it is generally lawful. 
International human rights law, therefore, can only render lawful lethal force that 
would otherwise constitute a violation of the right to life where such force is 
absolutely necessary, where there is evidence to indicate that capture and detention is 
not a feasible alternative to lethal force, and where the targeted person is about to 
commit an attack that cannot be repelled by any other means. A state’s obligations 
arising under international human rights law therefore constrains the state from 
pursuing an unremitting policy of targeted killings. 
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4.4 Application of International Human Rights Law Within and Linked to 
Armed Conflict 
 
The interrelationship between international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law will be examined through the prism of US drone strikes in greater 
detail towards the end of Chapter 5. At this point, it is worth mentioning how 
international human rights law applies within, and linked to, a situation of armed 
conflict. It is a well-established principle of international law that human rights 
obligations continue to apply during an armed conflict (whether international or non-
international), as a complement to international humanitarian law.
50
 In The Wall, the 
ICJ affirmed that: 
 
The protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in cases of armed 
conflict, save through derogations under Article 4 of the ICCPR.
51
 
 
The UN Human Rights Committee also clarified that: 
 
The ICCPR applies in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international 
humanitarian law are applicable. Both spheres of law are complementary, not 
mutually exclusive.
52
 
 
Therefore, the right to life continues to apply in situations of armed conflict, however, 
as the ICJ has held in Nuclear Weapons and The Wall, in such situations the 
prohibition against arbitrary killing must be interpreted according to the applicable 
targeting rules of international humanitarian law.
53
 The applicability of international 
human rights obligations during situations of armed conflict is confirmed by the 
presence of derogation provisions in most human rights instruments, which permit 
states parties to derogate from specific obligations under these treaties in times of war 
or public emergency.
54
 Absent any provision for derogation, human rights obligations 
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continue to apply during an armed conflict. This, of course, applies to the right to life, 
which is usually non-derogable.
55
 
Aside from, and in addition to, any determination under the jus ad bellum as to the 
legality of the use of force in the territory of another state, outside a situation of armed 
conflict, the corpus of international human rights law will be the proper framework 
for determining the legality of armed drone strikes. Of course, within a situation of 
armed conflict, non-derogable rights will continue to apply in full, while others may 
apply subject to any permissible derogation, to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation of armed conflict.
56
 
In an oft-cited dictum pertaining to the right to life as expressed in Article 6 of the 
ICCPR, the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, opined that: 
 
[t]he protection of the ICCPR does not cease in times of war, save by operation of 
Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time 
of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. 
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in 
hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be 
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed 
conflict, which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. This, whether a 
particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be 
considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can 
only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflicts and not deduced 
from the terms of the Covenant itself.
57
 
 
Several states, in particular the United States and Israel, argued unsuccessfully before 
the Court that the relevant provisions of the ICCPR were not applicable in a situation 
of armed conflict. This position has been generally discredited, and there is 
widespread international consensus as to the coexistence and interrelation of the 
human rights and armed conflict paradigms in situations of armed violence where the 
threshold requirements of armed conflict are satisfied. Yet the US obstinately rejects 
the applicability of international human rights law in situations of armed conflict to 
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individuals brought under its control and jurisdiction. For example, in its response 
dated 15
th
 April 2001 to the decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights to order precautionary measures in the Guantanamo Detainees Case, the US 
Administration submitted that international human rights law was not applicable to 
the conduct of hostilities or to the capture and detention of enemy combatants, and 
that these are instead governed by the more specific laws of armed conflict.
58
 
Furthermore, as noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions in 2004, the US position in respect of both its military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the al-Harithi drone strike in Yemen carried 
out by the CIA, implies that, where the law of armed conflict applies, it operates to 
exclude the application of international human rights law.
59
 The United States 
maintains its position that it is engaged in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban and associated forces, and that the law of armed conflict therefore applies to 
the exclusion of international human rights law. One can certainly understand the 
obvious attraction of justifying the use of lethal force, including targeted drone 
strikes, under the law of armed conflict, which has more permissive rules for the use 
of lethal force than international human rights law, and which offers the shield of the 
combatants’ privilege to military personnel participating in hostilities. 
As stated, however, the US position has been generally discredited, and there is broad 
consensus on the continued applicability of the relevant corpus of human rights law in 
situations of armed conflict. Certainly, in the view of this writer, the United States has 
not advanced any convincing arguments to substantiate its position of ‘mutual 
exclusivity’, a position which, it is submitted, stands in clear contradiction to treaty 
law and state practice. The United States did not enter any specific reservations as to 
the applicability of Article 6 of the ICCPR in situations of armed conflict at the time 
of its ratification of the Covenant in 1992, and its position neglects the historical fact 
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Geneva Conventions 
(1949), as well as the various regional human rights instruments, were drafted based 
on an awareness of the close link between armed conflict and violations of human 
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rights, coming soon after the atrocities committed during the Second World War 
(1939-1945). Further, it is of note that, as well as rejecting the applicability of human 
rights law in such cases, the United States initially refused to apply conventional 
international humanitarian law to counter-terrorism operations undertaken by its 
military, up until the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hamdan -v- 
Rumsfeld in June 2006, where the Court held that Common Article 3 of Geneva 
Conventions I-IV was applicable to the hostilities between the United States and Al-
Qaeda.
60
 It is difficult to find any legal merit in the evasive position maintained by the 
US in relation to the applicability of human rights law in situations of armed conflict, 
and the US’s position appears to lack moral credibility, particularly when the US 
positions itself in its international relations as a champion of democracy and respect 
for human rights. 
It is, therefore, a generally accepted principle that a situation of armed conflict giving 
rise to the applicability of international humanitarian law does not entail the 
suspension of a state’s obligations under international human rights law. In situations 
of armed conflict, the lawfulness of any deprivation of life must be determined first 
by reference to the lex specialis of international humanitarian law. To the extent that 
the lex specialis provides a specific rule covering the situation being considered, that 
rule takes precedence over the continuously applicable lex generalis of international 
human rights law. This precedence does not exclude the application of the particular 
rule of human rights law, but merely determines how that rule is to be interpreted. 
Only where the lex specialis of the law of armed conflict does not provide any rule at 
all, and where no sufficient guidance can be derived by the standard methods of treaty 
interpretation or by reference to the general principles underlying international 
humanitarian law, will recourse to the lex generalis of international human rights law 
be appropriate. 
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4.5 Applicability of International Human Rights Law to Extraterritorial Actions 
by States 
 
A key issue in analysing the applicability of international human rights law in the 
context of the US drone program is that of extraterritoriality. Are states bound by their 
human rights obligations when acting outside the borders of their own territory? Any 
assessment of the compliance of US drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen 
and Somalia with international human rights law requires an examination of whether 
the US’s obligations under international human rights law extend to the 
extraterritorial use of lethal force. 
There does exist ICJ jurisprudence in The Wall,
61
 Armed Activities,
62
 and Georgia -v- 
Russian Federation,
63
 which indicates that states can indeed be bound by international 
human rights law obligations in respect of activities undertaken on the territory of 
another state. Similarly, the UN Human Rights Committee has, on various occasions, 
clearly stated that extraterritorial activity by a state may be subject to that state’s 
obligations under international human rights law.
64
 
One argument repeatedly advanced in order to justify targeted killings using drones is 
based upon a narrow interpretation of international human rights law, for example 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR and Article 1 of the ECHR, which would be supportive of 
the position that states are only obligated to uphold the various rights and freedoms 
set out in human rights instruments within their own territories and in areas falling 
under their jurisdiction. 
Professor Paust submits that US targeting practices do not violate the arbitrary killing 
standard of international human rights law.
65
 Paust takes the view that extraterritorial 
targeted killings of suspected terrorists do not violate the, “general human right to 
freedom from arbitrary deprivation of life,” because it, “will only be applicable with 
respect to those persons who are within the jurisdiction, actual power, or effective 
control of the state or other entity using a drone.”
66
 Paust’s argument is clearly based 
                                                 
61
 See The Wall, supra n.3. 
62
 See Armed Activities, (2005) ICJ Rep.168. 
63
 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, ICJ, 15
th
 October 2008. 
64
 See, for example, Delia Saldias de Lopez –v- Uraguay, supra n.22, at para.88. See also UN Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment 31, supra n.22, at para.10. 
65
 See Jordan J. Paust, supra n.18, at 569-570. 
66
 Ibid, at 573-574. 
 96 
on the narrowly held view that a state’s international human rights law obligations are 
not of extraterritorial application. 
Andrew C. Orr adopts a similar position to that of Professor Paust. Writing in respect 
of US drone strikes in the tribal areas of north-west Pakistan, Orr takes the view that 
such strikes do not violate the right to life as expressed in Article 6(1) of the ICCPR.
67
 
Orr rightly recognises that a state is permitted to derogate from the prohibition on 
arbitrary killing in emergency situations, but that this derogation does not extend to 
punitive or deterrent killing. However, Orr submits that, far from being arbitrary, the 
targeted drone strikes against Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in Pakistan aim to 
disrupt future attacks rather than to punish or deter terrorist activities.
68
 Further, Orr 
submits, it is not at all clear whether the obligations owed by the US under the ICCPR 
extend to militants operating in Pakistan. The US is clearly obligated under Article 
2(1) of the ICCPR to guarantee the rights of persons within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction, however Orr submits that Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in Pakistan 
are neither within US territory nor subject to its jurisdiction, and so are not entitled to 
be afforded by the US the human rights protections of the ICCPR.
69
 Properly 
construed, Orr submits, in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, which provides for interpretation, “in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms,” the jurisdictional provision of the 
ICCPR does not obligate the United States to safeguard the right to life of terrorist 
suspects in Pakistan, and thus drone strikes that eliminate such targeted suspects do 
not violate the prohibition on arbitrary killing expressed in Article 6(1) of the ICCPR. 
Orr notes that, beyond refusing to adhere to the principles of international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law, Al-Qaeda rejects the premises 
underlying both frameworks.
70
 In the words of Sloane: 
 
[T]he common denominator of the war convention – which, absent reciprocity, 
repudiation, and other inter-state political dynamics, makes it “work”, however 
imperfectly, is a shared normative commitment to reducing superfluous suffering and 
harm in war. And the main convention by which international humanitarian law 
accomplishes this is the axiom of non-combatant activity, which modern transnational 
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terrorist networks typified by Al-Qaeda reject. This “new” genre of non-state actor 
also rejects the secular, aspirationally universal conception of human dignity 
underlying international human rights law.
71
  
 
Therefore, Orr submits, to insist, as O’Connell does, that existing law enforcement 
methods within the human rights law paradigm are perfectly capable of countering the 
threat posed by groups such as Al-Qaeda and other non-state actors, is to ignore the 
discrepancies between the underlying premises of that paradigm and the methods 
employed by Al-Qaeda and various affiliated groups in reality.
72
 
 
This narrow interpretation of a state’s human right obligations, seemingly favoured by 
scholars such as Paust and Orr, was certainly evidenced in the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Bankovic -v- Belgium and Others, where the 
Court admonished European states who participated in NATO’s aerial bombardment 
of the Serbian capital, Belgrade, during the Kosovo conflict in 1999, from any 
liability for loss of lives resulting from NATO air strikes, on the basis that the 
territory over which the strikes occurred was outside the Court’s ‘primary territorial’ 
definition of ‘jurisdiction’.
73
 Essentially, the Court decided against the extraterritorial 
application of the right to life as expressed in Article 2 of the ECHR, holding that a 
state party’s obligations in respect of that right extended only to the state’s own 
territory within its ‘effective control’, or territory which it physically occupies.  
Bankovic is certainly an interesting decision, for it appears to suggest that aerial 
bombardment does not bring a targeted individual within the jurisdiction of the 
targeting state. On one reading, the decision of the Court effectively negates the 
authority or control test and limits the extraterritorial applicability of the right to life 
expressed in Article 2 of the ECHR to those individuals coming within the effective 
control of the targeting state.
74
 Bankovic has been heavily criticised for seeming to 
provide states with carte blanche to kill citizens of other states with impunity, as well 
as for disregarding the notion of varying degrees of ‘effective control’, including 
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limited control over another state’s airspace, which can give rise to a measure of 
obligation under international human rights law. 
It is, however, important to note that the central issue in Bankovic was that of 
admissibility, and so the Court’s decision should not be taken as overruling previous 
jurisprudence that makes clear use of the authority or control test, as well as the 
pronouncements of other international organisations.
75
 Further, one must welcome the 
fact that the European Court of Human Rights has seen the error of its ways and has 
since narrowed the very broad sweep of its decision in Bankovic in later cases.
76
 
It is respectfully submitted that the arguments of Paust and Orr that the United States 
is not obliged to uphold international human rights law in respect of its extraterritorial 
operations, cannot be justified from a moral perspective, and go against the widely 
accepted notion of the universality of international human rights law. Denying the 
applicability of international human rights law to cases of extraterritorial targeted 
killing from a distance, as Paust and Orr do, and as Bankovic appears to do, by 
claiming that the targeted individual is not brought under the authority or control of 
the targeting state, creates a dangerous incentive for states to evade the applicability 
of human rights obligations by favouring one method of killing over another. While a 
state that pursues a policy of capture and detention must adhere to human rights 
obligations in respect of an individual’s detention, a state that pursues a policy of 
targeted killings might seek to evade scrutiny of its actions. 
It is submitted that the appropriate test for the applicability of the right to life 
expressed in Article 6 of the ICCPR in such circumstances is whether the targeting 
state exercises authority or control over the targeted individual in such a way that the 
individual’s right to life is essentially in the hands of the targeting state. If state actors, 
even if targeting from a distance, or even remotely using an armed drone, are able to 
undertake their missions with the intent to kill the individual, this amounts to a form 
of authority or control over the life of the individual that engages the human rights 
law obligations of the targeting state, including the prohibition against arbitrary 
deprivation of life. 
Authority or control should, therefore, correctly be interpreted to include not only 
situations where the targeted individual is physically in the hands of the targeting 
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state, but also any situation where, irrespective of physical distance, the targeting state 
has the ability to target and eliminate the individual. It is not so much about physical 
distance as the key factor in determining authority or control, and thus the 
extraterritorial applicability of human rights law obligations, but more to do with the 
power of the targeting state against the individual. In this sense, the state possesses the 
ultimate coercive power – the power to deprive the individual of his life. Whilst it is 
accepted that, on a strict interpretation, the ICCPR is limited in scope territorially, 
binding only upon states parties, requiring states to extend human rights protections to 
their citizens or persons within their sovereign territory, this writer shares the 
submissions of Paul Gormley that the obligation on a state not to arbitrarily deprive 
individuals of the right to life is of an erga omnes nature, owed to all states by all 
states, and is most likely a jus cogens norm of international law.
77
 Therefore, states 
are obligated to ensure individuals the right to life regardless of a state’s jurisdiction, 
actual power, or effective control of an individual. Thus, any targeted killing of an 
individual committed by a state outside the contexts of legitimate self-defence or 
armed conflict, including by means of armed drone strikes, and where the targeted 
individual presents no imminent threat, necessarily implicates human rights 
violations. 
 
Returning to the 2002 drone strike that killed al-Harithi in Yemen, the US 
Administration justified that strike on the basis that it was part of the US’s ‘war on 
terror’.
78
 This raises the separate issue of whether the strike was undertaken in the 
context of an armed conflict. The academic debate on the issue of whether actions 
taken outside zones of active hostilities (the ‘hot battlefields’ of Iraq and Afghanistan) 
in furtherance of this ‘war on terror’ can be considered part of an armed conflict, 
thereby engaging international humanitarian law, remains ongoing, and shall be 
examined in Chapter 5. At this stage, however, it should be noted that there are 
serious difficulties in accepting without reservation such measures as part of an armed 
conflict coming under the purview of international humanitarian law, and it is 
respectfully submitted that the circumstances of this particular strike are such that its 
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legality must be determined under the international human rights law paradigm. For 
the strike not to have violated the prohibition against arbitrary killing expressed in 
Article 6 of the ICCPR, it must have been carried out in accordance with the law, it 
must not have been arbitrary, and must have been necessary and proportionate. It 
could be argued that the strike against al-Harithi was not arbitrary, in the sense that it 
was a planned, intentional attack against a specific individual, although whether it was 
carried out in accordance with the law is questionable. It could well be argued that 
such targeted killings are in violation of US domestic law, in particular Executive 
Order 12333 banning assassinations, though the official view seems to be that there 
was legal authority for this particular strike and that it was undertaken with the 
consent and cooperation of the Yemeni authorities.
79
 The application of US domestic 
law to the issue creates a legal quagmire that is beyond the scope of this work. 
However, if the strike was found to be in violation of US domestic law, this would 
inevitably lead to a finding that it violated the right to life under international human 
rights law. If, however, it could be concluded that the strike was indeed regulated by 
law, it falls to be determined whether the force used complied with the principles of 
necessity and proportionality. From a human rights law perspective, it is submitted 
that, at first glance, it is difficult to reconcile the lethal force that killed al-Harithi with 
the underlying principles of international human rights law, and indeed some 
commentators have labelled the strike as an extrajudicial execution, given its apparent 
premeditation and lack of consideration given to capture and detention as an 
alternative to lethal force.
80
 The problem, however, is that the US has not indicated 
whether there was intelligence to suggest that al-Harithi and his five associates 
presented an imminent threat justifying lethal force as a proportionate response. Of 
course, one could understand the reluctance on the part of the US Administration to 
reveal intelligence sources, however the US has not detailed any specific imminent 
threat that was averted by the strike. Indeed, from the facts within public knowledge, 
it seems that the principal reason for targeting al-Harithi was, as alluded to previously 
in this chapter, his involvement in the attack on the USS Cole. Whilst it is not disputed 
that al-Harithi would certainly have continued to play an active role in future Al-
Qaeda attacks had he not been targeted, past violent actions cannot justify 
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extrajudicial killing, and international human rights law does not provide for lawful 
killing based solely on membership of a terrorist organisation unless there is evidence 
that the person targeted presents an imminent threat. 
On this basis, therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the drone strike that killed al-
Harithi and the five other men travelling with him violated the right to life and the 
prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of life as expressed in the ICCPR.  
 
4.6 Concluding Comments 
 
The above analysis, however, does not necessarily mean that all drone strikes 
automatically violate international human rights law, and it would be ill-judged to 
cloak the entire US drone program in a blanket of illegality. Certainly, in different, 
albeit exceptional, circumstances and with additional evidence, such strikes may not 
violate the right to life. Essentially, the legality of a drone strike under international 
human rights law can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, having regard to 
the specific circumstances surrounding the strike, including the identity of the targeted 
individual and the presence or otherwise of any imminent threat posed by the 
individual at the time. Ultimately, under international human rights law, the legality 
of any use of lethal force, including killing by remote weapons, will depend on 
satisfaction of the aforementioned tests, including those of necessity and 
proportionality. The problem remains the lack of transparency surrounding the US’s 
targeting practices, in particular the reluctance to detail any specific imminent threat 
posed by individuals targeted. In spite of the almost universally accepted requirement 
of imminence, the broad interpretation given to this requirement by the US 
Administration, as evidenced in the leaked Department of Justice White Paper, 
effectively dispels any requirement that an individual pose an imminent threat before 
he can be the object of lethal force.
81
 This approach to the imminence requirement, 
and the perceived willingness of the United States to target individuals on the basis of 
past involvement in terrorist attacks or simply on the basis of their membership of Al-
Qaeda or associated forces, has rightly been criticised by UN Special Rapporteur 
Christof Heyns.
82
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For so long as the United States maintains its position in relation to the extraterritorial 
applicability of international human rights law, and for so long as the perception 
remains that the US targets individuals with impunity, and casts its drone programs in 
almost complete secrecy, then it should expect the shadows of suspicion to linger over 
drone strikes conducted in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, with many in 
the international community, scholars, jurists and NGOs, suspecting that such strikes 
do not fully comply with long established principles of international human rights 
law. 
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5 
 
The US Drone Program and International Humanitarian Law 
 
5.1 Background 
 
As Lubell rightly submits, international humanitarian law is that corpus of 
international law designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities during an armed 
conflict, and thus the applicability of international humanitarian law to any given 
situation of armed violence is dependent on that situation satisfying the requisite 
threshold of an armed conflict.1 
At first glance, the use of armed drones in a situation of armed conflict may not seem 
too controversial under the jus in bello, given the use of drones as a weapons delivery 
platform, there being little practical difference between the use of a conventional 
manned aircraft equipped with bombs and missiles and an unmanned drone equipped 
with such armaments.2 Indeed, in his 2010 report, UN Special Rapporteur Philip 
Alston notes that, although in most circumstances targeted killings violate the right to 
life, in the exceptional circumstance of a situation of armed conflict, where the 
international humanitarian law paradigm is applicable, targeted killings may be 
lawful.3 Putting aside the separate issues of whether or not the use of armed drones 
constitutes an act of aggression or lawful self-defence under the jus ad bellum rules, 
should the use of armed drones occur within the context of an armed conflict, the 
legality of drone strikes would appear to fall to be determined according to 
international humanitarian law. Therefore, in such instances, drone strikes can only be 
considered lawful if they comply with, at a minimum, the rules applicable to the 
conduct of hostilities relating to military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and 
precautions in attacks (the principle of humanity). 
Therefore, this chapter seeks to examine the US drone program through the prism of 
international humanitarian law. As with the other paradigms discussed previously in 
this work, there is a lack of clear consensus amongst commentators as to the legality 
of US drone strikes under international humanitarian law, particularly in relation to 
                                                 
1 See N. Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors, (OUP, 2010), at 85. 
2 See, for example, John Yoo, ‘Assassination or Targeted Killings after 9/11’, 56 New York Law 
School Law Review (2011/12), at 58. 
3 See Report of Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
presented to the UN General Assembly, dated 28th May 2010, Ref: A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, at para.10. 
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those conducted outside Afghanistan. Indeed, there are some commentators, such as 
O’Connell, who submit that the battlefield is confined, both geographically and 
temporally, to the conflict occurring between the United States, the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda within Afghanistan, and that international humanitarian law is not applicable to 
operations occurring outside this ‘hot’ battlefield. As was submitted in the previous 
chapter, for O’Connell, the legality of drone strikes conducted away from the ‘hot’ 
battlefield falls to be determined under the international human rights law/law 
enforcement paradigm, with such strikes, for the most part, operating in violation of 
human rights norms.4 As stated by Koh in his ASIL speech in March 2010, the United 
States considers itself to be in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 
associated forces.5 This chapter shall therefore examine the nature of this conflict, 
whether it is in fact an armed conflict, whether it is international or non-international 
in its scope, as well as its geographical and temporal delineations. The US has 
asserted that, on the basis of the transnational character of Al-Qaeda and its associated 
forces, it is engaged in an armed conflict of global reach with those forces, and thus 
asserts that there are no express geographical or temporal limitations to the 
battlefield.6 As shall be discussed, however, there has been much criticism that the US 
position is at odds with the very nature of the jus in bello, that it potentially creates a 
‘global battlefield’, which risks undermining the very purpose of international 
humanitarian law by facilitating targeted killings in states where no situations of 
hostilities exist. This writer accepts without reservation that international 
humanitarian law is applicable to the conduct of hostilities in Afghanistan. However, 
can the legality of drone strikes carried out by the US in those other key target states, 
such as Pakistan and Yemen, rightly fall to be determined by international 
humanitarian law? In other words, do those strikes occur within, and as part of, a 
situation(s) of armed conflict? What is the nature and scope of such a conflict(s), and 
who are the parties thereto? It shall then be considered whether US targeting practices 
in those key target states, in particular what are referred to as “signature strikes”, 
comply with the jus in bello principles of distinction and proportionality. This issue 
has divided scholarship in recent years, with sound arguments having been advanced 
                                                 
4 See Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 111th Congress 2 (2010) (written statement of 
Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell). 
5 See H. Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’, ASIL Speech, 25th March 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (accessed 6th March 2014). 
6 See Koh, ibid. 
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by both proponents and opponents of US targeting practices. It shall be evidenced that 
difficulties exist, where international humanitarian law does apply, in squaring US 
targeting practices with the rules of that paradigm, but that these difficulties are not 
insurmountable. This chapter shall conclude by considering, through the prism of the 
US drone program, the complex relationship between international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law, and the notion of the concurrent applicability of 
both paradigms in the context of an armed conflict. 
It should be stated at this point that space constraints preclude a broad assessment of 
the compliance of each and every drone strike with the principles of international 
humanitarian law. As Robert P. Barnidge Jr. rightly submits, international 
humanitarian law is extremely fact intensive, and its principles, in particular that of 
proportionality, must be assessed within the context of the particular facts and 
circumstances unique to each strike, and legal conclusions should not be drawn in 
abstracto.7 However, such an exacting and individualised assessment for, quite 
literally, hundreds of drone strikes carried out by the US in recent years is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, hence the writer’s intention to focus analysis on the compliance 
of the Signature Drone Strike Protocol (SDSP) operating in the key target states with 
the principles of distinction and proportionality. It is hoped that such an analysis will 
enable an accurate and faithful assessment of SDSP whilst avoiding abstract 
conclusions as to the legality of SDSP under international humanitarian law.  
 
5.2 The existence and nature of the current ‘conflict’ 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the entire US drone program remains classified, there 
exist sufficient on-the-ground reports, eye-witness accounts and leaked information to 
facilitate assessments of the legality of such “signature” strikes – strikes that target 
individuals solely on their observed pattern of behaviour, or “signature”. In spite of 
President Obama’s insistence that such strikes do not cause a, “huge number of 
civilian casualties”,8 there is sufficient evidence indicating that “signature” strikes do 
                                                 
7 See Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., ‘A Qualified Defence of American Drone Attacks in Northwest Pakistan 
under International Humanitarian Law’, (2012) 30 B.U. Int’l L.J. 409, at 440. 
8 See Chris Woods et al, ‘Emerging from the Shadows: US Covert Drone Strikes in 2012’, Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism, 3rd January 2013, available at 
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not adequately distinguish between civilians and combatants, resulting in 
disproportionate civilian casualties. 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, it is now a fairly well-settled point that, in a 
situation of armed conflict (whether of an international or non-international 
character), the international human rights law prohibition against arbitrary killing 
continues to apply, but that the test of whether a deprivation of life is arbitrary must 
be determined under the applicable lex specialis of international humanitarian law.9  
Therefore, in the context of US drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, it 
is first important to determine whether there exists a situation of armed conflict, to 
which international humanitarian law applies, and if so, to delineate the scope of that 
conflict. 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration originally suggested that 
the conflict with Al-Qaeda was of an international character, albeit a new kind of 
conflict that did not readily fit into any of the traditional categories of conflict 
recognised under international humanitarian law. It was, “a different kind of war”, 
with, “a different kind of battlefield, where known political boundaries, which 
previously existed in traditional wars, do not exist in the war on terrorism.”10 This 
conflict was asserted to exist alongside the further international conflict between the 
US and the Taliban regime that governed Afghanistan, although the two conflicts 
were often conflated into, “an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their 
supporters.”11 
The Obama Administration entered office in January 2009, and appeared at first to 
promptly abandon the ‘war on terror’ rhetoric of its predecessor. However, in his 
national security remarks on 21st May 2009, President Obama stated: 
 
Now let me be clear. We are indeed at war with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates.12 
                                                 
9 See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion ICJ Rep. 1996, at para.25; The Wall Advisory Opinion ICJ 
Rep. 2004, at para.106; Armed Activities ICJ Rep. 2005, at paras.216-220. 
10 See Press Gaggle by Ari Fleischer, on board Air Force One, 5th November 2002, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021105-2.html, (accessed 31st July 2015). 
11 See Submission to the UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: United States of America’, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1/Add.1, 12th February 2008, at para.12. 
12 See ‘Remarks by the President on National Security’, The White House – Office of the Press 
Secretary, 21st May 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-by-the-
president-on-national-security-5-21-09, (accessed 31st July 2015). 
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In a similar vein to its predecessor, the Obama Administration asserted that it was 
engaged in, “a novel type of armed conflict.”13 Despite rejecting over time the broad 
‘war on terror’ rhetoric and acknowledging the need to depart from a ‘perpetual war’ 
paradigm, the main contention of the Obama Administration is that it is currently 
engaged in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, in 
response to the armed attacks perpetrated on 11th September 2001, and that the laws 
of armed conflict are thus applicable.14 Koh is adamant in his argument that US 
targeted killings, whether conducted in Afghanistan or elsewhere, are occurring 
within that armed conflict, and that US targeting practices comply with international 
humanitarian law.15 As Arnold rightly submits, there is an obvious attraction for the 
US to characterise the use of lethal force by armed drone strikes as justified under 
international humanitarian law, for when that paradigm applies, its broader, more 
permissive rules on targeting supplant the more restrictive rules of international 
human rights law, as well as providing immunity to state armed forces by means of 
the combatants’ privilege.16 As well as decreasing the limitations placed by human 
rights law on states resorting to such lethal force, the operation of international 
humanitarian law renders irrelevant the issue of “jurisdiction” discussed in the 
previous chapter in relation to the extraterritorial applicability of international human 
rights law. International humanitarian law would provide the US with a broader scope 
for targeting with lethal force. As noted previously, the human rights standard 
prescribes that lethal force is only permitted to prevent an imminent threat. 
International humanitarian law, however, is more permissive, permitting the killing of 
designated “combatants” and the incurring of collateral damage to civilians and 
civilian objects, within the jus in bello framework of necessity, proportionality, 
distinction and humanity. Alston recognises the inherent risk in allowing states to: 
 
                                                 
13 See ‘Respondents’ memorandum regarding the Government’s detention authority relative to 
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay’, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH), p.1, para.2. 
14 See Koh, supra n.5. 
15 See Koh, ibid. 
16 See Graham Arnold, ‘Extra-judicial targeted killing’, (2013) Int’l Rev. L, Comp. and Tech., 27:3, 
319, at 321. 
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Unilaterally extend the law of armed conflict to situations that are essentially matters 
of law enforcement that must, under international law, be dealt with under the 
framework of human rights….17 
 
Alston’s concern, of course, was that in so doing, states: 
 
Are not only effectively declaring war against a particular group, but eviscerating key 
and necessary distinctions between international law frameworks that restrict states’ 
ability to kill arbitrarily.18 
 
Thus, Alston essentially contends that if states were allowed to abuse the distinctions 
between the paradigms of self-defence, human rights and armed conflict, this could 
have disastrous consequences on these frameworks, which operate to constrain the 
right of states to use lethal force.19 
 
As Ben Emmerson QC notes in his report of 18th September 2013, the United States 
maintains its assertion that it is currently engaged in a non-international armed 
conflict of global reach with Al-Qaeda and other forces that are transnational in 
character,20 and so the US does not recognise any territorial or temporal limitations on 
the boundaries of the battlefield and thus on the applicability of the targeting rules of 
international humanitarian law.21 The obvious flaw in the US position, it is 
respectfully submitted, is that it runs entirely contrary to the fundamental principles 
underlying the law of armed conflict that seek to delineate the scope of the conflict 
territorially and temporally, so as to mitigate the adverse effects of warfare on 
civilians. The US position, in essence, is that it is engaged in a continuing, potentially 
perpetual, global armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, 
unlimited both in terms of time and territory. Such an assertion is, as Arnold rightly 
submits, unsustainable, and has very limited support amongst commentators outside 
                                                 
17 See P. Alston, supra n.3, at para.48. 
18 See ibid. 
19 See ibid. 
20 The shift in contemplating the AUMF conflict against Al-Qaeda as being more akin to a non-
international armed conflict, albeit one with a global reach, followed the decision of the US Supreme 
Court in Hamdan -v- Rumsfeld 548 US 557 (2006). 
21 See Interim Report of Ben Emmerson QC, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, presented to the UN General 
Assembly, dated 18th September 2013, Ref: A/68/389, at para.62. 
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the US.22 There may indeed be instances of localised armed conflicts, as can be seen 
in parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, between the US and Al-Qaeda or Taliban 
fighters in particular areas at particular times. However, this does not, and should not, 
equate to the recognition of a “global battlefield”, unlimited geographically and 
temporally, where the US is free to target the enemy when and where it is found. 
International humanitarian law simply does not recognise the concept of an undefined 
armed conflict, still less the concept of a ‘perpetual’ armed conflict. Armed conflicts 
must be capable of being brought to a determinative conclusion, by means of 
negotiation, victory, or surrender, and the concept of a conflict without geographical 
or temporal delineations goes against the very raison d’être of international 
humanitarian law. 
 
The Hamdan23 case highlights extremely well the complexities of modern warfare, 
and the difficulties in the classification of the AUMF conflict within traditional legal 
frameworks. It has been submitted previously that the approach to the nature of the 
conflict with Al-Qaeda and its associated forces taken by both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations has been less than articulate. It appears, however, to have evolved 
from considering the purported conflict to be of an international character, to 
considering it to be of a non-international character, albeit one with a global reach.24 
This evolution in approach appears to reflect the decision of the US Supreme Court in 
Hamdan, where the Court held that Common Article 3 applied to detainees captured 
pursuant to the ‘war on terror’, and thus the Obama Administration appeared to rely 
on the interpretation of the Supreme Court in support of its assertion that the US was 
engaged in a non-international armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 
associated forces. The US Supreme Court, although clearly aware of the transnational 
character of the conflict in which the US was engaged, interpreted Common Article 
3’s “not of an international character” language as applicable to any armed conflict 
that takes place other than between two states.25 This, according to the Court, was the, 
“literal meaning”, of Common Article 3.26 The dissenting Justices in the case, Thomas 
                                                 
22 See G. Arnold, supra n.16, at 321. 
23 See Hamdan, supra n.20. 
24 See J. Pejic, ‘“Unlawful/Enemy Combatants”: Interpretations and Consequences’, in M. Schmitt and 
J. Pejic (eds.), International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Fault-lines, (London, 2007), at 
341.  
25 See Hamdan, supra n.20, at 628-631. 
26 See ibid, at 630. 
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and Scalia, opined that the Bush Administration’s interpretation of Common Article 3 
to the contrary was, “reasonable and should be sustained. The conflict with Al-Qaeda 
is international in character in the sense that it is occurring in various nations around 
the globe.”27 It can be difficult to find fault with either interpretation proffered, both 
are, as the dissenting Justices acknowledged, “plausible and reasonable.”28 Thus, 
according to Hamdan, any conflict that takes place other than between two states is to 
be characterised as a non-international armed conflict. 
 
It is submitted that the decision in Hamdan was clearly predicated on the absence of 
an international armed conflict between two or more states, than on a consideration of 
the principles of non-international armed conflict in the context of a state responding 
to violence perpetrated by a non-state actor.29 Its decision that Common Article 3 was 
applicable has been cited in support of the existence of a non-international armed 
conflict with Al-Qaeda, though whether the decision actually provides support for this 
view, as opposed to simply upholding the applicability of minimum protections under 
international humanitarian law, has itself proven to be a contentious point. Whilst 
some commentators read the judgment as at least assuming that there exists a global 
non-international armed conflict against Al-Qaeda, others question whether the Court 
in fact took any position on the existence or nature of the armed conflict(s) in 
Afghanistan or beyond.30 It is unfortunate that the US Supreme Court took no 
opportunity to consider the decision of the ICTY in Tadic, and in failing to do so, 
missed a valuable opportunity to interpret existing international jurisprudence in the 
context of current US counter-terrorism operations and to develop opinio juris in this 
area. In any event, the decision has been relied on by the US Administration as 
providing judicial approval or imprimatur of its position that the US is engaged in a 
                                                 
27 See ibid, at 718. 
28 See ibid, at 719. 
29 See generally International Human Rights and Conflict Centre (Stanford Law School) and Global 
Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law), ‘Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians 
from U.S. Drone Practices in Pakistan’, September 2012, available at 
http://www.livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-
Drones.pdf, (accessed 14th May 2015). 
30 See, for example, Y. Ku and J. Yoo, ‘Hamdan -v- Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign 
Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch’, Constitutional Commentary, 23 (2006), at 111: “[T]he 
Court held that Common Article 3 applied to the US conflict with Al-Qaeda…The Court concluded 
that the war with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan…qualifies as a “conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”” An opposing view was given by E. 
Shamir-Boner, in ‘Revisiting Hamdan -v- Rumsfeld’s Analysis of the Laws of Armed Conflict’, 21 
Emory Int’l Law Review 601 (2007), at 607-608, noting that the Court, “reserved its position on the 
nature and classification of the conflict.” 
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global non-international armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other armed 
groups. 
Therefore, the question of whether there exists such a situation of armed conflict(s) 
with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, depends on the satisfaction of 
criteria for determining the existence of a non-international armed conflict. Sylvain 
Vité rightly submits that, as per the decision of the ICTY in Tadic,31 the threshold for 
determining the existence of a non-international armed conflict breaks down into two 
basic elements: (1) the intensity and protraction of the armed violence, and; (2) the 
degree of organisation of the parties.32 Both elements must be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis, by reference to key indicators.33 In determining whether a non-
international armed conflict exists, the primary focus must be on the actions of the 
non-state actor, rather than the state actor.34 A non-state actor needs only a minimal 
degree of organisation, sufficient to facilitate collective armed activities against the 
state.35 The use of a state’s military against the non-state actor can, of course, be 
indicative of the sufficient organisation of that armed group. As to the requirement of 
intensity and protraction of violence, this condition is satisfied when the situation of 
armed violence rises above those, “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
nature.”36 Thus, intensity is measured by, inter alia, the seriousness of armed attacks, 
the expanse and duration of armed clashes, involvement of the UN Security Council, 
the employment of military weapons and tactics, and the number of civilians 
affected.37 Additionally, the duration of the conflict must involve, “protracted armed 
                                                 
31 See Prosecutor -v- Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ICTY, 2nd October 1995, at para.70. 
32 See S. Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and 
Actual Situations’, 91 Int’l Review of the Red Cross 69 (2009), at 72. 
33 See ibid. 
34 See Tadic, supra n.31, at paras.566-567. 
35 See Prosecutor -v- Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, ICTR, Judgment of 27th January 2000, at 
para.248: “The expression “armed conflicts” introduces a material criterion: the existence of open 
hostilities between armed forces which are organised to a greater or lesser degree. Internal disturbances 
and tensions, characterised by isolated or sporadic acts of violence, do not therefore constitute armed 
conflicts in a legal sense, even if the government is forced to resort to police forces or even armed units 
for the purpose of restoring law and order. Within these limits, non-international armed conflicts are 
situations in which hostilities break out between armed forces or organised armed groups within the 
territory of a single state.” See also P. Alston, supra n.3, at para.52. 
36 See Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (AP II), Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8th June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
37 See Prosecutor -v- Boskoski and Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ICTY, Judgment of 10th July 
2008, at paras.177, and 182-183. See also Tadic, supra n.31, at para.565. 
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violence.”38 The Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (AP II) 
affirms that isolated acts of violence do not rise to the level of an armed conflict.39 
 
Armed attacks by non-state actors, which engage the victim state’s right to self-
defence, may also rise to the level of violence required to constitute an armed conflict 
(subject to the satisfaction of the Tadic criteria of intensity and organisation). Thus, it 
is possible for a state to respond in self-defence to an armed attack, while 
simultaneously acting within the context of an armed conflict. The distinction is a 
marked one – in responding in self-defence to an armed attack, the state must ensure 
that each and every response is necessary and proportionate to the armed attack, 
whereas a state acting within the context of an armed conflict only has to ensure that 
each use of force is necessary and proportionate to the overall military objective. A 
state is therefore less confined when using force within the armed conflict paradigm. 
It is for this reason that the United States has asserted both its right of self-defence 
and the existence of an armed conflict as justifications for lethal drone strikes in the 
key target states.40 Returning to Koh’s ASIL speech in March 2010, unfortunately 
Koh makes no comment as to whether or not the US regards Al-Qaeda, the Taliban 
and associated forces to collectively constitute a single organised armed group, or as 
multiple armed groups. Further, it is unclear from Koh’s speech whether the US 
regards the violence perpetrated by these groups to meet the threshold of armed 
conflict on an individual or collective basis. 
 
O’Connell maintains that the justifications of self-defence and armed conflict 
proffered by Koh are, “mutually contradictory”, and that the US must either be acting 
in self-defence in response to an ongoing armed attack, or be engaged in violence that 
rises to the level of an armed conflict.41 This writer is unsure whether he can subscribe 
to O’Connell’s view in this respect. It is not a universally accepted view that the two 
paradigms are mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is perfectly possible for a state to be 
acting in self-defence in response to an armed attack by another state, which is 
simultaneously an armed conflict. It is also perfectly possible for a victim state to 
                                                 
38 See Tadic, ibid, at para.561. 
39 See AP II, supra n.36, at Article 1(2). See also Tadic, ibid, at para.562. 
40 See Koh, supra n.5. 
41 See O’Connell, ‘Remarks: The Resort to Drones under International Law’, 39 Denv. J. Int’l Law and 
Pol’y 585 (2011), at 592. 
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respond in self-defence to an armed attack by a non-state actor, with the level of 
violence rising to a sufficient intensity and protraction so as to evolve into an armed 
conflict. 
 
As Sassoli notes, the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
excludes: 
 
Situations of internal disturbances and tensions…and other acts of a similar 
nature….Relevant factors that contribute to an armed conflict include: intensity, 
number of active participants…duration and protracted character of the violence; 
organisation and discipline of the parties; capacity to respect international 
humanitarian law; collective, open and co-ordinated character of the hostilities; 
direct involvement of governmental armed force…and de facto authority by the non-
state actor over potential victims.42 
 
One of the most novel, and controversial, aspects of the US’s assertion that it is 
engaged in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda and other armed groups, is the assertion 
that the conflict is of global reach, unlimited territorially.43 Thus, the US appears to 
suggest that international humanitarian law can apply on a global scale to a potentially 
limitless conflict with no territorial nexus. The conflict is not limited to any specific 
territory, but ‘follows’ the members of Al-Qaeda and its associates, thus providing a 
basis for invocation of international humanitarian law rules on targeting with lethal 
force anywhere in the world.44 Lehto describes this as a, “fundamentally new aspect 
to the arguments,” concerning armed conflict with armed non-state actors.45 
It is respectfully submitted that the repeated assertions of the US Administration that 
it is engaged in a global non-international armed conflict with Al-Qaeda and its 
associated forces fail to acknowledge that the aforementioned criteria for such a 
conflict are premised upon an assumption that the conflict is geographically 
                                                 
42 See M. Sassoli, ‘Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law’, 6 HPCR 
Occasional Paper Series 1 (2006), at 6. 
43 See G. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address’, 29th January 2002. 
44 See K. Anderson, ‘Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether there Is 
a Legal Geography of War’, Hoover Institute Online Volume Essay ‘Future Challenges’, SSRN 
Working Paper Version, 26th April 2011, at pp.3-15. 
45 See M. Lehto, ‘War on Terror – Armed Conflict with Al-Qaeda?’, 78(4) Nordic Journal of 
International Law (2009), at pp.505-506. 
 114 
delineated. As Emmerson rightly notes, the intensity criterion has traditionally been 
measured by an analysis of the frequency and severity of armed attacks occurring 
within a defined area.46 Delineating the geographical boundaries of a conflict serves 
the practical purpose of determining whether the targeting rules of international 
humanitarian law are applicable to a particular operation, otherwise, as Emmerson 
states, the law would permit attacks in areas that are otherwise free of hostilities.47  
 
However, developments in practice have resulted in a flexible approach to the issue of 
the territorial scope of a non-international armed conflict, whereby it is perfectly 
acceptable, and well accepted, to make allowance for a “spill over” non-international 
armed conflict, where an armed conflict occurring within one state “spills” across the 
territorial borders of a neighbouring state.48 This is a reasonable and pragmatic 
approach, reflecting the nature of contemporary conflict and the often transnational 
nature of the non-state actor’s operations. However, it is the assertions of the US that 
the non-international armed conflict in which it is currently engaged is of global 
reach, which has drawn international criticism, being described as, “perhaps the most 
controversial aspect,” of contemporary US foreign and counter-terrorism policy.49 
Lehto, for example, states that: 
 
[A]lthough a non-international armed conflict can extend to the territory of several 
states, the geographical scope of the conflict must be defined.50 
 
The widespread criticism of the US position is almost certainly because the very 
notion of an armed conflict with no territorial limitations does not sit easily with the 
inherently limited, definable and exceptional nature of armed conflict and 
international humanitarian law. Only in exceptional circumstances will a situation of 
armed violence rise to satisfy the threshold of armed conflict and thus engage the 
application of international humanitarian law. 
 
                                                 
46 See B. Emmerson, supra n.21, at para.63. 
47 See Emmerson, ibid. 
48 See Emmerson, ibid. 
49 See M. Lehto, supra n.45, at pp.505-506. 
50 See ibid, at p.508. 
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Proponents of the US approach suggest that it is necessary to ensure that individuals 
forming part of an armed conflict, but operating outside a zone of active hostilities, 
cannot escape the consequences of international humanitarian law. Lewis, for 
example, expresses concern that individuals should not be, “immune from targeting 
based purely on geography.”51 Thus, Lewis submits, if individuals are engaged in 
hostilities from the territory of another state, the law must allow them to be targeted 
on the same basis as those participating within a zone of active hostilities.52 This is 
echoed by Schmitt, who argues that the nature and geography of conflict has changed, 
and that where a state is engaged in a non-international armed conflict with a non-
state actor operating transnationally, there is no traditional battlefield.53 Schmitt points 
to the absence of state practice and the paucity of opinio juris pointing to the 
existence of a legal rule confining a non-international armed conflict to a defined 
geographical area, arguing that the territorial approach is lex feranda rather than lex 
lata, what the law should be in future as opposed to what the law is at present.54 
 
The majority of commentators, however, take the territorial approach. While 
acknowledging that a non-international armed conflict can extend beyond the borders 
of one state, the legal definition of a non-international armed conflict still requires 
that, for international humanitarian law to be applicable in any state, the threshold of 
conflict must be met within that particular state.55 Otherwise, the standards of 
international humanitarian law may be applied in response to threats and sporadic 
armed violence, situations properly falling within the purview of the international 
human rights/law enforcement paradigm. 
It is submitted that, at a minimum, there must exist a nexus to a particular locus of an 
armed conflict where the legal criteria are met, in order for international humanitarian 
law to apply.56 If individuals are to be targeted remotely, such as by drone strikes, it 
                                                 
51 See M. Lewis, ‘The Boundaries of the Battlefield’, Opinio Juris, 15th May 2011, at para.5, available 
at http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/11/the-boundaries-of-the-battlefield, (accessed 4th August 2015). 
52 See Lewis, ibid. 
53 See M. Schmitt, ‘The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A 
Critical Analysis’, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol.1 (2010). 
54 See ibid. 
55 See N. Schrijver and L. Herik, ‘Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and 
International Law’, Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, 1st April 2010, at para.63, available 
at 
http://www.grotiuscentre.org/resources/1/Leiden%20Policy%20Recommendations%201%20April%20
2010.pdf, (accessed 5th August 2015). 
56 See ibid. 
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must be in accordance with the rules governing legitimate targeting in respect of that 
conflict. 
Even if one accepts the application of international humanitarian law in principle, the 
geographic locus far from the ‘hot’ battlefield scenario may, in certain circumstances, 
call for capture rather than kill where this is feasible.57 The applicability of 
international humanitarian law may, therefore, not have the blanket effect in all 
situations of permitting a state to engage in the use of lethal force anywhere in the 
world. 
 
The ICRC has noted the lack of consensus on this issue, taking the view that the 
existence of a non-international armed conflict can only be determined by reference to 
each situation of violence on a case-by-case basis. The ICRC maintains that 
international humanitarian law does not permit the targeting of individuals directly 
participating in hostilities who are located in non-belligerent states, and does not 
recognise the concept of a “global battlefield”.58 This territorial approach finds 
support among most international lawyers. Indeed, for the most part, the US position 
finds support only among US commentators. In this respect, Anderson, in testimony 
to the US House of Representatives, noted that the US is, “remarkably indifferent to 
the increasingly vehement and pronounced rejection,” of the view that the US can, 
“simply follow combatants anywhere and attack them.”59  
This writer would subscribe to the orthodox, territorial approach, although it is 
accepted that the debate as to the proper territorial delineations of the current non-
international armed conflict is far from settled, and the law in this area is likely to be 
debated in the coming years. 
 
                                                 
57 See N. Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, 2009, at p.7. 
58 See ICRC, ‘The Use of Armed Drones Must Comply With Laws’, 10th May 2013, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2013/05/10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm, (accessed 
7th July 2014). 
59 See K. Anderson, Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War, House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, (Congressional Research Service, Nimble Books LLC, 23rd March 2010), at p.5, 
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5.3 A Non-International Armed Conflict with Al-Qaeda and Associated Forces? 
 
It must be submitted at the outset that, as regards the existence of any situation of 
non-international armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the attacks of 11th September 2001 
would certainly have satisfied the intensity threshold,60 and at the time of the attacks, 
Al-Qaeda’s central command and organisational structures were quite rigid 
throughout the transnational network. Osama bin Laden’s leadership was 
unquestioned and the hierarchy known and established. More difficult is the issue of 
whether armed violence by Al-Qaeda and associated forces has continued to satisfy 
the intensity criterion in the years following 9/11, and in light of developments since 
then, particularly as a result of US efforts against the network. Do the frequency, scale 
and nature of Al-Qaeda attacks remain such that they can be considered sufficiently 
intense so as to amount to an armed conflict, rather than sporadic acts of lethal armed 
violence? It has been suggested that, in order to continue to satisfy the threshold, it 
would be necessary to amalgamate all major acts of violence attributed to Al-Qaeda in 
recent years, such as the Bali bombings in October 2002, the Madrid and London 
bombings of March and July 2005, and the attacks in Mumbai of July 2011.61 The 
problem with this approach, however, is that the governments of the other victim 
states, unlike that of the US, have utterly rejected the notion of those terrorist attacks 
as being acts of an armed conflict, instead viewing them as criminal acts of 
terrorism.62 Further, it can only be doubted that the various attacks emanated from the 
same source, so as to constitute violence that might satisfy the intensity threshold. 
Helen Duffy submits that, in any event, it is the ‘organisation’ prong of the Tadic 
criteria that presents the greater obstacle for those proponents of the notion of an 
                                                 
60 It is important to note that the intensity ‘indicators’ set out by the ICTY relating to the criterion of 
protracted violence refer more to the intensity than to the duration of the violence. See Prosecutor -v- 
Ramush Haradinaj, Case No. ICTY-04-84-T, Judgment, 3rd April 2008, at paras.49 and 60. 
61 See ‘Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, 27th March 2009, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-by-the-president-on-a-new-strategy-
for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/, (accessed 1st August 2015). 
62 See ‘Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: 
Assessing Damage, Urging Action’, International Commission of Jurists, 2009, retrieved from 
http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf, (accessed 2nd August 2015). 
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armed conflict with Al-Qaeda and associated forces.63 Duffy expresses doubts as to 
whether Al-Qaeda could possess the characteristics of an ‘armed group’ as understood 
by international humanitarian law, such that it could be a party to a non-international 
armed conflict, pointing to ICTY jurisprudence, which, she argues, makes it clear that 
an armed conflict can only exist with a non-state actor that has a sufficient level of 
organisation, to be assessed by reference to ‘indicative’ factors, including whether the 
group has a sufficiently identifiable scope and membership, sufficient organisation 
and structure, and is capable of abiding by international humanitarian law.64  
It is submitted that, as a result of US military and counter-terrorism operations in the 
aftermath of 9/11, the capacity and core structures of Al-Qaeda have, admittedly, been 
depleted, to the extent that it has been viewed not so much as a single organisation 
with a central command and control structure, but more as a series of loosely 
connected operational and support cells, which no longer satisfy the ‘organisation’ 
prong of Tadic. Al-Qaeda is not the same organisation today that it was prior to and in 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11.65 Indeed, as Duffy submits, it is unclear whether the 
Al-Qaeda of today can reasonably be conceived of as one organisation, or as disparate 
regional, national, local, or even individual, manifestations of the Al-Qaeda 
ideology.66 The matter is further complicated by the repeated assertions of the US that 
it is also engaged in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda’s ‘associates’ or ‘affiliates’. The 
proper functioning of international humanitarian law requires the identity of the 
parties to the armed conflict to be known, yet the US continues to shroud the identity 
of these ‘associates’ in secrecy. While it does maintain a list of disparate terrorist 
groupings, whose affiliates are classified as ‘enemy combatants’, such as al-Shabaab 
in Somalia, the potential breadth of those groups that might come under the umbrella 
of ‘associates’ raises doubts as to the precise identification of parties to any conflict.67 
While concerns have been raised about so-called ‘lone wolf’ attacks, where 
individuals perpetrate isolated, albeit deadly, terrorist acts inspired by the anti-western 
ideology of Al-Qaeda, the evidence points to a depletion in the resources available to 
Al-Qaeda and a decimation of its higher ranks as a direct consequence of US efforts 
against it, portraying an image of a network that is increasingly decentralised, reliant 
                                                 
63 See Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, Second Edition, 
(Cambridge, 2014), at 395-399. 
64 See Haradinaj, supra n.60, at para.60. See also Boskoski, supra n.37, at para.194. 
65 See Duffy, supra n.63, at 396. 
66 See ibid. 
67 See ibid, at 397. 
 119 
on individual, sporadic and largely uncoordinated attacks, and one that has been 
largely displaced as leader of the global jihad movement by the so-called Islamic 
State. Thus, the Al-Qaeda of today bears no characteristics required to constitute an 
identifiable, organised party to an armed conflict, and so the prevailing view is that 
there is no longer a situation of armed conflict subsisting between the US and Al-
Qaeda and its associates to which international humanitarian law applies. In relation 
to so-called ‘lone wolf’ attacks, individual acts of terrorism carried out on the basis of 
an Al-Qaeda ‘franchise’ model cannot be attributed to Al-Qaeda for the purposes of 
constituting a non-state party to a non-international armed conflict. It follows from 
this that the legality of US actions against Al-Qaeda and its associates falls to be 
determined by the international human rights law/law enforcement paradigm.68 
Whether particular armed groups qualify as parties to an armed conflict largely turns 
on the specific facts. While Al-Qaeda may certainly have played a role in the 
Afghanistan conflict alongside the Taliban, and may have constituted a party to the 
non-international armed conflict following the overthrow of the Taliban in March 
2002, this status would almost certainly have been lost in consequence of the 
degradation of its organisational base as a result of US military action against its 
structure, hierarchy and resources. 
Despite the rhetorical shifts, the Obama Administration consistently maintains that it 
is currently engaged in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda and associated forces, and 
maintains the right to wage war on suspected terrorists and terrorist groups. However, 
this broad approach, which treats individual terrorists and armed groups as parties to 
an armed conflict, rather than criminals to be dealt with under the international human 
rights law/law enforcement paradigm, finds little support among other states and the 
majority of commentators.69 
 
                                                 
68 See Eminent Jurists Panel Report, supra n.62, at p.54: “[t]he dominant view seems to be that Al-
Qaeda is a loosely connected network rather than a single transnational organisation. However, even if 
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69 See ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism: Questions and Answers’, 1st January 
2011, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/terrorism-faq-050504.htm, 
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5.4 Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan was the first theatre of armed conflict in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, 
and in contrast to the uncertainty discussed supra in relation to the somewhat 
ambiguous notions of the ‘war on terror’ or a ‘war against terrorists’, or even a non-
international armed conflict with global reach, it is quite clear that an international 
armed conflict arose in Afghanistan from 7th October 2001 between the United States 
and its allies on the one hand, and Afghanistan, as represented by the de facto 
government led by the Taliban, together with its supporters (including elements of Al-
Qaeda) on the other.70 It should be noted that, prior to the military action launched in 
October 2001, there was a situation of non-international armed conflict in 
Afghanistan, between the de facto government of the Taliban and the Northern 
Alliance. Thus, by the end of 2001, an international armed conflict existed alongside a 
non-international armed conflict. 
The classification of the conflict(s) becomes more complex over time, and much of 
this stems from assertions by both the Bush and Obama Administrations of a broader 
purported conflict with Al-Qaeda and associated forces, and the uncertain relationship 
of this broader conflict with those occurring in Afghanistan. It is difficult to determine 
the extent to which the conflicts occurring in Afghanistan at this time had been 
subsumed by any broader conflict against Al-Qaeda and associated forces. 
By 19th June 2002, the Taliban had been removed from power, and a government led 
by President Hamid Karzai, friendly to the US and its allies, was sworn in. This 
brought the international armed conflict to an end. From being the once de facto 
government of Afghanistan, the Taliban became a non-state armed group. There 
continued a situation of various non-international armed conflicts fought between 
armed groups, including the remnants of the Taliban and elements of Al-Qaeda 
against the state of Afghanistan and US-led coalition forces mandated under, inter 
alia, UN Security Council Resolution 1386.71 There is little support among 
                                                 
70 Questions have arisen as to the relationship between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, in 
particular whether the former fell under the overall control of the latter, or vice versa, or whether they 
are one and same party to the conflict or not. Francoise Hampson submits that for all intents and 
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p.242. 
71 See A. Cole, ‘Legal Issues in Forming the Coalition’, in M. Schmitt (ed.), The War in Afghanistan: A 
Legal Analysis, 85 (2009), US Naval War College International Law Studies, at p.146. 
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commentators for the view that the continuing involvement of the US and other states 
in Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in June 2002 meant that 
the conflict remained international in nature.72 
As to whether there remains, at the time of writing, a situation of armed conflict(s) in 
Afghanistan, it is respectfully submitted that, while the international armed conflict 
may have long since concluded, the criteria for the existence of a non-state armed 
conflict continue to be satisfied. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban may have been subdued, 
but they have not been defeated, and still pose a significant, and deadly, threat to 
security, capable of planning and executing lethal attacks.  Whether the criteria 
continue to be satisfied must be assessed on an ongoing basis, particularly in light of 
the graduated withdrawal of US and ISAF forces, which commenced in late 2014. At 
some future point, the intensity prong will no longer be satisfied, and acts of armed 
violence perpetrated by the Taliban will then fall below the threshold of armed 
conflict, within the purview of the law enforcement/international human rights law 
paradigm. However, for the moment, the aforementioned non-international armed 
conflict between the Afghan government and the Taliban (and elements of Al-Qaeda) 
continues to subsist, thereby engaging the application of international humanitarian 
law.73 
Signature drone strikes currently undertaken by the US in Afghanistan are done so 
with the consent of the civilian government in Kabul, and are, “ordered by a local 
commander, overseen by military lawyers.”74 Thus, it is submitted, the legality of 
such strikes, given that they occur with the consent of the Afghan government, within 
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a situation of non-international armed conflict, falls to be determined by the 
applicable rules of international humanitarian law. 
 
5.5 Pakistan 
 
Pakistan has been the principal focus of US drone strikes in recent years. However, it 
is important to emphasise at the outset that the United States is not, and has never 
been, in a situation of international armed conflict with the state of Pakistan. 
However, the uneasy, often strained, relationship between the US and Pakistan was 
previously discussed in Chapter 3 of this work, and although it was noted therein that 
there has been some unease at the frequency and intensity of US drone strikes in the 
tribal regions of north-west Pakistan, there have been instances where certain strikes 
have been celebrated by Pakistani authorities.75 The state of lawlessness that existed, 
and still exists, as a consequence of the inability of the Pakistani government to 
effectively control and administer the FATA region of Pakistan, enabled it to become 
a base of operations and a place of sanctuary for Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters. 
Despite arguments that the FATA region is, “ungoverned territory”, outside the 
central government’s authority and control, the Pakistani government has repeatedly 
protested that US signature strikes in the region, “compromise the sovereignty of 
Pakistan.”76 This has not prevented Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies 
assisting in the execution of these strikes.77 The intended targets of drone strikes in 
north-west Pakistan are Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters and their associates.78 
The conflict in Pakistan has been characterised as part and parcel of the non-
international armed conflict in Afghanistan, a “spill-over” of that conflict.79 Signature 
strikes make up a significant proportion of US drone strikes in Pakistan, and the 
estimates on the number of people killed in Pakistan as a result of drone strikes, 2562-
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3325 between 2004 and 2012, are staggering.80 It is worth considering, therefore, 
whether drone strikes in north-west Pakistan can legally be regarded as ‘part and 
parcel’ of the conflict in Afghanistan.81 
On 31st January 2012, President Obama stated that drone strikes in Pakistan, being 
undertaken by the CIA, were a, “targeted, focused effort at the people who are on a 
list of active terrorists,” and that the US was not just, “sending in a whole bunch of 
strikes willy-nilly,” but targeting, “Al-Qaeda suspects who are up in very rough 
terrain along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.”82 
As Lubell rightly states, there must exist a clear nexus to an armed conflict with a 
clearly defined non-state actor.83 Koh’s ASIL speech is clearly indicative of US 
efforts to establish such a nexus between the activities of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 
in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the US Administration distancing itself from 
the ill-defined ‘global war on terror’ rhetoric of the Bush Administration, instead 
speaking in terms of a war on specific terrorist groups – Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 
associated forces.84 As Melzer rightly notes: 
 
Whether or not a group is involved in hostilities does not only depend on whether it 
resorts to organised armed violence temporally and geographically coinciding with a 
situation of armed conflict, but also on whether such violence is designed to support 
one of the belligerents against another (belligerent nexus).85 
 
Eric Holder, during his tenure as US Attorney-General, addressed the issue of drone 
strikes in a speech in March 2012, stating that the US’s, “legal authority is not 
confined to the battlefields in Afghanistan,” and that there are circumstances in which 
                                                 
80 See ‘Drone Strikes Kill, Maim and Traumatise Too Many Civilians, U.S. Study Says’, CNN News, 
25th September 2012, available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/25/world/asia/pakistan-us-drone-
strikes/index.html@iref=allsearch, (accessed 9th July 2015). See also ‘Living Under Drones’, supra 
n.41. 
81 Where, in contrast, Pakistani or Afghani Taliban members are planning and executing cross-border 
operations in Afghanistan, or the US is conducting drone strikes in support of the Pakistani 
government’s non-international armed conflict with the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), these are clearly 
within the context of a specific armed conflict. 
82 See ‘Obama discusses U.S. use of drones in online Q&A – video’, The Guardian, 31st January 2012, 
available at http://www.theguardian.co.uk/world/video/2012/jan/31/obama-us-drones-video, (accessed 
10th July 2015). 
83 See N. Lubell, supra n.1, at 113-114. 
84 See Koh, supra n.5. 
85 See N. Melzer, ‘Keeping the balance between military necessity and humanity: a response to four 
critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’, New 
York Univ. J. Int’l Law and Pol, Vol.42 (2010), at p.841. 
 124 
the use of lethal force in the territory of another state against senior operational 
leaders of Al-Qaeda or its associated forces, who are actively engaged in hostilities, 
would be lawful.86 Such circumstances would, no doubt, include where it was 
believed that the individual posed an imminent threat of violent attack against the 
United States, where capture is not feasible, and where the operation would be 
conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles.87 Regrettably, 
Mr Holder’s statement does not address directly the issue of whether such strikes in 
north-west Pakistan occur within the context of an armed conflict, either as part of a 
separate non-international armed conflict or as a spill-over from the conflict in 
Afghanistan: an oral commitment to conduct operations, including drone strikes, “in a 
manner consistent with applicable law of war principles,”88 does not necessarily mean 
that there exists a situation of armed conflict engaging the application of international 
humanitarian law.   
 
To the extent that a sufficient nexus exists between the armed conflict in Afghanistan 
between the US, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda post-9/11, and the acts of a person directly 
participating in hostilities operating from north-west Pakistan, it can be said that, “the 
fight follows the fighter.”89 The effect of this “extension” of the theatre of conflict is 
that international humanitarian law applies both to the immediate area of hostilities (in 
this instance, Afghanistan), and, “further afield,” (in this instance, north-west 
Pakistan), subject to the requirement of a, “substantial relation.”90 In this sense, 
therefore, O’Connell would be incorrect in her submission that, “[a]rmed conflict has 
a territorial aspect. It has territorial limits. It exists where, but only where, fighting by 
organised armed groups is intense and lasts for a significant period.”91 Further, the 
ICTY in Kunarac stated that, “there is no necessary correlation between the area 
where the actual fighting is taking place, and the geographical reach of the laws of 
                                                 
86 See ‘Attorney-General Eric Holder defends killing of American terror suspects’, Daily Telegraph, 6th 
March 2012, available at http://www.thetelegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9125038/Attorney-
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87 See ibid. 
88 See ibid. 
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(2010), at 168. 
90 See Prosecutor -v- Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ICTY, 12th June 2002, 
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91 See Declaration of Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, Al-Aulaqi -v- Obama, 8th October 2010, at 7, 
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war.”92 Of course, this understanding must be read in conformity with the Tadic 
criteria of intensity and organisation. 
One could argue that, as an alternative to the notion of the “extension” of the 
Afghanistan conflict into north-west Pakistan, that US drone strikes in north-west 
Pakistan have “overlapped” with the separate non-international armed conflict going 
on between the Pakistani government, the Taliban (both the Afghan and the 
TTP/Pakistani Taliban) and Al-Qaeda. This “overlap” understanding of armed 
conflict was clearly recognised by the ICTY in Tadic: 
 
It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between two 
or more states. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the 
territory of a state, it may become international (or, depending upon the 
circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal armed conflict) if: 
(i) another state intervenes in that conflict through its troops; or, alternatively, if (ii) 
some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that state.93 
 
It is worth mentioning in this context that the Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Hina Rabbani Khar’s, condemnation of US drone strikes in Pakistan on 17th March 
2011 was phrased in the language of armed conflict, stating that, “[s]uch strikes 
constitute a matter of serious concern and raise issues regarding respect for human 
rights and humanitarian law. Irresponsible and unlawful conduct cannot be justified 
on any grounds.”94 While the Minister’s statement was not particularly clear in 
recognising that the US was engaged in an armed conflict with the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda in Pakistan, it certainly contributes to the case for the existence of such a 
conflict. 
 
It is therefore submitted that the level of armed violence in the tribal regions of 
Pakistan is of sufficient intensity and organisation to satisfy the Tadic criteria, thereby 
constituting a non-international armed conflict. Given that the targets of US drone 
strikes in those regions are members of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and those responsible 
                                                 
92 See Kunarac, supra n.90, at para.57. 
93 See Tadic, supra n.31, at para.84. 
94 See Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Pakistan Strongly Condemns Drone Attacks’, press 
release n.104/2011 (17th March 2011), available at 
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for perpetrating the attacks of 11th September 2001, it is further submitted that there 
exists a sufficiently clear nexus to regard the conflict in north-west Pakistan as an 
extension (spill-over) of the conflict in Afghanistan, although it should be noted that 
this is not the justification advanced by the United States in respect of drone strikes 
carried out in Pakistan, which is rather unfortunate, as there may well be a basis for 
the legitimate use of lethal force under international humanitarian law, although only 
against such individuals participating in operations against the US and its allies in 
Afghanistan.95 Thus, it is submitted, while the legality of US drone strikes in the 
FATA region falls to be determined by the international humanitarian law paradigm, 
the legality of strikes occurring beyond those regions would fall to be assessed under 
the rules of the international human rights law/law enforcement paradigm.96 
  
5.6 Yemen 
 
The US drone program presently operating in Yemen was discussed previously in 
Chapter 3. What is clear is that a different scenario arises in relation to Yemen, based 
on its own unique circumstances and on its greater relative distance from the ‘hot’ 
battlefield of Afghanistan. It was the drone strike that killed Anwar al-Aulaqi, a US 
citizen, on 30th September 2011, that brought the US drone program operating in 
Yemen to the fore, and the program has been controversial, with reports of the effects 
of numerous strikes since 2011 bringing that controversy into sharp focus.97 In 
considering whether US drone strikes in Yemen occur within a situation of armed 
conflict and thus within the purview of international humanitarian law, a key question 
of fact to be assessed on an ongoing basis is whether the intensity prong of the Tadic 
criteria are met on the basis of armed violence occurring within Yemen itself. It has 
been suggested that the level of armed violence between Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) and the Yemeni government has, since 2011 at least, reached the 
threshold of a non-international armed conflict.98 The open question that remains is 
                                                 
95 See N. Lubell, ‘Classification of Conflict’, in E. Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and the 
Classification of Conflict, supra n.70, at p.255 on the conflict in Afghanistan, “crossing borders,” and 
noting that, “if the individual or group are continuing to engage in the armed conflict from their new 
location, then operations taken against them could be considered to be part of the armed conflict. 
96 See N. Lubell, supra n.1, at 225. 
97 See Report of Human Rights Watch, “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda” – The Civilian Cost of US 
Targeted Killings in Yemen, October 2013. 
98 See ibid. 
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whether the United States has become a party to this conflict. The US, it appears, has 
not claimed that this is the case.99 While the notion of a global non-international 
armed conflict with Al-Qaeda and associated forces can, and has been, disputed by 
commentators, as discussed supra, on the facts there can be little doubt that AQAP 
meets the criteria of a party to a non-international armed conflict, given the nature and 
scale of its activities in Yemen, its level of membership and degree of organisation, 
and the resources at its disposal.100 
The Washington Post reported in early 2010 that, “U.S. military teams and 
intelligence agencies are deeply involved in secret joint operations with Yemeni 
troops who in the past six weeks have killed scores of people, among them six of 
fifteen top leaders of a regional Al-Qaeda affiliate, according to senior administration 
officials.”101 It was also reported that, “American advisers are acting as intermediaries 
between Yemeni forces and hundreds of US military and intelligence officers…the 
combined efforts have resulted in more than two dozen ground raids and air-
strikes.”102 President Obama approved the use of signature drone strikes in Yemen in 
2011, and these strikes are undertaken, with the consent of the Yemeni government, 
from the US Africa Command based in Djibouti.103  
It was discussed in Chapter 3 that, as well as being engaged in a conflict against 
AQAP, the Yemeni government is presently engaged in operations against an 
insurrection by the Houthi, a Shia militia group, potentially aided by the main 
regional Shia power, Iran, that has captured large swathes of territory. Saudi Arabia, 
the main regional Sunni power, has intervened militarily in support of the Yemeni 
government against the Houthi. AQAP has taken full advantage of the Houthi 
insurrection, most notably seizing the coastal city of Al Mukalla on 2nd April 2015. 
Despite the death of its leader, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, in a US drone strike in June 2015, 
AQAP remains of sufficient organisation and a potent threat to the Yemeni 
government, that there continues to exist a situation of non-international armed 
conflict between the two parties. It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the nature 
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of the US’s intervention in Yemen, undertaking drone strikes on behalf, and with the 
consent of, the Yemeni government, has been such that its actions have ‘overlapped’ 
with the ongoing non-international armed conflict between AQAP and the Yemeni 
government, and so on the basis of this ‘nexus’ between that non-international armed 
conflict and the US drone strikes, the legality of such strikes falls to be determined by 
international humanitarian law. 
 
5.7 The Fundamentals of International Humanitarian Law 
 
On the basis of the above analysis, it can be submitted, therefore, with a fair degree of 
certainty that, in those key target states where signature drone strikes are most 
frequent – Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, that international humanitarian law is 
applicable, with equal force, and to all parties. Thus, the legality of signature strikes in 
those states falls to be determined by the lex specialis of international humanitarian 
law, and the US is under an obligation to ensure that such strikes are carried out in a 
manner consistent with the rules of that paradigm – necessity, proportionality, 
distinction, and humanity. 
 
International humanitarian law requires that a state use military force that is necessary 
to achieve the objectives of a military operation, that causes incidental loss of life or 
civilian casualties proportionate to the military objective, and that distinguishes 
between legitimate military targets and civilians.104 These fundamental principles are 
codified within the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto, and 
also, as the ICJ noted in Nuclear Weapons, “constitute intransgressible principles of 
international customary law.”105 International humanitarian law does not require 
perfection in the execution of a military attack,106 nor does it prohibit all civilian 
casualties. However, these three interrelated and indivisible principles assessed 
collectively are intended to provide sufficient protection for civilians. 
It is, of course, very tempting to conclude that international humanitarian law, while 
applicable to the aforementioned conflicts, has become somewhat irrelevant, given 
                                                 
104 See First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12th August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), 8th June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, at Art. 
X, Art.57(1)(iii), and Art.57(1)(i). 
105 See Nuclear Weapons, supra n.9, at para.79. 
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that the main enemy is an armed non-state actor. However, such a conclusion would 
be difficult to reconcile with Common Article 3, which anticipated the existence of 
such groups, and which clearly applies to armed conflicts with such groups, 
notwithstanding that such groups are not themselves parties to relevant treaties.107 
According to the ICRC: 
 
To what extent Common Article 3 directly addresses armed non-state actors (ANSAs) 
has been debated. The article states that ‘each Party to the conflict shall be bound to 
apply, as a minimum’, its provisions. It has sometimes been claimed that the term 
‘each Party’ does not apply to ANSAs, even though they may meet the criteria for 
being a Party to the conflict, but only to government armed forces. State practice, 
international case law, and scholarship, have, however, confirmed that Common 
Article 3 applies to such ANSAs directly…Suffice to acknowledge that, although the 
legal reasoning to sustain this conclusion remains unsettled, it has now become 
uncontroversial, even ‘commonplace’, that ANSAs are bound by IHL.108 
 
Further, a resolution adopted in 1970 by the UN General Assembly speaks of 
combatants in all armed conflicts, suggesting that attacks on transnational armed 
groups are still subject to the principle of distinction.109 The language of Article 51(3) 
of the First Additional Protocol is succinct: “civilians shall enjoy the protection 
afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.”110 However, some scholars have argued that the rise of armed non-state 
actors operating transnationally has “discredited” the traditional orientation of 
international humanitarian law. Wolfrum, for example, has argued that the paradigm 
is in a period of transition, referring to a “reformulation” of concepts of self-defence 
that have impacted on the “legitimacy” of the resort to the use of force and the 
conduct of hostilities.111 However, the Charter rules were affirmed at the World 
Summit in 2005, and the justifications proffered by both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations for the US drone program have been couched in terms of the 
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traditional legal frameworks. It is, therefore, difficult to conclude that these 
frameworks have become irrelevant post-9/11. Given the numerous statements of the 
Obama Administration referring to a situation of armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban and associated forces, it is obvious that the US still regards international 
humanitarian law as a source of legitimacy for the conduct of armed hostilities. 
 
5.8 The Principle of Humanity/Precautions in Attacks 
 
This principle permeates the entire corpus of contemporary international humanitarian 
law, with the “Geneva Law” (protection of persons) at its centre, and extending to the 
“Hague Law” regulating the conduct of hostilities. The principle is grounded in 
morality, inspired by notions of mercy and compassion in warfare, and has been 
inserted into the positive law of armed conflicts by express provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions, notably Common Article 3 and Articles 12, 13 and 27 of Geneva 
Conventions I-IV. These provisions are reflective of a universal moral rule translated 
into practical law. The principle has a rich array of content, but at its centre is the 
requirement of humane treatment in warfare. There are direct links between respect 
for the principle of humanity and respect for the other customary rules applicable to 
the conduct of hostilities, notably distinction and proportionality. Most of the rules on 
this principle are contained within the First Additional Protocol (AP I),112 but it is 
generally accepted that these rules now form part of customary international law, 
binding on all states, and applicable to both international and non-international armed 
conflicts. There exists an obligation to take, “constant care”, in the conduct of military 
operations, to, “spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects.” In this 
regard, “[a]ll feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event, to 
minimise, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian 
objects.”113 
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Article 57 of the First Additional Protocol provides that those who plan or decide 
upon an attack shall, “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of attack.”114 
There are several reasons, therefore, underlying the argument that drone strikes 
comply with the principle of precautions in attacks. First, the video-feed from a drone 
can give ‘real-time’ eyes on the target so that the absence of civilians close to the 
target can be monitored until the last few seconds before any strike takes place. 
Second, various tracking mechanisms are used to locate targets, such as thermal 
imaging, GPS, even paint markers. Third, in certain cases, notably in Afghanistan, 
nearby ground forces can undertake surveillance of the target prior to a strike. Fourth, 
other than the thermobaric variant of the Hellfire missile, most weapons fired from 
armed drones have a smaller blast radius than other conventional munitions used by 
manned aircraft. While these reasons do not entirely eliminate the risk of civilian 
casualties, they certainly represent reasonable precautionary measures that can serve 
to minimise the collateral damage of a drone strike. However, one must be aware of 
the note of caution sounded by Alston in this regard: 
 
Drones’ proponents argue that since drones have greater surveillance capability and 
afford greater precision than other weapons, they can better prevent collateral 
civilian casualties and injuries. This may well be true to an extent, but it presents an 
incomplete picture. The precision, accuracy, and legality of a drone strike depend on 
the human intelligence upon which the targeting decision is based. 115 
 
Indeed, as Daniel Byman has argued: 
 
To reduce casualties, superb intelligence is necessary. Operators must know not only 
where the terrorists are, but also who is with them and who might be within the blast 
radius. This level of surveillance may often be lacking, and terrorists’ deliberate use 
of children and other civilians as shields make civilian deaths more likely.116 
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This is not to say, however, that significant failings have not occurred. One drone 
strike in Afghanistan in February 2010 killed twenty-three Afghan civilians and 
wounded twelve others.117 In May 2010, the US military released a report on the 
deaths, blaming, “inaccurate and unprofessional”, reporting by the drone operators, 
which failed to provide the ground commander with evidence that there were civilians 
in the vehicle.118 
The debate as to the quantum of civilian casualties is highly polarised. It was reported 
in the New York Times in May 2012 that the Obama Administration had embraced a 
method for counting civilian casualties that, “in effect counts all military-age males in 
strike zones as combatants…unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously 
proving them innocent.”119 Seen in light of this, therefore, the claim of John O. 
Brennan that there had not been a single collateral death resulting from a US drone 
strike in the twelve months to June 2011, is certainly extraordinary.120 
 
5.9 The Principle of Distinction 
 
The rule on distinction is, arguably, the most fundamental of all humanitarian law 
rules, operating by effectively directing the theatre of conflict towards military 
objectives and away from civilian populations and civilian objects. The purpose of 
this cardinal rule is simply to limit the scope of the conflict and the potential 
destruction in consequence thereof, by requiring the parties to the conflict to at all 
times distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives. Given the realities of the current non-international armed conflicts 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen, the applicable rule on distinction is that which 
governs the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts, which states 
that only lawful military targets, including civilians directly participating in hostilities, 
may be subject to lethal force, in accordance with Common Article 3, as 
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supplemented by customary international law, and, where applicable, Article 13(3) of 
the Second Additional Protocol.121 
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under International Humanitarian Law has proven to be highly controversial in 
several respects. Whilst, naturally, the Interpretive Guidance does not prohibit the 
targeting of a state’s armed forces in the course of a non-international armed conflict, 
controversially it asserts that members of an organised armed group that is a party to 
the conflict are likewise targetable if they fulfil a ‘continuous combat function’,122 
(subject to the principle of military necessity). 
Alston expressed concern with the ICRC’s creation of the ‘continuous combat 
function’ category of targetable individual in his 2010 report, stating that: 
 
The creation of the CCF [continuous combat function]category is, de facto, a status 
determination that is questionable given the specific treaty language that limits direct 
participation to ‘for such time’ as opposed to ‘all the time’…Creation of the CCF 
category also raises the risk of erroneous targeting of someone who, for example, 
may have disengaged from [that] function.123 
 
In relation to the identification of such individuals, for both practical and legal 
purposes, the ICRC observes that: 
 
Under international humanitarian law, the decisive criterion for individual 
membership of an organised armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous 
function for the group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities…[This 
function] distinguishes members of the organised fighting forces of a non-state party 
from civilians who directly participate in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, erratic, 
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or unorganised basis, or who assume exclusively political, administrative, or other 
non-combat functions.124 
 
Direct participation in hostilities, according to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance, 
arises when a given act fulfils the following criteria: first, the act must be likely to 
adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed 
conflict, or, alternatively, to inflict death or serious injury or destruction to persons or 
objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm); second, there must be a 
direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or 
from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part 
(direct causation); third, the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the 
required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of 
another (belligerent nexus).125 Thus, direct participation may include such acts as 
capturing, wounding or killing military personnel, or damaging military objects.126 
Alternatively, “indirect” participation would include activities that fail to meet the 
threshold of harm, but which do contribute to the efforts of the party, but which, “[do] 
not necessarily lead to a loss of protection against direct attack.”127 Such acts would 
include the provision of financial, administrative, logistical and political support.128 
 
Thus, it would appear that, whilst those with a ‘continuous combat function’ may be 
lawfully targeted at any time, those who ‘directly participate in hostilities’ on a 
merely spontaneous, erratic, or unorganised basis, may only be lawfully targeted with 
lethal force while they so participate. Those who assume exclusively political, 
administrative, or other non-combat functions, may not be lawfully targeted unless 
and until they directly participate in hostilities, and only for such time as they 
undertake such acts.129 Where doubt exists as to an individual’s status, that person 
should be presumed to be a civilian, and thus protected against direct attack, until 
evidence to the contrary can be adduced.130 
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One issue related to the principle of distinction focuses on the nature of the weapon 
utilised in an attack. Certain weapons, by their very nature, inherently violate the 
principle of distinction because of their inability to distinguish between civilians and 
combatants. In Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ acknowledged that weapons such as 
landmines, incendiaries, and biological and chemical armaments, inherently violate 
international humanitarian law, as recognised by conventional and customary 
international law, as they, by their very nature, are unable to distinguish between 
civilians and combatants.131 Based on generous estimates as to the number of civilian 
casualties resulting from US drone strikes, as compared to the number of suspected 
terrorists killed, it could be argued that drones equipped with Hellfire missiles are 
inherently indiscriminate weapons. However, most commentators agree that drones 
are precise weapons delivery platforms, with technical capabilities permitting constant 
surveillance, allowing operators to gather substantial data about a targeting area, 
including the presence of any civilians. Further, laser guidance targeting systems 
permit greater precision in attack, further minimising the risk of collateral damage.132 
The employment of Hellfire missiles in drone strikes, particularly against high-value 
targets, may not violate the principle of distinction. The missile has a precise blast 
radius of ten-fifteen feet, and can be programmed for a delayed detonation, allowing 
for minimisation of collateral damage to nearby civilians and civilian objects. It is 
submitted that, on balance, attacks executed using Hellfire missiles launched from 
armed drones do not inherently violate the principle of distinction. As Drake rightly 
recognises, the potential misuse of a weapon does not render that weapon unlawful. 
As Drake notes: 
 
Commentary on Article 36 of AP I confirms this, providing that, “[a] state is not 
required to foresee or analyse all possible misuses of a weapon, for almost any 
weapon can be misused in ways that would be prohibited.”133 
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Therefore, even if the United States was indiscriminately launching Hellfire missiles 
from drones, that failure to distinguish would not automatically render the missile or 
the drone unlawful. 
 
A further issue in relation to the principle of distinction relates to the actual execution 
of an attack. Drone strikes would fall foul of the rule if they were directed specifically 
against civilians or civilian objects, or launched indiscriminately without distinction 
between civilians and military targets.134 Further, once an attack is launched, if a 
mistake is discovered that has resulted in an error in target identification, then the 
attack must be immediately aborted.135 States must adequately and effectively employ 
mechanisms and processes to distinguish between civilians and combatants, 
particularly where an attack is launched from a considerable distance and there is no 
direct view of the target and the surrounding locus.136 
The requirements of the principle of distinction are, no doubt, the reason why the US 
has made use of informants on the ground in those key target states, to assist in the 
identification of legitimate targets prior to the launch of any strike.137 Such informants 
often successfully prevent the mistaken targeting of civilians, however, it must be 
noted that the US remunerates local informants for received intelligence, which 
perhaps inevitably, has resulted in allegations of suspect reliability. It is therefore 
critical that the US ensures that procedural safeguards are in place to ensure that the 
intelligence relied upon as the basis for a drone strike is accurate and verifiable.138 
 
Thus, in the context of drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, the use of 
lethal force to target those who are engaged in planning, directing, or carrying out an 
attack, would, a priori, be compliant with the principle of distinction. The targeting of 
others would not be so compliant, unless (and only for such time as) those individuals 
were directly participating in hostilities. The legality of a drone strike against a 
suspected terrorist, where the strike was also expected to result in collateral damage in 
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the form of death or injury to civilians, would depend on a determination according to 
the rules of proportionality. A failure to make such a distinction during a strike would 
render the attack unlawful, and may constitute evidence of a violation of international 
criminal law. In this regard, there have been disturbing claims that the CIA has 
conducted so-called “double-tap” drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, deliberately 
targeting funerals or those providing assistance to victims of initial drone strikes. 
According to a report by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism:  
 
A three-month investigation including eyewitness reports has found evidence that at 
least 50 civilians were killed in follow-up strikes when they had gone to help victims. 
More than 20 civilians have also been attacked in deliberate strikes on those 
attending funerals.139 
 
Consider, by way of example, the facts surrounding the drone strike carried out by the 
United States in Pakistan in August 2009 against Baitullah Mehsud. Mehsud was, 
undoubtedly, a high-profile target, as the primary Taliban leader operating from 
Pakistan, and so would certainly have been involved in planning and coordinating 
attacks against US forces across the border in Afghanistan. Mehsud was also 
implicated in the assassination of former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, 
in December 2007. After several failed attempts to eliminate Mehsud, the US military 
tracked him to his father-in-law’s house, where, at the time of the strike, he was on 
the roof with his wife, receiving treatment for kidney disease via an intravenous drip. 
The Predator drone involved fired two Hellfire missiles, killing Mehsud and eleven 
others, including his wife and doctor.140 It is submitted that this particular strike was 
broadly compliant with the rule on distinction. The strike was not purposefully 
launched at civilians or civilian objects without a military objective, and if one 
accepts that Mehsud had a ‘continuous combat function’ status, he would have been a 
legitimate target. It is highly probable that prior to launching the strike, the drone 
operator had conducted surveillance of Mehsud and the surrounding area, and 
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conducted a proportionality assessment as to any anticipated collateral damage, 
thereby not targeting indiscriminately. 
 
5.10 Signature Strikes and the Principle of Distinction 
 
The majority of US drone strikes are now based on Signature Drone Strike Protocol 
(SDSP). The theory behind these signature strikes is that an individual’s pattern of 
behaviour, their “signature”, serves as a proxy for determining if that individual has 
either a ‘continuous combat function’ (and is therefore a lawful target), or, 
alternatively, is a civilian ‘directly participating in hostilities’. The general rule is that 
an individual combatant may be targeted with lethal force under international 
humanitarian law. The difficulty with SDSP, however, is that it does not sit easily 
with the accepted definitions of ‘continuous combat function’ or ‘directly 
participating in hostilities’. 
Certainly, comments by US officials indicate that drone operators may be instructed 
to assume that all military-age males in a potential strike zone are combatants unless 
there is explicit evidence to the contrary.141 In the leaked DOJ White Paper, the 
Administration argued for an expanded definition of “imminent” danger,142 primarily 
based on its argument that an individual directly participates in hostilities simply by 
virtue of membership of Al-Qaeda or an associated group, and that defining the scope 
of ‘direct participation’ in this manner allows the US to, “avoid broader harm to 
civilians and civilian objects.”143 Some counter-terrorism officials have insisted that 
an individual in an area of known terrorist activity is most likely participating in such 
activities, especially if in close proximity to a senior Al-Qaeda member, and is 
therefore a legitimate target for a signature strike: “Al-Qaeda is an insular, paranoid 
organisation – innocent neighbours do not hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed 
for the border with guns and bombs.”144 
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It is respectfully submitted that targeting on the basis of such assumptions may violate 
international humanitarian law. As Melzer rightly notes, even in the context of a ‘war 
on terror’, or a war against specific terrorists, individuals do not become legitimate 
targets simply by membership of a terrorist group or by physical association with, or 
proximity to, members of such a group.145 Individuals can only become legitimate 
targets on the basis of their roles within such groups as determined by their actual 
activities.146 Thus, within the context of international humanitarian law, the term 
‘combatant’ must refer only to members participating in armed hostilities, and 
combatant status cannot be established on the basis of affiliations, family ties, or mere 
association.147 There must be an act, and that act must contribute to a continuous role 
within the armed group. Therefore, the insistence of the Obama Administration that a 
person in physical proximity to terrorists is more likely than not to be a terrorist too, is 
not necessarily compliant with the principle of distinction. 
There is, regrettably, little information in the public domain as to what types of 
behaviour are sufficiently suspicious to merit a signature drone strike. However, it can 
be inferred from the various information leaks and investigative reporting that the 
“signature” of a potential target is defined very broadly. The difficulty, however, is 
that in some communities, there may be little significant difference between the day-
to-day behaviour of a civilian and that of a terrorist, as perceived by a drone operator. 
For example, it is a well-accepted fact that in some strike zones, terrorists regularly 
intermingle with the civilian population, and do not wear uniforms or other 
distinguishing markers setting them apart from civilians.148 In consequence of this, 
drone operators have conflated otherwise normal behaviour with suspicious behaviour 
on several occasions, targeting people who were carrying weapons, or who were 
present in a location mistakenly identified as a terrorist compound, or who were 
travelling in a convoy of vehicles.149 Individuals have also been targeted for driving a 
suspicious vehicle, for spending time in and around certain facilities, and for 
operating certain types of communication equipment.150 
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The fact that Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters have adopted the tactic of mingling 
regularly with the civilian population certainly poses challenges for drone operators 
and military commanders. However, this tactic is no justification for the adoption of a 
broad ‘pattern-of-life’ analysis with a wide scope of activities listed as suspicious 
“signatures”. International humanitarian law requires that militaries engaged in armed 
conflict must always attempt to distinguish between civilians and combatants.151 The 
United States cannot simply circumvent this requirement by adopting a broadly 
defined Signature Drone Strike Protocol, in which a wide scope of activities are listed 
as suspicious “signatures”, exposing individuals to the possibility of targeting by 
lethal force. Given the broad scope of suspicious “signatures”, as well as the 
expanded concept of “imminence” favoured by the US Administration, which exposes 
individuals to lethal force on the basis of membership of Al-Qaeda or associated 
forces, SDSP stands as a poor proxy for the concepts of ‘direct participation’ and 
‘continuous combat function’. Not only does SDSP constitute a prima facie violation 
of the duty placed upon the United States by international humanitarian law to 
distinguish between civilians and combatants, but also, as shall be evidenced, the 
mandate to exercise proportionality in the execution of lethal force. 
 
5.11 The Principle of Proportionality  
 
The principal purpose of the rule on proportionality in international humanitarian law 
is to require a certain type of balancing exercise in the execution of any targeting 
operation. While in principal a military objective may always be attacked, the rule 
recognises the reality of situations where the attack on the military objective yields 
only a limited military advantage, while the expected civilian losses, or damage to 
civilian objects, appear excessive compared to that advantage. In such situations, the 
principle of proportionality operates to prohibit the attack as disproportionate. Thus, 
even if a target is a lawful military objective, the issue of proportionality arises and 
may either affect the means and methods of warfare, or even effectively prohibit the 
execution of an attack. According to the First Additional Protocol, violating the rule 
of proportionality renders the attack indiscriminate.152 This rule is not expressed in 
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either Common Article 3 or the Second Additional Protocol, but it is deemed to be a 
rule of customary international law, applicable to both international and non-
international armed conflicts. 
 
According to Rule 14 of the ICRC’s study of customary international humanitarian 
law: 
 
Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is 
prohibited.153 
 
The key issue, therefore, is in defining what exactly constitutes “excessive”. In the 
commentary to Article 51(5) of the First Additional Protocol, from where the text 
expressing the rule on proportionality originates, it is stated: 
 
Of course, the disproportion between losses and damages caused and the military 
advantages anticipated raises a delicate problem: in some situations there will be no 
room for doubt, while in other situations there may be reason for hesitation. In such 
situations the interests of the civilian population should prevail.154 
 
Thus, the principle of proportionality acts as a check on the broader principle of 
military necessity. The expected collateral damage from an attack must not be 
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.155 
The first step, then, in any assessment of proportionality is a pre-execution 
consideration of the expected collateral damage, rather than a post-execution 
evaluation of the outcomes of a military operation.156 
Civilian casualties are always regrettable, however if the expected level of casualties 
is not excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage of an attack, those 
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casualties would not be disproportionate under this analysis, and the attack would not 
be unlawful for lack of proportionality. The principle of proportionality is not a 
counsel for perfection and does not demand a nil rate of civilian casualties. The 
objective of the rule is to mitigate, rather than eliminate, the effects of warfare, as it is 
recognised that the latter would be an impossible objective during any armed conflict. 
The immunity enjoyed by civilians is not an absolute, provided of course that they are 
not targeted indiscriminately.157 
 
The second step in any proportionality assessment relates to evaluating the expected 
military advantage of an attack. While this assessment must be completed for each 
and every intended attack, debate has arisen over the scope of the anticipated 
advantage a state may use to justify an attack. Some scholars, in particular Duffy and 
Neuman, argue that the specific attack must be weighed against the specific military 
objective that an individual attack will achieve.158 An alternative analysis would be to 
assess the anticipated advantage as a whole, considering the overarching military 
objective of the entire military campaign. For example, the US could justify the 
killing of the eleven civilians surrounding Baitullah Mehsud as collateral damage 
weighed against either the specific objective of eliminating Mehsud or the 
overarching objective of defeating the Taliban. The analysis proffered by Duffy and 
Neuman places a greater restriction on the targeting state, as only the military 
advantage of a specific target can be used to justify collateral damage, while the latter 
analysis permits the targeting state greater latitude by allowing it to weigh the 
collateral damage of a specific attack to the military benefit in the context of the 
objectives of the entire campaign. 
 
The final step in any proportionality assessment is to weight the prospectively 
determined collateral damage against the military advantage, so as to ensure that the 
damage will not be excessive to the anticipated gain. The term ‘excessive’ is vague, 
and unfortunately there exists little by way of state practice or opinio juris to readily 
determine its exact meaning and scope. Proportionality is assessed on a case-by-case 
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basis, requiring that, for each intended attack, the targeting state must weigh the value 
of the target, the location of the attack, the timing of the attack, the number of 
anticipated civilian casualties, and the amount of damage anticipated to civilian 
objects.  
Returning to the drone strike that killed Baitullah Mehsud, the key issue in any 
prospective proportionality assessment would have been whether the anticipated 
collateral damage, including people in the house, other civilians nearby, and the house 
itself, was excessive relative to the value of targeting and eliminating Mehsud. 
Obviously, given Mehsud’s position as a Taliban leader, the US could have justified a 
greater number of civilian casualties resulting from the strike. 
 
5.12 Signature Drone Strikes and the Principle of Proportionality  
 
The principle of proportionality as a central component of international humanitarian 
law has been discussed, and whilst Article 51(5)(b) of the First Additional Protocol 
has no similar provision in the Second Additional Protocol in respect of non-
international armed conflicts, it is generally accepted that the principle forms part of 
customary international law, binding on all states and applicable to both international 
and non-international armed conflicts.159 
 
The fact that SDSP seems unable to take into account the cultural context in which it 
operates may have led to disproportionate attacks on civilians in violation of 
international humanitarian law. The apparent inability of drone operators to 
contextualise commonplace behaviours and social gatherings within their proper 
cultural sphere, particularly in homo-social societies like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
Yemen, has, regrettably, resulted in disproportionate civilian deaths. 
On one occasion, for example, a signature strike was executed against what was 
believed to be a heavily armed group acting in a manner consistent with Al-Qaeda 
militants and including men linked to Al-Qaeda. After executing the strike, the US 
claimed that it had killed twenty “militants”. However, community members and 
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Pakistani officials stated that the missiles had struck a “jirga”, a type of meeting held 
in tribal areas to resolve local disputes. Such meetings require the presence of senior 
members of the tribal groups, some of whom undoubtedly have connections to the 
Taliban, in order to have any legitimacy. In the end, it turned out that only four 
Taliban members were present and killed. The rest of the dead included almost forty 
civilians.160 
 
Vogel highlights the many cultural and contextual obstacles that inform SDSP 
operating in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, pointing to the practice of 
terrorists to mingle with civilian populations in order to frustrate attempts by the US 
to capture or kill them, effectively using civilians and civilian objects as shields, as 
well as targeting civilian populations themselves and carrying out operations in 
civilian settings.161 
Article 50 of the First Additional Protocol makes it expressly clear that the presence 
of combatants within a civilian area does not automatically render that area a military 
object, and civilians associating with combatants likewise do not forfeit their civilian 
status. Vogel’s argument, however, is that a civilian object, such as a house, may be 
used to shelter “belligerents”, thus transforming the nature of the object from civilian 
to military.162 Of course, international humanitarian law does not recognise the term 
“belligerents”, in much the same way that it does not recognise the term “militants”. 
Both these terms are political rather than legal constructs, with no meaning in 
international humanitarian law. Only two categories are recognised under this 
paradigm – “civilians” and “combatants”.163 Thus, if a “civilian” object is used to 
shelter “combatants”, it may lose its civilian status, given that combatants are liable to 
be targeted with lethal force at any time. The position is less clear where a civilian 
object is used to shelter “belligerents”. That object may indeed retain its civilian 
status, even if it shelters individuals who may engage in future hostilities. 
It is respectfully submitted that, even if the provisions of Article 50 of the First 
Additional Protocol are set aside, and if the arguments advanced by Vogel are 
accepted, it must be recognised that Vogel’s arguments are not presented with any 
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recognition or reference to the unique cultural context of the homo-social societies in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East. Vogel fails to consider that a gathering 
where “militants” are present among civilians can take place for non-military 
purposes. 
It can only be deeply regretted that a significant number of civilian casualties have 
resulted from signature drone strikes. Some of these casualties have resulted from 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations of behaviours, cultures and customs in the 
various key target states in which the strikes are undertaken. Such casualties could 
have been avoided, or at least reduced, had drone operators been given a measure of 
exposure to the cultural and customary norms prevailing in those homo-social 
societies. On balance, it is submitted, the apparently unpredictable character of SDSP 
and its inability at times to properly distinguish between civilians and combatants, 
may lead to disproportionate civilian casualties and thus to violations of the principle 
of proportionality, given that the general rules of international humanitarian law were 
developed to protect civilians from the harmful effects of warfare, to mitigate damage 
and destruction to civilian objects, and to provide care for the casualties of conflict.164 
 
Notwithstanding the evident difficulties in reconciling SDSP with the principles of 
distinction and proportionality, some scholars have advanced arguments in favour of 
the use of armed drones. Orr, for example, whilst acknowledging that civilian 
casualties do pose legal challenges to the framework of international humanitarian 
law, states that: 
 
Targeted killing of Al-Qaeda fighters is permissible under Common Article 3, which 
applies protections to “persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de 
combat”…The drones do not attack such persons, instead targeting Al-Qaeda 
fighters, which is permissible during an armed conflict.165 
 
Lewis makes a similar argument stating: 
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The longer loiter time of drones allows for a much higher level of confidence that the 
target has been properly identified…Even if the drone is evading fire at the time of 
weapons release, those making the final decision to carry out the attack are not 
dealing with the decision-impairing effects of mortal fear. Although the sanitary 
environment of the drone control room has been criticised for making war too much 
like a video game, it undoubtedly leads to sounder proportionality determinations.166 
 
With respect, the arguments advanced by Orr and Lewis are not entirely solid. Whilst 
the targeted killing of Al-Qaeda and Taliban members who have a ‘continuous 
combat function’ is generally permissible, it has already been discussed that such 
individuals are not the only ones targeted under current targeting practices. The Living 
Under Drones study undertaken by Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law 
concluded that the number of “high-level” targets killed relative to the number of total 
casualties was extremely low. The “militant-to-target” ratio, furthermore, is difficult 
to verify given that SDSP regards all military-age males in a strike zone to be 
“militants” liable to be targeted.167 Statements from eyewitnesses on the ground, as 
well as from drone operators themselves, all point to SDSP resulting in the 
unnecessary deaths of civilians.168 It can, therefore, be difficult to sustain an argument 
that drones, by virtue of their advanced technical capabilities, are inherently more 
likely to adhere to the rules of international humanitarian law. Further, the longer 
loiter time of drones, which, according to Lewis, “allows for a much higher level of 
confidence that the target has been properly identified”,169 takes no account of the 
actual criteria for the identification of targets. Lewis’s argument would certainly carry 
more weight if the notion of “signature” sat well with the concepts of ‘continuous 
combat function’ and ‘direct participation in hostilities’, however, as has been 
submitted, SDSP stands as a poor proxy for the requirement under international 
humanitarian law to distinguish between civilians and combatants. A Hellfire missile 
fired from a drone may be able to strike a target with greater accuracy than a missile 
fired from a conventional manned aircraft, however the target itself may not be a 
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lawful one.170 Vogel has submitted that the precision targeting capabilities of drone 
aircraft, which allows for greater accuracy in targeting, makes drones an ideal weapon 
for minimising civilian casualties, stating that: 
 
With their ability to surveil for hours or days at a time, and to perform surgical 
strikes with pinpoint accuracy, drones typically offer a cleaner alternative to other 
forms of aerial bombardment or missile strikes. P.W. Singer writes that, “[u]nmanned 
systems seem to offer several ways of reducing the mistakes and unintended costs of 
war,” including by using, “far better sensors and processing power…allow[ing] 
decisions to be made in a more deliberate manner,” and, “remov[ing] the anger and 
emotion from the humans behind them.” “Such exactness”, Singer argues, “can 
lessen the number of mistakes made, as well as the number of civilians inadvertently 
killed.” Senior US officials have consistently stated that, “procedures and practices 
for identifying lawful targets,” in the AUMF conflict, “are extremely robust, and 
advanced technologies have helped to make our targeting more precise.”171 
 
However, it is submitted that while there continues to remain a lack of transparency 
regarding the application of Signature Drone Strike Protocol, together with the 
apparent deficiencies of SDSP in respect of distinction and proportionality, as well as 
debate and disagreement as to the true extent of civilian casualties resulting from 
signature drone strikes in particular, it is difficult to reconcile Vogel’s steadfast 
arguments with respect to the advanced capabilities of drones to precisely and 
accurately identify and strike targets with the reality of SDSP. 
 
5.13 “Double Tap” Strikes 
 
So-called “double tap” drone strikes, which have become a common feature of US 
drone strikes carried out in Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan, have 
proven to be a highly controversial method of targeted killing. In this method, the 
drone operator first fires at the intended target, and again at those arriving at the scene 
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to offer aid and assistance, including rescuers and medical personnel.172 The method 
has been used with such frequency in both states that at one stage it was reported that, 
“almost every other”, strike in the tribal regions of Pakistan was a “double tap” 
strike.173 The adverse effects of such strikes on civilian populations certainly appear 
to be profound. In addition to killing civilians, such strikes have essentially 
discouraged rescuers and medical personnel from attending the scenes of drone strikes 
to offer assistance.174 
It is submitted that the practice of “double tap” strikes prima facie violates the 
specific international humanitarian law protections in place for the, “sick, 
wounded…[and] others such as medical and religious personnel, humanitarian 
workers, and civil defence staff.”175 Indeed, Christof Heyns has gone so far as to label 
the practice of “double tap” drone strikes as a, “war crime.”176 
 
5.14 Concluding Comments on Signature Drone Strikes 
 
“Signature” drone strikes against individuals not known and identified as targets 
individually, but rather on the basis of a “signature” or ‘pattern-of-life’ analysis, have 
proven to be highly controversial means of targeted killing. 
Under the armed conflict paradigm, the targeting of an individual can only be lawful 
if that individual is directly participating in hostilities. This ‘direct participation’ can 
only be ascribed on the basis of the individual’s conduct, and this in turn must be 
based on reliable and verifiable information. Of course, in a conflict where the enemy 
wears no identifiable markers and often intermingles with civilian populations, it is 
undoubtedly more challenging, but all the more important, to make accurate 
assessments of an individual’s role in hostilities, not least given the possible end result 
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of such an assessment – a potentially lethal drone strike. Whilst some commentators 
have suggested that the use of force in this context depends on an assessment of 
imminent harm, and that such assessments in a conflict involving a non-state actor 
require a higher threshold of imminent harm, this point has not been settled, but what 
clearly is required is an assessment that the particular individual is directly engaged in 
hostilities. Such individuals may only be lawfully targeted under international 
humanitarian law for so long as they are directly engaged. Therein lies the difficulty 
with the Signature Drone Strike Protocol. It has been submitted that “signatures” are 
not necessarily an accurate method of determining whether an individual has a 
‘continuous combat function’ or is ‘directly participating in hostilities’ in a manner 
consistent with the rules of distinction and proportionality. The nature of Signature 
Drone Strike Protocol may lead to disproportionate civilian casualties. One can 
certainly understand and empathise with the reported fears and anxieties of local 
civilian populations, given the unpredictability of SDSP, and SDSP certainly does 
nothing to garner local support for US operations in those key target states. 
What is clear is that, in order to ensure full compliance with international 
humanitarian law in the application of lethal force, SDSP requires some fine-tuning in 
order to ensure that civilian casualties are proportionate to legitimate military 
objectives, and that SDSP effectively and consistently distinguishes between civilians 
and combatants, particularly taking account of the unique cultural contexts of those 
key target states.  
It is respectfully submitted that there is a paucity of information in the public domain 
as to the criteria adopted by the United States for determining whether an individual is 
‘directly participating in hostilities’ or has a ‘continuous combat function’. Of course, 
the reluctance of the United States to disclose this criteria may be on legitimate 
national security grounds, but such a disclosure is key to achieving transparency as to 
the forms of conduct (“signatures”) that may expose an individual to the threat of 
lethal force, and in ultimately settling the debate as to whether SDSP is compliant 
with international law. It is not sufficient for the United States to simply state its 
objections to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance and argue that all members of armed 
groups are legitimate targets at all times, and it is neither unrealistic nor impractical to 
require the US to proffer, prior to any drone strike, credible intelligence 
demonstrating an individual’s role within an armed group. In his speech at the 
National Defence University in Washington D.C. on 23rd May 2013, President Obama 
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sought to provide reassurance that, in areas outside zones of active hostilities, no 
strike would be authorised unless there was near-certainty that no civilians would be 
killed or injured.177 However, Professor Schmitt has since emphasised that this is not 
a legal requirement, arguing that, “the degree of requisite certainty would drop in the 
case of a very high-value target because less certainty would be justified in light of 
the military advantage likely to accrue from the operation.”178 This may be so, but as 
Emmerson submits, it remains unclear as to whether such standards are being adopted 
in respect of drone strikes being carried out within and outside zones of active 
hostilities.179 This, together with the US’s categorical refusal to reveal the evidence on 
which specific signature strikes are based, render US targeting practices of dubious 
legality under international humanitarian law, given the uncertainties that remain as to 
the nature of those practices and whether they are capable of compliance with the 
principles of distinction and proportionality.180 It may be that only a radical 
reformulation of US targeting practices can ensure parity with the armed conflict 
paradigm. 
 
5.15 The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law 
 
In the previous chapter, the applicability of international human rights law to 
extraterritorial drone strikes was discussed, yet, as Lubell submits, the actual use of 
international human rights law as a regulatory framework is not yet assured, with 
much depending on whether a particular situation has been classified as part of an 
armed conflict and on the interpretation of the relationship between international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law.181 Even accepting the 
extraterritorial applicability of international human rights law, in particular Article 6 
of the ICCPR, to US drone operations carried out as part of the current AUMF 
conflict, any determination of whether US drone strikes violate human rights law 
must take account of other applicable rules, namely those of international 
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humanitarian law, that may supersede or alter the interpretation of the US’s 
obligations under international human rights law. 
In the past, there was a vibrant debate surrounding the view that international human 
rights law was essentially the law of peacetime, and international humanitarian law 
was the law of war.182 While there are still some expressions that the human rights 
paradigm is of limited use during armed conflict,183 most commentators now accept 
that international human rights law continues to apply during an armed conflict. 
Turning to the US drone programs operating in the context of what the Obama 
Administration refers to as the armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 
associated forces, actions taken in that context may or may not, as has been discussed, 
come within the purview of international humanitarian law, the existence of an armed 
conflict being dependent on the facts and the interpretation of those facts. If occurring 
outside the context of an armed conflict, then the conduct of lethal force of course 
falls to be regulated by international human rights law. However, in a situation of 
armed conflict, the armed conflict and human rights paradigms apply concurrently. 
Given the significant differences between the two paradigms, particularly in respect of 
targeting with lethal force, their concurrent application is a complicated issue. 
The previous chapter discussed the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali, 
which raises an important challenge for the regulation of the conduct of hostilities in 
an armed conflict. In a situation of armed conflict, is international human rights law 
supplanted by international humanitarian law in defining the rights and obligations of 
states and individuals during an armed conflict? 
The 1968 International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran was the first formal 
recognition of the applicability of international human rights law to situations of 
armed conflict, however the interconnections between human rights law and armed 
conflict were recognised before 1968, and certainly some human rights instruments 
concluded prior to 1968 contemplated situations of armed conflict. For example, both 
the ECHR (1950) and the ICCPR (1966) contain derogation clauses in respect of 
times of war. Likewise, certain international humanitarian law instruments recognise 
the applicability of human rights norms, the most obvious being Common Article 3, 
                                                 
182 See G.I.A.D. Draper, ‘The Relationship between the Human Rights Regime and the Law of Armed 
Conflicts’, 1 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 191 (1971). 
183 See, for example, M. Dennis, ‘ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory: Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed 
Conflict and Military Occupation’, 99 AJIL 119 (2005). 
 152 
which according to the ICRC Commentary, reflects, “the few essential rules of 
humanity which all civilised nations consider as valid everywhere and under all 
circumstances as being above and outside war itself.”184 More significantly, the 
Additional Protocols, in particular the Second Additional Protocol, indicated a shift 
towards the convergence of human rights and humanitarian law norms. 
Professor Draper was a leading critic of the attempt to fuse the two paradigms, 
describing it as: 
 
Insupportable in theory and inadequate in practice. The two regimes are not only 
distinct but are diametrically opposed….[H]uman rights instruments are neither 
intended nor adequate to govern an armed conflict….The [human rights] regime in 
no way purports to regulate the conduct of war…even assuming that both [parties to 
the armed conflict] were subject to that human rights regime. Hostilities and 
government-governed relationships are different in kind, origin, purpose, and 
consequence. Accordingly, the law that relates to them, respectively, has the like 
differences. Human rights regimes and the humanitarian law of war deal with 
different and distinct relationships.185 
 
Draper’s remarks are certainly cautious, and are reflected in the argument proffered 
by the United States that in addressing particular issues during an armed conflict, 
international humanitarian law should supplant the application of international human 
rights law. 
Returning to Nuclear Weapons,186 where the ICJ was faced with the argument that the 
ICCPR protects human rights only in peacetime, with the United States (along with 
the UK and the Netherlands) also arguing that the conduct of hostilities during an 
armed conflict is regulated by international humanitarian law, and that if deaths result 
from actions that comply with international humanitarian law, the deprivations of life 
cannot be considered arbitrary. Referring to the negotiating history of Article 6 of the 
ICCPR, it was submitted on behalf of the UK: 
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The only sensible construction which can be placed on the term “arbitrary” in this 
context is that it refers to whether or not the deliberate taking of life is unlawful under 
that part of international law which was specifically designed to regulate the conduct 
of hostilities, that is the laws of armed conflict.187 
 
The oft-quoted dicta of the ICJ, at paragraph 25 of the Advisory Opinion, need not be 
repeated again from the previous chapter, suffice to say that in that case we see a 
Court confronted with two legal paradigms, international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, both with their own rules regarding deprivation of life 
by lethal force. In order to reconcile these paradigms, the Court resorted to the 
principle of lex specialis derogat lex generali to opine that the ICCPR’s provisions on 
the right to life must be construed, within a situation of armed conflict, by making a 
renvoi to the rules of international humanitarian law.188 
Subsequently, the ICJ provided clarification in the form of the following dicta in The 
Wall: 
 
The protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed 
conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in 
Article 4 of the ICCPR. As regards the relationship between international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law, there are thus three possible 
situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; 
others may be exclusively matters of international human rights law; yet others may 
be matters of both these branches of international law.189 
 
Thus, while the ICJ confirmed the non-derogable nature of the right to life, it held in 
effect that it was appropriate, in situations of armed conflict, to refer to international 
humanitarian law as lex specialis, in order to determine what could be considered an 
arbitrary deprivation of life. Therefore, in interpreting the precise content of the right 
to life in the context of an armed conflict, the two paradigms applied concurrently, or 
within each other. However, from a different perspective, international humanitarian 
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law, with its more permissive targeting rules, simply set aside the standard of 
arbitrariness provided for under the ICCPR.  
The jurisprudence of the ICJ in the aforementioned cases draws attention to an 
important aspect of the operation of the lex specialis principle in the context of an 
armed conflict. Even as the principle operates to justify recourse to the more 
permissive rules of the armed conflict paradigm, what is being ‘set aside’ (the lex 
generalis of human rights law) does not vanish altogether. The Court was careful to 
point out that the lex generalis continues to apply during an armed conflict, and that 
the lex specialis affected only one aspect of it, albeit an important aspect of it, namely 
the assessment of arbitrariness in respect of the deprivation of life by lethal force. 
There was nothing within the lex specialis itself to suggest that the lex generalis was 
abolished in times of armed conflict, and indeed the ICJ clarified its intention in The 
Wall and Armed Activities, that the lex specialis of international humanitarian law 
should not be used in order to cast aside as a whole the lex generalis of human rights 
law, but rather that the applicable rules for each situation must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.190 
 
It is respectfully submitted that the lex specialis principle has made a significant 
contribution towards a coherent approach to the complex issue of concurrent 
applicability. However, it has been remarked that it is too vague and rather 
oversimplifies the relationship between international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law during an armed conflict. There exist varying, and 
often contradictory, interpretations as to the scope and implementation of the lex 
specialis principle. For example, Prud’homme states that: 
 
The vagueness of the lex specialis principle generates serious reservations as to its 
ability to stand as a sound theoretical model that clarifies the co-existence of the two 
disciplines.191 
 
Although the lex specialis principle states that the specific norm prevails over the 
general one, there is no indication as to how to determine which norm is specific or 
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general. Whilst in Nuclear Weapons, it was clear that in terms of the right to life 
during an armed conflict, the international humanitarian law rule was more specific, 
this will not be so in relation to other norms, such as economic, social and cultural 
rights.192 
Thus, while the approach taken in Nuclear Weapons and The Wall to the use of the 
lex specialis principle as a means of reconciling a conflict between international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law seems clear and straightforward, 
problems do arise. The ICJ’s approach in both cases fails to clarify how the lex 
specialis principle is to be applied, in particular whether it should be used to afford 
primacy to international humanitarian law over international human rights law in all 
situations during an armed conflict, or only with regard to specific norms, such as the 
right to life. The ICJ in Nuclear Weapons seemed to be applying lex specialis to the 
case before it, opining that international humanitarian law displaces international 
human rights law in the context of a violation of the right to life during an armed 
conflict. However, the Court gave no clarification as to how lex specialis would apply 
in respect of other rights. In The Wall, the ICJ appeared to deduce that, in a situation 
of armed conflict, international humanitarian law is always lex specialis, displacing 
international human rights law. The problem with the Court’s deduction therein is that 
is assumes that all rules of international humanitarian law are lex specialis to 
international human rights law as a whole. Thus, in the event of a conflict between the 
two paradigms, the effective distinguishing of the lex generalis rule of international 
human rights law might create a level of tolerance of serious violations of human 
rights. This leads on to something of a judicial retreat from the application of the lex 
specialis principle in Armed Activities, where the ICJ did not refer to the lex specialis 
principle as it applied in the previous cases, instead stating that: 
 
Both branches of international law, namely international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, would have to be taken into consideration.193 
 
There is an unresolved issue, raised by Schabas, which presents a marked difference 
between the human rights and armed conflict paradigms in respect of the nexus 
                                                 
192 See the range of diverse views expressed by commentators in Expert Meeting on the Right to Life in 
Armed Conflicts and Situations of Occupation, International Conference Centre, Geneva: The 
University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, September 2005, at 18-20. 
193 See Armed Activities, supra n.9, at para.216. 
 156 
between the aims and the means, and which is worthy of exposition.194 Schabas notes 
that, whilst international humanitarian law is indifferent to the jus ad bellum, 
international human rights law cannot be, since there is an assumption of the right to 
peace, and because under international human rights law, the legitimacy of the aims is 
part of the test for determining the legality of the means.195 Therefore, there may be 
killings that take place within the context of an armed conflict, and which are lawful 
under international humanitarian law, but the application of human rights law would 
require an examination of the circumstances surrounding the use of force and whether 
legitimate aims are being pursued, as well as jus ad bellum considerations as to the 
legality of the resort to force.196 This approach, however, carries no favour with 
Lubell, who submits that it challenges the separation between the jus ad bellum and 
the jus in bello, and could undermine adherence to international humanitarian law.197 
 
The circumstances of the US drone strike that killed al-Harithi in Yemen, discussed in 
the previous chapter, provide a useful example of a case exemplifying the need for 
further analysis of the relationship between international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, as well as the search for additional models of 
interpretation in respect of the concurrent applicability of both paradigms during an 
armed conflict. This writer has already submitted that this particular strike occurred 
outside the context of an armed conflict, thereby coming under the purview of 
international human rights law. Assuming though, for the sake of academic argument, 
that the strike occurred within the context of an armed conflict, engaging the 
application of international humanitarian law, and if it was to be concluded that those 
individuals targeted were lawful targets under international humanitarian law, then the 
legality of the deprivation of life would fall to be determined by reference to the lex 
specialis, in accordance with the aforementioned ICJ jurisprudence. Therefore, 
subject to accepting the conditions regarding the applicability of international 
humanitarian law and the status of those individuals as lawful targets, it could be 
argued that the al-Harithi drone strike, as well as similar strikes, could have a lawful 
basis under the lex specialis, although such a conclusion obviously rests uneasily with 
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those, including this writer, who are not entirely convinced of the legality of the strike 
under international human rights law. 
 
Attempts by scholars, then, to come to a consensus on the complex issue of the 
concurrent applicability of the human rights and armed conflict paradigms, have 
ultimately been unsuccessful, and there exists a diversity of views and approaches to 
the issue.198 If one adopts an approach to lethal force in any situation of armed 
conflict that assumes the complete supplanting of international human rights law in 
favour of international humanitarian law, this would create the risk of states being 
able to readily claim that individuals are not civilians and thus can be lawfully 
targeted with lethal force.199 This problem is certainly evident in the context of the 
current AUMF conflict in which the US is engaged, as well as in the wider context of 
current US counter-terrorism operations. The US asserts that its actions, included 
targeted killings using drones, occur within and as part of an armed conflict with Al-
Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, thereby permitting the invocation of the 
broader targeting rules of international humanitarian law.200 As Lubell rightly 
submits, assertions of the applicability and predominance of international 
humanitarian law carry a risk of abuse,201 and one need only refer back to the US’s 
widely-criticised loose interpretation of the targeting rules of international 
humanitarian law in the current non-international armed conflicts discussed above, in 
particular SDSP affixing a combatant signature to all military-aged males within a 
strike zone, and arguing for a broader definition of imminence to bring individuals 
within the scope of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ solely on the basis of 
membership of an armed group without reference to the actual roles played by such 
individuals within the group.202 
However, this is not to say that this particular issue can be resolved simply by 
advocating the use of a human rights approach. Whilst such an approach may be 
suited to drone strikes such as that which killed al-Harithi in Yemen, and other similar 
strikes occurring outside zones of active hostilities, reliance solely on the human 
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rights paradigm would be unrealistic, almost nonsensical, on a “hot” battlefield. Take, 
for example, a US soldier on the ground in Afghanistan. Constrained by international 
human rights law, he would only be able to open fire in immediate self-defence of 
himself or others. Such an approach, it is submitted, does not reflect the reality of 
armed conflict, and one cannot resolve the complexities of the issue of concurrent 
applicability by simply dismissing long-established rules of international 
humanitarian law for regulating the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict. 
 
As an alternative to the lex specialis principle, Kretzmer proposes a ‘Mixed Model’, 
in which the availability of alternative options must be taken into account before 
lethal force against suspected terrorists operating from and within another state can be 
considered lawful.203 In the context of targeted killings, this might include the 
imposition of a legal requirement to capture and detain where this is a feasible option 
before resorting to lethal force. 
At first sight, Kretzmer’s alternative seems reasonable enough, appearing to allow the 
retention of the central elements of human rights law in the context of an armed 
conflict. The problem, however, is the unclear status of international humanitarian law 
under Kretzmer’s approach. International humanitarian law has never operated in the 
course of an armed conflict on the basis of a presumption that non-lethal measures, 
such as capture and detention, must be considered and implemented where feasible, as 
an alternative to the use of lethal force against a lawful target. It is respectfully 
submitted that any interpretation of international humanitarian law rules that requires 
attempts to capture and detain in certain circumstances is unlikely to gain support 
amongst commentators. Kretzmer’s approach in combining the human rights and 
armed conflict paradigms does not overcome the obstacle that human rights norms 
would place restrictions on the use of direct lethal force that the rules of international 
humanitarian law do not prohibit. 
Notwithtanding the difficulties presented by Kretzmer’s ‘Mixed Model’, this writer 
would respectfully agree with Lubell that, until a legal formulation can be agreed 
upon in respect of the human rights-armed conflict conundrum, it is perfectly 
acceptance to advance the argument that, as a matter of policy and desirable practice, 
where circumstances permit, capture and detention should be attempted where 
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feasible, although this may not always be possible in the heat of battle, such are the 
realities of war.204 What is clear is that there exists scope for further development of a 
coherent approach allowing for a pragmatic and consistent concurrent application of 
both the human rights and armed conflicts paradigms in an armed conflict.205 
 
5.16 Concluding Comments 
 
Looking through the prism of the US drone programs operating in the key target 
states, extant literature reveals a complex, yet ambiguous, relationship between the 
human rights and armed conflict paradigms, in part due to a lack of clarity within the 
corpus of international humanitarian law itself. Where the rules are clearer, such as in 
relation to the classification of an object under the definition of military objective, 
there is little problem in relation to the concurrent applicability of the paradigms. 
Likewise, where there exist parallel rules in the two paradigms, such as in respect of 
the prohibition of torture, there is little problem in resorting to the more developed 
corpus of international human rights law in this field to determine if an act constitutes 
torture. When dealing with the use of lethal force by one combatant against another in 
the context of an international armed conflict, there seems little difficulty in 
interpreting the right to life through the lex specialis of international humanitarian 
law. 
The situation becomes more difficult when the international humanitarian law rules 
are unclear. Take, for example, the use of force against a civilian who is ‘directly 
participating in hostilities’. In respect of the issue of concurrent applicability, this 
example raises the question of whether the human rights paradigm imposes a 
requirement to consider capture and detention where feasible, as an alternative to 
lethal force, or whether certain individuals can lawfully be targeted. 
The question of the use of lethal force encompasses numerous areas of contention 
within international humanitarian law itself, such as whether the situation of violence 
can actually be classified as an armed conflict, the legal status of those participating in 
hostilities, and the activities (given the lack of clarity as to what behaviours and 
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activities constitute a “signature” under SDSP) and duration of time for which 
civilians lose their protected status on account of their direct participation in 
hostilities.206 
While international humanitarian law and international human rights law have very 
different origins and certain fundamental differences, they are capable of concurrent 
application in situations of armed conflict. Concurrent applicability has the potential 
to enhance the scope of protection afforded to individuals, as one paradigm can 
influence the application of the other to fill in any lacuna, demonstrated with regard to 
the right to life. The lex specialis principle, espoused by the ICJ to ensure the mutual 
application of both paradigms during an armed conflict, has its supporters and its 
detractors, and while the issues surrounding the principle are notoriously complex, it 
remains the primary method for reconciling the application of both paradigms in 
situations of armed conflict. Nevertheless, where a conflict of norms results from the 
application of rules of both paradigms, it may be that policy rather than law dictates 
what exactly fills the lacuna. Of course, the overriding objective must be to secure the 
maximum possible protection for non-combatants. 
With regard to the US drone programs currently operating, what is of concern is that 
the debates surrounding the somewhat ambiguous nature of the global conflict with 
Al-Qaeda and associated forces, discussed earlier in this chapter, and the legal status 
of members of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces (the United States 
regarding such individuals as ‘unlawful combatants’, not entitled to the protections 
afforded by international humanitarian law) have highlighted the risk of a situation 
being brought about where the US can wilfully disregard its obligations under both 
paradigms. Such a disdain for the fundamental principles of human rights and 
humanitarian law must be discouraged and condemned. Further jurisprudence from 
the ICJ clarifying the issue of concurrent applicability would be of great assistance to 
legal scholars, as indeed would judicial comment, perhaps in the form of an Advisory 
Opinion, addressing the legal issues surrounding the US drone programs, and indeed 
the use of armed drones generally, and other extraterritorial counter-terrorism 
operations, in particular the applicability of international humanitarian law to such 
operations undertaken as part of a purported armed conflict with ‘global reach’. 
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6 
 
Conclusions 
 
Developments in the technology behind Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or as 
they have come to be known in common parlance, “drones”, have been rapid in the 
past two decades. From languishing in Research and Development (R&D), to their 
initial use in surveillance and intelligence gathering, the United States has built up a 
formidable fleet of ‘Predator’ and ‘Reaper’ drone aircraft, armed with laser-guided 
bombs and missiles. These aircraft are at the cutting edge of military technology, 
capable of flight times in excess of 24 hours without refuelling, equipped with the 
most advanced surveillance and targeting systems that allow for precision targeting, at 
a fraction of the cost of a conventional manned combat aircraft. It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that, in an era of fiscal austerity, with national defence budgets under 
considerable restraint, states such as the US and the UK are investing heavily in the 
development and procurement of drone technology as a weapons delivery platform. 
Aside from the economic reasons for this investment in drone technology, the use of 
armed drones to date by the US and the UK has avoided the thorny and politically-
sensitive issue of committing traditional forces to counter the threat posed by 
transnational terrorism. Both the US and UK are ‘war-weary’ as a result of long 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks, and the sight of 
military service personnel killed in combat operations being repatriated has endured 
in the public conscience. Thus, US and UK operations against the self-styled Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria have been restricted to aerial assaults, such is the lack of public 
and political appetite for committing conventional forces to a ground war against 
Islamic State. Armed drones have therefore played a prominent role in this ‘air war’ 
against Islamic State over the skies of Iraq and Syria. 
 
It has been evidenced that the armed drone, considered as a weapons delivery vehicle, 
actually has much to commend it, from the perspective of compliance with 
international law. The tactical military advantage of the swift delivery of lethal force 
by a precision-guided missile or bomb from the moment of sighting a target, coupled 
with the ability of drones to loiter and to gather real-time intelligence on a potential 
target for a significant period of time prior to launching any strike, has the potential to 
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reduce the risk of collateral damage, both in terms of civilian casualties and damage 
to civilian objects, by allowing for significant improvement in overall situational 
awareness. This, it is submitted, is certainly a positive aspect, particularly from the 
view of ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law principles.
1
 
As the ICRC has noted: 
 
Any weapon that makes it possible to carry out more precise attacks, and helps avoid 
or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian 
objects, should be given preference over weapons that do not.
2
 
 
It has been previously discussed that there is little practical difference between an 
armament launched from a conventional manned combat aircraft and one deployed 
from an unmanned drone – the armament is the weapon, the aircraft is the delivery 
platform.  
Even if the armed drone itself, inclusive of the vehicle, could be conceived of as an 
actual weapon, this writer does not believe that it would fall foul of the requirements 
of Article 36 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. There is no 
evidence to suggest in any way that the nature, design, or technology of the drone 
results in any design-dependent effects that are of such a nature as to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, especially when compared to modern 
conventional combat aircraft. Indeed, quite the opposite may be true, as the standard 
non-thermobaric variant of the Hellfire missile, the weapon most commonly used with 
‘Predator’ and ‘Reaper’ drone aircraft, has a smaller blast radius than similar weapons 
used on conventional combat aircraft. Thus, the drone itself would not be an unlawful 
weapon, incompatible with international law as a means or method of warfare, 
assuming of course that the United States, as well as other nations that have acquired 
UAV technology, have in place effective procedures to ensure compliance with 
applicable laws, as required in order to guarantee the effective implementation of the 
prohibition of certain means and methods of warfare. The overriding objective of 
Article 36 is the prohibition of weapons that are incapable, by virtue of their inherent 
                                                 
1
 See M. Schmitt, ‘Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the 
Red Cross, Vol.87, No.859 (September 2005). 
2
 See ICRC, ‘The Use of Armed Drones Must Comply With Laws’, 10
th
 May 2013, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm, (accessed 
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nature and characteristics, of compliance with the cardinal principles of international 
humanitarian law – distinction and proportionality. The armed drone is capable of 
such compliance, and when used in strict compliance with settled legal principles, has 
the potential to mitigate the adverse effects of conflict by reducing the risk of 
disproportionate civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. 
 
The main legal controversies surrounding the US drone programs presently operating 
in the key target states – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and most recently 
against the self-styled Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, are not so much concerned with 
the inherent nature or characteristics of the armed drone itself as a weapon or weapons 
delivery platform, as they are concerned with how, when and where drone strikes are 
being used as a method of targeted killing in the context of what the United States 
asserts is a global non-international armed conflict against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 
associated forces. 
The United States has grounded its defence of lethal drone strikes in its inherent right 
to self-defence within a situation of armed conflict, and has repeatedly asserted that its 
actions comply with all applicable laws, including the law of armed conflict.
3
 
However, the legal justifications proffered by the United States have come under 
sustained scrutiny and criticism from commentators, particularly outside the US. With 
regard to the broad concept of self-defence favoured by the US, the assertion of a 
broad concept of “imminence”, which would essentially justify the resort to lethal 
force against an individual solely on the basis of membership of an armed group, 
irrespective of the degree of actual imminence of any threat of armed attack,
4
 that 
notion has found little support among commentators, with UN Special Rapporteur 
Christof Heyns challenging any notion that the jus ad bellum rules in relation to self-
defence can be read in any way that dispenses with the requirement that an individual 
must pose an imminent threat before he/she can be considered a legitimate target for 
lethal force in self-defence. Heyns states that: 
                                                 
3
 See H. Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’, ASIL Speech, 25
th
 March 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (accessed 6th March 2014). See also B. Obama 
(2013), Speech delivered at National Defense University, Washington D.C., 23
rd
 May 2013, full 
transcript. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/23/obama-drone-speech-
transcript_n_3327332.html?view=print&comm_ref=false. 
4
 See Department of Justice White Paper, ‘Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. 
Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qaeda or An Associated Force’, available at 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. 
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The view that mere past involvement in planning attacks is sufficient to render an 
individual targetable even where there is no evidence of a specific and immediate 
attack distorts the requirements established in international human rights law.
5
 
 
Thus, while the US appears to accept that the resort to lethal force in anticipatory self-
defence is subject to an imminence requirement, its broad interpretation of this 
requirement, which does not include any requirement of a specific, imminent attack, 
appears to challenge established norms, and has been criticised by the majority of 
commentators. Likewise, a note of caution must be sounded in relation to the reliance 
placed by the US on the “unable or unwilling” test, which has been used to justify the 
resort to force in self-defence against armed groups operating within several states 
where the US has asserted that the various host states are “unable or unwilling” to 
counter the threat posed by these armed groups. As has been submitted, most notably 
by Deeks, it is not yet clear whether this relatively novel principle has assumed a 
place in the lex lata as a rule of customary international law.
6
 While the status of the 
principle within the jus ad bellum remains undetermined, it seems to this writer 
unwise for the United States to place a great deal of reliance on it. Certainly, where 
any host state refuses to consent to US drone strikes on its territory against suspected 
members of an armed group operating from and within that territory, the “unable or 
unwilling” test should not be used as a means of circumventing the established 
principles of consent, sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 
In relation to that other justification proffered by the United States, that it is engaged 
in an ongoing non-international armed conflict of global reach against Al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban and associated forces, what is of concern to this writer is the continuing 
refusal of the United States to acknowledge the applicability of international human 
rights law to its targeted killing operations. The US obstinately argues that 
international human rights law does not apply in situations of armed conflict, being 
supplanted by the law of armed conflict, and that international human rights law is not 
of extraterritorial applicability and so is irrelevant to operations undertaken outside 
                                                 
5
 See Report of Christof Heyns, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, presented to the UN General Assembly, dated 13
th
 September 2013, Ref: A/68/389, at 
para.37. 
6
 See A. Deeks, ‘Unwilling or unable: toward a normative framework for extraterritorial self-defence’, 
(2012) Va J Int Law 52(3), 483-550. 
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the United States’ own territory. It has been discussed that both arguments do not 
withstand scrutiny. There is settled jurisprudence of the ICJ in Nuclear Weapons, The 
Wall, and Armed Activities, that the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of life 
contained within Article 6 of the ICCPR and forming part of customary international 
law continues to apply during a situation of armed conflict, alongside the lex specialis 
of international humanitarian law, and that the test of whether a deprivation of life is 
arbitrary must be determined by reference to the applicable rules of international 
humanitarian law.
7
 Further, it is now almost universally accepted that a state’s 
obligations under international human rights law apply extraterritorially, and thus the 
US finds scant support for its assertion to the contrary, sitting as it does at odds with 
state practice and opinio juris. Outside situations of armed conflict, the use of lethal 
force is lawful under international human rights law only in those circumstances 
where it is strictly necessary and proportionate, if it is aimed at preventing an 
immediate threat to life, and if there is no other means of preventing the threat from 
materialising. As UN Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC rightly submits, only in 
the most exceptional of circumstances would it be permissible under international 
human rights law for killing to be the sole or primary purpose of an operation.
8
 As the 
principal purpose of a drone strike is the employment of lethal force to kill a targeted 
individual(s), it follows that drone strikes will rarely comply with established 
principles of international human rights law in respect of arbitrary deprivation of life 
outside a situation of armed conflict. This is the prevailing view among 
commentators, and one shared by this writer. It is lamentable that the US seemingly 
continues to disregard the applicability of international human rights law to its 
targeted killing programs. For so long as this remains the case, many commentators 
and human rights organisations will continue to view drone strikes as being of 
dubious legality and as a sophisticated means of extra-judicial execution. 
 
The repeated assertion of the United States that it is engaged in a non-international 
armed conflict of global reach with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, has 
been a cause of concern for commentators outside the US, and this writer has been 
                                                 
7
 See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion ICJ Rep. 1996, at para.25; The Wall Advisory Opinion ICJ 
Rep. 2004, at para.106; Armed Activities ICJ Rep. 2005, at paras.216-220. 
8
 See Interim Report of Ben Emmerson QC, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, presented to the UN General 
Assembly, dated 18
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struck by the contrasting ‘American’ and ‘European’ approaches in relation to the 
applicability of human rights law and the nature of the purported armed conflict. The 
US has advanced the argument that it is engaged in an armed conflict with the 
aforementioned armed groups, that this conflict is directed against those armed groups 
that perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, that it is a ‘novel’ form of conflict, and that it is of 
such a nature, given the transnational nature of the operations of those armed groups, 
that the ‘battlefield’ has no geographical or temporal delineations. Essentially, the 
United States argues that no member of these armed groups is beyond the reach of the 
targeting rules of the law of armed conflict – that ‘the fight follows the fighter’. These 
arguments, which bring into the realm of possibility the notion of a ‘perpetual war’ in 
which the entire globe is a potential ‘battlefield’, have been seized upon and roundly 
criticised by the majority of legal opinion, especially that outside the US. The 
criticisms of the US position are sound, based as they are upon traditional 
interpretations of international humanitarian law. The US position is clearly at odds 
with the cardinal principles of international humanitarian law, where this applies, that 
seek to mitigate the adverse effects of armed conflict, especially on civilians. 
Although it is accepted that any conflict with the aforementioned groups is better 
categorised as a non-international armed conflict, international humanitarian law does 
not recognise the notions of the ‘perpetual war’ or the ‘global battlefield’. Armed 
conflict must exist within geographical and temporal delineations, and must be 
capable of being brought to a determinative conclusion. 
While situations of non-international armed conflict have been shown to exist at 
particular times and in particular localities in those key target states where US drone 
programs presently operate, this does not equate to a situation of global non-
international armed conflict. Whether or not a situation of armed conflict exists at a 
particular time and within a defined geography, can only be determined on the facts 
known at the time. Although allowance is made for a situation where a non-
international armed conflict “spills” across the border of a neighbouring state, the 
threshold rules for engaging international humanitarian law remain primarily 
territorial.
9
 
Likewise, given the scale of US operations against the Al-Qaeda network in the years 
following the 9/11 attacks, and the notable successes of these operations, culminating 
                                                 
9
 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Combatants and the Combat Zone’, University of Richmond Law 
Review, Vol.43, No.3 (March 2009). 
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of course in what has been considered the most successful US counter-terrorism 
operation, that which located and killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011, it must now 
be doubted whether the United States can legitimately consider itself to be, at present, 
in a state of armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, within the purview of international 
humanitarian law. While the requisite elements of an armed conflict, as per the Tadic 
criteria, were clearly present at the time of, and in the immediate years after, the 9/11 
attacks, as a result of US operations against it, the network has become so irreversibly 
degraded, in terms of its membership, hierarchy, command and control structure, and 
resources at its disposal, that it must now be open to question whether Al-Qaeda 
continues to subsist as a single transnational network, or as a loose collection of 
individual, local, regional or national cells, inspired by the ideology of Al-Qaeda but 
operating independently of one another. While the danger of so-called ‘lone wolf’ 
attacks has been much discussed in the media, the reality is that Al-Qaeda no longer 
exists in the some form as it once did, and so it must be doubted that it continues to 
satisfy the ‘organisation’ prong of the Tadic criteria, with the consequence being that 
there is no longer a situation of armed conflict with Al-Qaeda to which international 
humanitarian law applies. Despite US assertions to the contrary, operations against 
Al-Qaeda, including armed drone strikes, no longer fall within the purview of 
international humanitarian law, and the legality of such operations properly falls to be 
determined by the more restrictive rules of the lex generalis of international human 
rights law and the law enforcement paradigm. Of course, the principal difficulty, aside 
from the obstinate refusal by the United States to acknowledge the extraterritorial 
applicability of human rights law to its targeted killing programs, remains in squaring 
US targeting practices with the essence of the right to life, particularly as expressed in 
Article 6 of the ICCPR.  
Where it is accepted that an armed conflict does exist to which international 
humanitarian law applies, there remain concerns that US drone targeting practices fall 
foul of the requirements of the fundamental principles of distinction and 
proportionality. The US has expressed its chagrin at what it considers to be the unduly 
restrictive notions of ‘continuous combat function’ and ‘direct participation in 
hostilities’, expressed in the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance,
10
 as a means of 
designating combatant status. However, it has been shown that the US’s Signature 
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 See ICRC (2009), ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, Geneva. 
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Drone Strike Protocol (SDSP) stands as a poor proxy for these notions, and that there 
are significant difficulties in reconciling US targeting practices, including SDSP, with 
the principles of distinction and proportionality. The problems with SDSP, as 
discussed previously, are several, and give rise to strong concerns that drone strikes 
carried out pursuant to that Protocol violate international humanitarian law. The 
United States has not disclosed those actions or behaviours that constitute 
“signatures”, though it is believed that the range of actions and behaviours which may 
lead to a targeted “signature” strike is quite broad, fuelling concerns that common 
behaviours in homo-social societies, such as Pakistan and Yemen, are being wrongly 
ascribed “signature” status, perhaps in part due to the lack of cultural awareness on 
the part of drone operators and military commanders. The legitimate concern, 
therefore, is that SDSP is too permissive in its scope, inadequately distinguishing 
between civilians and actual combatants, and resulting in disproportionate civilian 
casualties relative to any military advantage. In such respects, therefore, SDSP is 
widely regarded as violating international humanitarian law. 
There has long been concern expressed as to the reported large numbers of civilian 
casualties resulting from US drone strikes,
11
 with reliable reports as to the levels of 
such casualties casting doubt on the various denials of the US Administration, 
including John O. Brennan’s now infamous remark in 2011 that there had not been a 
single collateral casualty in the year to June 2011.
12
 The seemingly incontrovertible 
evidence of mounting civilian casualties has only served to add to the debate as to 
whether drones can, and in practice do, comply with the rules on distinction and 
proportionality. Considerations of the strengths and limitations of armed drones are 
likely to continue, contributing to an ongoing debate as to the proper role of UAVs 
generally and within a situation of armed conflict. What is certain is that, in respect of 
US drone strikes, it is incumbent on the US to demonstrate that it has placed reliance 
on credible intelligence and that it abides by its obligations under international law, 
particularly those relating to distinction and proportionality. Rather than publicly 
demonstrating this, the US continues to hold a veil of secrecy over the entire drone 
program, in particular official casualty rates, and the secrecy that has surrounded the 
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deaths of civilians has led to growing international criticism among commentators and 
human rights NGOs.
13
 Whilst this writer does appreciate that there must be a degree 
of secrecy surrounding military operations, particularly in situations of armed conflict, 
on grounds of national security, the sheer lack of transparency and accountability that 
has surrounded the US drone program, particularly where it has been alleged that 
drone strikes have resulted in civilian deaths, is unacceptable and has been sharply 
criticised in various Reports of UN Special Rapporteurs, in particular Alston, Heyns 
and Emmerson.
14
 Each Rapporteur has expressed concern that the US places reliance 
on inaccurate information from paid informants, that positive identification 
procedures are weak and ineffective, and that there remains a lack of independent 
post-strike reviews.
15
 
 
Although the US Administration’s pledge to remove the CIA from its role in the US 
drone program, and to transfer operations to the Department of Defence, must be 
welcomed, given the doubts as to the legality of a civilian intelligence agency that has 
no military command and control framework undertaking lethal drone strikes, it 
remains to be seen whether this will ultimately translate into improved oversight and 
accountability mechanisms. In the absence of clarification by the US Administration 
of its position on the relevant legal issues, and its continued refusal to declassify to the 
maximum extent possible all relevant information relating to extraterritorial targeted 
killing operations, including its own civilian casualty figures as well as information 
on the methodology used to ascribe combatant status in targeting operations, the 
transfer of drone operations from the CIA to the military will do little to alleviate 
concerns as to the legality of US drone strikes. To date, requests and legal actions in 
pursuit of a degree of declassification of information for those affected by current US 
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targeting practices, and ultimately the opportunity to challenge those practices, have 
been summarily dismissed.
16
 
In short, the US drone program remains largely beyond the reach of any effective 
legal or judicial oversight. One suggestion to remedy this is the establishment of a 
Congressional Committee to conduct post-strike reviews, although this writer is of the 
opinion that such reviews could better be undertaken, and the appearance of political 
impartiality preserved, by an independent tribunal(s) comprised of senior members of 
the judiciary, assisted by independent counsel and advised by international lawyers 
and various relevant NGOs. As to the possibility of US targeting practices being the 
subject of contentious inter-state litigation before the ICJ, this writer does not hold 
this to be a realistic prospect. Substantive issues aside, the pertinent consideration is 
that of jurisdiction, and it must be borne in mind that the jurisdiction of the ICJ is 
fundamentally based on state consent.
17
 It is therefore doubtful that the US would 
consent to being the respondent state in such litigation,
18
 and it is highly doubtful that 
the US would make any declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ to determine 
the legality of US drone strikes in any such inter-state litigation.
19
 In addition, such 
litigation would have to be commenced by one or a combination of the key target 
states, and it is highly unlikely that any of these states would be minded to initiate 
proceedings against the US, given the evident degree of cooperation between the US 
and these states in the execution of drone strikes in their territories. It seems more 
probable, at least to this writer, that any recourse to the ICJ will be at the behest of 
one of the UN organs, such as the General Assembly, requesting an Advisory Opinion 
on the legality of US drone strikes. It is unlikely that such a request will emanate from 
the Security Council, on account of the US’s power of veto. Such a request is more 
likely to come from the General Assembly, on the basis of a simple majority vote and 
where the US has no power of veto to block such a request. Although such an opinion 
from the ICJ would certainly lend clarity to the complex legal issues surrounding the 
US drone programs, the non-binding nature of the opinion may be of limited value in 
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 See Al-Aulaqi -v- Obama, 727 F.Supp. 2d 1 (DDC.2010) (No.10 Civ. 1469), where Al-Aulaqi’s 
family sought information regarding the grounds for putting Al-Aulaqi on a “kill-list”, and the legal 
basis for the asserted authority to use lethal force. The case was summarily dismissed on national 
security grounds. 
17
 See Article 36(1), Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
18
 Indeed, the United States withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in 1986, following its 
decision in Nicaragua (1986) ICJ Rep. 14. 
19
 See Article 36(2), Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
 171 
practice, both in terms of achieving justice on behalf of civilian casualties and their 
families, and in effecting change to US targeting practices using armed drones. Of 
course, affected parties with sufficient locus standi may commence legal proceedings 
against the United States in US federal courts, with a view to challenging alleged 
violations of international law, but any such litigation will be problematic owing to 
sensitive considerations of national security and will stand little prospect of success, 
as shown in the Al-Aulaqi litigation.
20
 
 
Although the newly-effected presidential policy guidance referred to by President 
Obama in his May 2013 speech seemed to adopt a more stringent standard for lethal 
counter-terrorism operations outside zones of active hostilities, indicating that, 
“before any strike is taken, there must be near certainty that no civilians will be killed 
or injured,”
21
 it is regrettable that this guidance has only been released in outline, and 
of course does not equate to the imposition of a legal obligation on the part of drone 
operators to hold fire unless there is an expectation of zero civilian casualties, or that 
any individual or location should be presumed to be civilian in nature unless there is 
credible evidence to the contrary. 
 
What was quite surprising to this writer in the course of this project was the length of 
time taken for the international community, and international lawyers, to react to the 
initial resort to armed drone strikes post-9/11 and to their rapid rate of increase in the 
following years. It seems that the concerns of the media, NGOs and commentators 
were mainly concentrated on Guantanamo Bay, the reported abuses of prisoners 
carried out by military personnel in Iraq, and on the highly controversial US policy of 
extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects. Concerns, of course, shifted over time, as 
drone strikes took on an ever more prominent role in the so-called  ‘war on terror’. 
In the absence of any clear transparency on the part of the Obama Administration in 
relation to the US drone program, the responses of international organisations become 
ever more important in reporting when US targeting practices fall foul of international 
law standards. As Christof Heyns has rightly stated, there is a need for a, 
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“comprehensive overview by the international community,” of the means and 
methods of targeted killings.
22
 
There is a legitimate concern that, in the words of Alston: 
 
The United States’ assertion of ill-defined license to commit targeted killings against 
individuals around the globe, without accountability, does grave damage to the 
international legal frameworks designed to protect the right to life.
23
 
 
The problems of terrorism and assymetrical warfare are very real, but they are neither 
new nor unique to the US. However, as Heyns rightly makes clear, part of the concern 
about, “a state killing its opponents in other countries around the world, far from any 
armed conflict, is the precedent it sets for all states to act in this way.”
24
 
Given that over fifty states have acquired, or are in the process of acquiring, drone 
technology, as well as the risk of this technology falling into the hands of armed non-
state actors, it is ever more important that there is transparency and accountability in 
the use of armed drones, so that outstanding legal issues can be definitively settled 
and that strict adherence to the applicable legal paradigms can be monitored and 
assured. This would go some way to facilitating consensus among relevant 
intergovernmental organisations and states, in particular those states using drone 
technology and those states in whose territory they are used to lethal effect. From 
such a consensus will come mechanisms for determining the proper application and 
interpretation of settled legal principles for the use of armed drones, which will be 
equally applicable to all states. To quote Philip Alston, which in the view of this 
writer sums up the worst-case scenario in the absence of such adherence to 
international law in the use of armed drones: 
 
If other states were to claim the broad-based authority that the United States does, to 
kill people anywhere, at any time, the result would be chaos.
25
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